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John A. Beckstead(0263)
Tyler L. Murray (10308)
Emily V. Smith (10212)
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800

IIV CLE P.*

Attorneys for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., successor to Bank One, N.A.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, MOTION OF JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
a Utah corporation,
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
FRAUD CLAIM
Plaintiff,
Case No. 030917018
VS.

Honorable John Paul Kennedy

MARK H. ROBBINS; BANK ONE,
UTAH, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a
national banking association, and DOES 1
through 50,

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A., successor by merger to Bank One, Utah, National Association ("Bank
One") moves for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's
fraud claim.
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5M\D

The fraud claims of Bodell Construction Company (''Bodell") are based upon
Bodell's alleged reliance on a letter dated August 22, 2000 purportedly sent by Ben
Lightner of Bank One. There are genuine issues whether the letter is authentic and was
signed by Mr. Lightner. However, even if the letter is authentic and was signed by Mr.
Lightner, Bodell cannot recover on its fraud claim because the undisputed evidence
establishes that Bank One did not know, and had no reason to expect, that statements
allegedly attributable to Banlc One would reach Bodell and influence its conduct. Bodell
cannot establish the intent-to-induce-reliance element of its fraud claim.
In support of this Motion, Bank One submits the accompanying Memorandum of
Points and Authorities, which is filed and served herewith.
DATED this ffi*day of November, 2006.

lyuA^x^

JohnA. Becksteaa
Tyler L. Murray
Emily V. Smith
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.
Attorneys for Defendant JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A successor to Bank
One, Utah, National
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION
OF JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON FRAUD CLAIM, postage prepaid, this ffi ""day of November, 2006 to the
following:
Robert Shelby
Burbidge & Mitchell
Parkside Tower
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

David W. Tufts
Durham Jones & Pinegar
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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1 John A. Beckstead (0263)
Tyler L. Murray (10308)
Emily V.Smith (10212)
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., successor to Bank One, N.A.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
OF JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON FRAUD
CLAIM

vs.

Case No. 030917018

MARK H. ROBBINS; BANK ONE,
UTAH, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a
national banking association, and DOES 1
through 50,

Honorable John Paul Kennedy
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Defendants.

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), Defendant Bank One, Utah National
Association ("Bank One") respectfully submits this Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs fraud claim.
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 18, 2006, hearing was held on the Motion to Amend filed by Bodell
Construction Company ("Bodell"). The Motion sought leave to add a claim for fraud against
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., successor by merger to Bank One, Utah, National Association
("Bank One"). Bank One opposed the Motion to Amend on the ground that the proposed claim
failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted and therefore the amendment would be
futile. The Motion to Amend was granted but the Court also ordered that any motions for
summary judgment on the newly added fraud claim be filed by November 30, 2006. This
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is filed in response to that order.
SUMMARY
Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company claims that it was fraudulently induced to loan $4
million to Marc Jenson based on statements contained in a letter dated August 22, 2000 that was
purportedly written by Bank One. Ben Lightner, the purported author of the August 22, 2000
letter, testified in his deposition that he questions the authenticity of his signature and of the
letter. There are genuine issues of fact as to whether the letter is authentic and signed by Mr.
Lightner. However, even if it is determined that the August 22, 2000 letter is authentic and was
signed by Mr. Lightner, Bodell cannot recover on a fraud claim against Bank One as a matter of
law.
The only evidence concerning the intended recipients of the alleged August 22, 2000
letter is the testimony of Mark Robbins. This undisputed evidence establishes that, if the August
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22, 2000 letter is authentic, it was intended solely for Lincoln Partners in connection with a
transaction in which a company owned by Mark Robbins, called MadTrax Group LLC
("MadTrax"), was attempting to purchase the Mongoose Bicycle Division from Brunswick
Corporation.
Bodell's theory is that Bank One is liable to Bodell (and to anyone who might have seen
this letter) regardless of whether Bank One knew about Bodell or the Bodell loan. The law,
however, does not extend liability for fraud this far. Instead, to hold Bank One liable for fraud,
Bodell must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Bank One intended the letter to reach
Bodell, or that Bank One had reason to expect that the letter would reach Bodell and influence
his conduct.
The undisputed evidence in this case proves that Bank One had no such intent or
expectation. Bank One did not know, and had no reason to expect, that this letter would find its
way from Mark Robbins, to Marc Jenson, and finally to Bodell, who would purportedly use it as
the basis for lending money to Jenson. In fact, Bank One had no knowledge that Bodell even
existed or that there was to be a loan by Bodell. As a result, Bank One is entitled to summary
judgment on Bodell's fraud claim.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
A.

Mark Robbins and His Bicycle Businesses
1.

In the late 1990's, defendant Mark Robbins became involved in the bicycle

business. In 1998, Mark Robbins and others formed Wasatch Cycle, Inc. (uWasatch Cycle"),
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which designed, sold and distributed bicycles to LDS missionaries. Deposition of Mark Robbins
("Robbins Dep.") 40-45, 49. (Annexed as Exhibit 1 ).
2.

Around 2000, Mr. Robbins started a company known as Vtrax Sports LLC

("Vtrax Sports"). Vtrax's plan was to sell and distribute bicycles through various distribution
channels. It obtained a license agreement from Icon to put names like ProForm, NordicTrack,
and HealthRider on bicycles and attempted to distribute the bicycles through large massmerchandisers like Sears and Wal-Mart. Robbins Dep. 59-60; 67-70.
3.

Also in 2000, Mr. Robbins founded a company called Madwagon LLC, which

attempted to sell bicycles on college campuses and via the Internet. Robbins Dep. 76.
B.

The Potential Mongoose Acquisition and the August 22, 2000 Letter
4.

In the summer of 2000, Mark Robbins also began pursuing an opportunity to buy

the Mongoose Bicycle Division from Brunswick Corporation. Mr. Robbins formed a company
called MadTrax Group LLC ("MadTrax") to pursue this acquisition. He sent letters on behalf of
MadTrax confirming its interest in the acquisition. Robbins Dep. 81; 194-95; July 11, 2000
Letter from MadTrax to Brunswick (annexed as Exhibit 2); July 13, 2000 Letter from MadTrax
to Brunswick (annexed as Exhibit 3).
5.

In response, Brunswick required MadTrax to agree to maintain the confidentiality

of the materials Brunswick provided to enable MadTrax to evaluate the Mongoose Bicycle
Division. July 13, 2000 Confidentiality Letter Agreement (annexed as Exhibit 4).
6.

In addition, on August 9, 2000, Lincoln Partners, the investment banking firm

representing Brunswick in the sale of the Mongoose Division, sent a letter to Trevor Larson,
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MadTrax CFO, asking for, among other things, "a description of your sources and level of
financing for the proposed transaction." August 9, 2000 Letter from Lincoln Partners to Trevor
Larson (annexed as Exhibit 5 ).
7.

Mr. Robbins was a client of Bank One's private banking services. Bank One

employee Ben Lightner was Mr. Robbins' private banker. Mark Robbins testified that in August
2000, he had conversations with Mr. Lightner about the fact that "Lincoln Partners and all of the
investment bankers were, you know, looking for verification of funding and stuff like that."
Robbins testified that he asked Mr. Lightner to draft a letter for Lincoln Partners regarding
potential funding sources for MadTrax. Robbins Dep. Robbins Dep. 308-310; 316-17; 324-25.
8.

One of Robbins' potential funding sources for the Mongoose acquisition was a

loan from Arimex Investments, Ltd. (''Arimex"), and Robbins had discussions with Arimex
about a potential loan.1 Robbins Dep. 255-267.
9.

Robbins claims that Lightner produced the August 22, 2000 letter in response to

this request. The letter reads:
To:

Whom it May Concern

Re:

Mad Trax Group, LLC

MadTrax Gtoup, LLC (the "Company") and its individual
members Mark Robbins and Marc Jenson (the "Members") will be
depositing $165,000,000 into Bank One, Utah NA. The funding is
coming from a loan agreement between MadTrax Group, LLC, a
Utah limited liability company and Arimex Investments, LTD., a
Bahamian corporation
The sum of $165,000,000 will be
deposited into an inteiest bearing account in the name of the
Company and managed by its Members.
1

Robbins also sought funding from Unisouice Capital and GE Capital Robbins Dep 199-203
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Should you have any questions with respect to this matter,
please contact the Undersigned.
Ben Lightner
Wealth Advisor
Private Banking Group
August 22, 2000 Letter (Annexed as Exhibit 6). 2
10.

Mark Robbins' testimony makes clear that the August 22, 2000 letter was

intended for Lincoln Partners in connection with the proposed Mongoose acquisition, and was
not intended for other potential investors or for use in any other transaction. Under examination,
Mr. Robbins testified:
Q: You told Mr. Lightner that you needed a letter like this to show
potential investors as evidence of, you know, your financial backing.
A: Potential investors—its Lincoln Partners.

Q: And what do you remember discussing with Ben Lightner about what
use you intended to make of this letter?
A: That the letter was being used for Lincoln Partners and - I mean we
were having to do verifications and all that kind of stuff through that period.
***

Q: Was it your intention in obtaining a letter like this that you would show
it to potential investors as needed?
A: No. I mean, I don't recall that, but I mean, this letter was intended for
Lincoln Partners.

' Lightner testified that he was "unable to say either way" whether he wrote the August 22 letter but noted that his
signature looked strange. Deposition of Benjamin Lightner ("Lightner Dep.") 239 (annexed as Exhibit 7). No
copies of the August 22 Letter or any other evidence of the letter, or any of the other letters described in Bodell's
Memorandum, have been found in the files of Bank One.
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Q: When you asked for this letter, was it your intention that be shown to
anyone other than Lincoln Partners?
A: No.
Robbins Dep. 324; 326-327; 446.
11.

On September 27, 2000, Lincoln Partners informed Trevor Larson that Brunswick

"would like to invite [MadTrax] to submit a proposal to acquire [Mongoose.]" September 27,
2000 Letter from Lincoln Partners to MadTrax (annexed as Exhibit 8).
12.

MadTrax hired Duff & Phelps to assist in its efforts to bid for the Mongoose

Division, but despite help from Duff & Phelps, and despite making several offers for Mongoose
ranging from $63 million to $76.6 million, MadTrax was not the winning bidder and was
therefore unable to make the purchase. Robbins Dep. 200-03; October 10, 2000 Letter from
MadTrax to Lincoln Partners (annexed as Exhibit 9); November 3, 2000 Letter from MadTrax to
Lincoln Partners (annexed as Exhibit 10); November 8, 2000 Letter from MadTrax to Lincoln
Partners (annexed as Exhibit 11).
13.

There is no other evidence in the record concerning the intent or expectation of

Bank One concerning the August 22, 2000 letter (assuming the letter is authentic).
C.

Robbins Agrees to Purchase Cherokee & Walker LLC's Interest in Wasatch Cycle,
Madwagon, and Vtrax
14.

In 2000, around the same time he was working on the potential Mongoose

transaction, Mark Robbins was also working on a transaction through which he would purchase
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the 50% interest in Wasatch Cycle, Madwagon, and Vtrax owned by Cherokee & Walker LLC
("Cherokee & Walker"). Robbins Dep. 145, 150-52.
15.

Cherokee & Walker had purchased their 50% interest on January 7, 2000 in

exchange for a $4.5 million loan and a $500,000 capital contribution.

January 7, 2000

Membership Interest Purchase Agreement (annexed as Exhibit 12).
16.

By June 10, 2000, Mr. Robbins and Cherokee & Walker had negotiated an

agreement through which Robbins would repurchase Cherokee & Walker's 50% interest for
approximately $8 million. June 10, 2000 Purchase and Settlement Agreement (annexed as
Exhibit 13); Robbins Dep. 172-73.
17.

Robbins needed to borrow or raise the $8 million to pay Cherokee & Walker, and

ultimately identified an individual named Marc Jenson as a potential source of funds for the
Cherokee & Walker buyout. Robbins Dep. 182-83.
D.

Marc Jenson and the Bodell Construction Loan
18.

Jenson was in the business of borrowing funds, and then loaning those funds to

others. Jenson makes a profit on the difference between the interest he must pay to borrow the
money and the interest he receives from lending the money. Deposition of Marc Jenson ("Jenson
Dep.") 305 (annexed as Exhibit 14).
19.

In mid-2000, Jenson met Robbins and learned that Robbins needed $8 million to

buy out Cherokee & Walker's interest. After negotiations, Jenson agreed to loan Robbins the $8
million. Jenson Dep. 43-46; 48.
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20.

Jenson's plan was to fund the Robbins loan with $4 million of Jenson's own

money and $4 million from someone else. Accordingly, Jenson approached Mike Bodell, of
Bodell Construction Company, about the possibility of loaning Jenson $4 million that Jenson
would, in turn, loan to Robbins for the Cherokee & Walker buyout. Jenson Dep. 72-73; 102;
Deposition of Michael J. Bodell ("Bodell Dep.") 42-45 (annexed as Exhibit 15).
21.

Jenson testified he received a copy of the August 22, 2000 letter from Robbins.

Jenson, however, had no discussions with Robbins regarding what Jenson intended to do with the
letter. Jenson Dep. 215-16; Robbins Dep. 329.
22.

Jenson likewise recalls no discussions with Lightner, or anyone else at Bank One,

about the letter and was not involved in requesting that it be drafted. Nevertheless, as part of the
discussion between Jenson and Bodell, Jenson provided a copy of the August 22, 2000 letter to
Bodell. Jenson Dep. 187, 215-16, 219, 227; Bodell Dep. 49-50.
23.

On August 30, 2000, Bodell Construction Company loaned $4 million to MSF

Properties, LC (a company owned by Marc Jenson) and obtained a personal guaranty from
Jenson. Bank One was not a party to this loan. August 30, 2000 Promissory Note (annexed as
Exhibit 16); August 30, 2000 Guaranty (annexed as Exhibit 17) (collectively the "Bodell
Loan").3
E.

No Relationship Whatsoever Between Bank One and Bodell
24.

At the time of the August 22, 2000 letter, Bodell had no relationship whatsoever

with Bank One—it was not a customer and it had no accounts at Bank One. Bodell does not
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even know who Bank One employee Ben Lightner is. And before making the loan to Jenson,
Bodell never contacted Mr. Lightner or anyone else at Bank One.

Bodell Dep. 11-12, 56;

Deposition of Merrill L. Weight ("Weight Dep.") 62, 65 (annexed as Exhibit 18); Bodell
Response to Bank One Request for Admission No. 2 (annexed as Exhibit 19).
25.

Similarly, while Lightner was aware that Robbins and Jenson had some sort of

business relationship, Lightner recalls no discussions about Jenson loaning Robbins $8 million in
connection with his bicycle business. Lightner Dep. 39.
26.

Bank One knew nothing about Bodell, or the loan that Bodell planned to make to

Jenson, and had no discussions with Jenson about Bodell Construction or Michael Bodell.
Lightner Dep.39; 205; 259.
27.

Indeed, when asked directly about whether he knew where Marc Jenson was

getting money to loan to Robbins so that Robbins could buy out Cherokee & Walker, Lightner
responded that he had "no idea." Lightner further testified that "I wouldn't know [Bodell] if he
walked in here today." Lightner Dep. 259.
F.

Jenson Fails to Timely Repay the Bodell Loan, and Bodell Sues Bank One
28.

Jenson failed to repay the Bodell Loan. First Amended Compl. f 18.

29.

Bodell has now sued Bank One, claiming that it was fraudulently induced to loan

money to Jenson based on the August 22, 2000 letter. First Amended Compl. ^ 15-16; 29-35.

3

The terms of the Bodell Loan required Jenson to pay a loan fee of $80,000 and to pay interest of 1% per week, or
52% per year. Bodell Dep. 19-20.
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ARGUMENT
A.

Summary Judgment Standard for a Fraud Claim
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial burden of proving

that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. See Jenson v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997). However, "in
opposing a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of proving
all the elements of his or her cause of action." See id. at 339. "Once challenged, the party who
opposes such a motion must come forward with sufficient proof to support his or her claim." See
id.
A plaintiff like Bodell, who is pursuing a fraud claim, bears an even heavier burden. The
Utah Supreme Court requires that "the elements of fraud . . . be proven by 'clear and convincing
evidence.'" Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exck, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991). This burden applies at
the summary judgment stage, meaning that a plaintiff "must be able to prove each element of
fraud by clear and convincing evidence" to prevail at summary judgment. Andalex Resources v.
Myers, 871 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). See also Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First
Affiliated Secur., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that "the clear and
convincing standard must be considered in determining whether defendant's motion for summary
judgment should have been granted on the fraud claim").
B.

Bodell Cannot Establish the Intent-to-Induce Reliance Element of it Fraud Claim
To prevail on its fraud claim, Bodell must prove the following elements by clear and

convincing evidence: (1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing fact
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(3) which was false and (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made
recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a
representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it, and (6) the other
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and was
thereby induced to act to that party's injury and damage. Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co.,
915 P.2d 1060, 1066-67 (Utah 1996). Here, Bodell cannot prevail on its fraud claim against
Bank One because the undisputed evidence negates the intent-to-induce reliance element of
Bodell's fraud claim.
To show that Bank One intended to induce Bodell's reliance on the August 22, 2000
letter, Bodell must show that Bank One specifically intended to induce Bodell to rely on the
letter, or that Bank One had some reason to expect that Bodell would act in reliance on the letter
in a certain type of transaction:
One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability to the
persons or class of persons whom he intends or has reason to expect to act
or to refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation, for
pecuniary loss suffered by them through their justifiable reliance in the type
of transaction in which he intends or has reason to expect their conduct to
be influenced.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 531. See also Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298,
301 (Utah 1978) (plaintiff must prove that defendant "knowingly misrepresented a
material fact with intent to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from action").
Under the Restatement, "if the maker [of the misstatement] neither intends nor has reason
to expect that the misrepresentation will reach a particular person or class of persons or that they
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will act or refrain from acting in reliance upon it, the fact that it does reach them and they do so
act does not [subject the maker to liability for fraud]," Id. at Comment b.
This is because "[virtually any misrepresentation is capable of being transmitted or
repeated to third persons, and if sufficiently convincing may create an obvious risk that they may
act in reliance on it," Id. at Comment d. This obvious risk, however, is not sufficient to hold a
defendant liable for fraud. Id. Indeed, it is not even enough that the defendant recognizes, or as
a reasonable man should recognize, the risk that the misrepresentation will be communicated to
third parties and that they may act upon it. Id.
Instead, there must be facts showing that the defendant had some reason to conclude that
it was especially likely that the alleged misrepresentation would reach the plaintiff and influence
its conduct:
The maker of a misrepresentation must have information that would lead a
reasonable man to conclude that there is an especial likelihood that it will
reach those persons and will influence their conduct. There must be
something in the situation known to the maker that would lead a reasonable
man to govern his conduct on the assumption that this will occur.
Id.
Utah law is consistent with the Restatement provisions. For example, in Ellis v. Hale,
373 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah 1962), one defendant made a fraudulent statement to another defendant,
who in turn repeated the fraudulent statement to the plaintiff. The court dismissed the fraud
claim because there was no allegation that the defendant who made the alleged fraudulent
statement intended for it to be transmitted to the plaintiff. Id.
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Similarly, courts in other jurisdictions have held that when a party makes a
misrepresentation about another's financial condition, it cannot be held liable to all third parties
who might come across the misrepresentation and rely on it. For example, in Ernst & Young
LLP v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company, 51 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. 2001), the plaintiff, an
institutional investor, sued an auditor for fraud in connection with plaintiffs purchase of
approximately $8.5 million worth of notes.

Id. at 576.

The auditor moved for summary

judgment based on evidence showing that it did not specifically intend for the plaintiff to rely on
the audit report. In response, the plaintiff put on evidence from financial experts showing that
international accounting firms like the defendant knew and expected that people would rely on
their audit report letters to make investment decisions. Nevertheless, the Texas Supreme Court
sustained summary judgment in favor of the auditor on the plaintiffs fraud claim because there
was no evidence showing that the auditor specifically intended for the note purchasers to rely on
the audit report—despite its general knowledge that people might rely on the audit report. Id.
576, 582. See also Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305,
323-26 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming trial court's judgment on the pleadings on plaintiffs fraud
claim because the allegations in the complaint failed to show that defendant Morgan Stanley
intended its allegedly fraudulent opinion letter to reach the plaintiff debenture holders); In re
Worldcom Sec. Litig., Case No. 02 Civ. 3288(DLC) )3 Civ.1785, 2006 WL1047130 (S.D.N.Y.
April 21, 2006) (dismissing fraud claims because there were no allegations of any special
communications with defendants or any particular facts giving rise to inference that defendants
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had information showing an especial likelihood that plaintiff would rely on their public
statements).
Here, the undisputed evidence proves that Bank One had no information that would lead
it to conclude that the alleged misrepresentations in the August 22, 2000 letter would reach
Bodell and cause him to loan money to Marc Jenson.
The evidence establishes that:
•

The August 22, 2000 letter (if authentic) was intended solely for Lincoln Partners in
connection with MadTrax's efforts to buy the Mongoose Bicycle Division of Brunswick
Corporation. It was not intended for some unspecified class of potential investors for use
in any transaction they might undertake. Robbins Dep. 324; 326-327; 446.

•

Robbins and Jenson never told Ben Lightner, or anyone else from Bank One (i) that the
August 22, 2000 letter would be provided to anyone other than Lincoln Partners; (ii) that
Robbins was trying to obtain funds to buy out Cherokee & Walker, or (iii) that Jensen
was trying to obtain money from Bodell that he would, in turn, loan to Robbins to buy
out Cherokee & Walker. Lightner Dep. 39; 259; Jenson Dep. 187; 215-219; 227, 229.

•

Although Robbins allegedly gave a copy of the August 22, 2000 letter to Jenson, Jenson
never told Robbins what he intended to do with the August 22, 2000 letter, so there was
no way for Robbins to know that Jenson was going to show it to Bodell. Jenson Dep.
225-26; Robbins Dep. 329, 437.

•

Bodell never told Bank One that it was contemplating a loan to Jenson based on the
August 22, 2000 letter. In fact, Bodell had no relationship whatsoever with Bank One—
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it was not a customer and it had no accounts at Bank One. Bodell does not even know
who Bank One employee Ben Lightner is. And before making the loan to Jenson, Bodell
never contacted Mr. Lightner or anyone else at Bank One. Instead, Bodell dealt only
with Jenson in deciding to make the loan. Bodell Dep.11-12, 55-56; Weight Dep. 62, 65;
Bodell Response to Bank One Request for Admission No. 2.
In short, Bank One knew nothing about Bodell or the Bodell loan transaction. There is
no evidence to show that, assuming the letter is authentic, Bank One had any reason to expect
that the August 22, 2000 letter—which was specifically intended for Lincoln Partners—would
later be provided to Jenson and would be used by Jenson to raise funds from Bodell in a
completely different transaction. As a result, Bank One cannot be liable to Bodell for fraud.
Bodell has argued in this case that Lightner's general understanding that there was some
business relationship between Jenson and Robbins, and that Lightner's memory of taking checks
to Cherokee & Walker (though he does not recall taking any to Cherokee & Walker for Robbins
or Jenson) (Lightner Dep. 40-41) is enough to satisfy the "reason to expect" standard. But such
general, vague assertions of business dealings are not enough. See, e.g., Ernst & Young LLP v.
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company, 51 S.W.3d at 576, 582 (auditor's general understanding
that investors rely on audited financial statements was not enough to show that the auditor has
reason to expect that the plaintiff would receive and rely on the audit report).
Indeed, this case is identical to the example provided in the Restatement — literally a
textbook example — of a situation where Bank One cannot be liable to Bodell:
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A [Bank One] [allegedly] makes fraudulent statements concerning the
financial standing of B [MadTrax Group LLC, Robbins, and Jenson] to C
[Robbins] and asks him to repeat them to D [Lincoln Partners] for the
purpose of inducing D [Lincoln Partners] to [sell the Mongoose Bike
Division] to B [MadTrax Group LLC, Robbins, and Jenson]. A [Bank One]
does not intend and has no reason to expect that C [Robbins] will repeat the
statements to anyone other than D [Lincoln Partners]. C [Robbins] repeats
them to [Jenson, who in turn,] repeats them to E [Bodell], who relies upon
the statements and extends credit to B [Jenson]. A [Bank One] is not liable
to E [Bodell] under the rule stated in [Restatement (Second) of Torts § 531].
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 531 illus 2. (modified).
Instead, Bank One must have had information "that would lead a reasonable man to
conclude that there is an especial likelihood that [the August 22, 2000] letter [would] reach
[Bodell] and influence [his] conduct." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 531 cmt. d. Lightner's
general understanding that there may be some business relationship between Jenson and
Robbins, does not show, by clear and convincing evidence, that Bank One understood there was
an "especial likelihood" that the August 22, 2000 letter would be provided to Robbins, then to
Jenson, and then finally to Bodell in connection with a loan transaction between Bodell and
Jenson.
C.

Lack of a Specific Addressee in the Letter Is Not Sufficient Evidence
Bodell contends that the reason-to-expect standard is satisfied because the August 22,

2000 letter was addressed "To whom it may concern" and Bank One's witnesses acknowledged
that there is a risk that any number of people might rely on such a letter. But the law is clear that
"even an obvious risk that a misrepresentation might be repeated to a third party"—such as a
letter addressed "To whom it may concern"—is "not enough to satisfy the reason-to-expect

419643 3

17

33^

standard." Ernst & Young LLP v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company, 51 S.W.3d at 576,
582; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 531 cmt. d. Moreover, this is not a case in which the
August 22, 2000 letter, if authentic, was written for a class of potential lenders, of which Bodell
was a member. Instead, the testimony establishes that the letter was intended specifically for
Lincoln Partners and no one else. Robbins Dep. 324; 326-327; 446. The fact that the letter was
addressed "To whom it may concern" does not establish that Bank One intended to induce
Bodell—or anyone else like him—to rely on the letter. As a result, Bank One cannot be liable to
Bodell for fraud.
CONCLUSION
There is no evidence that Bank One intended, or had any reason to expect, that the
purported August 22, 2000 letter would be provided by Robbins to Jenson, and then by Jenson to
Bodell, who would rely on it in making a loan to Jenson. To the contrary, the undisputed
evidence proves that, if the letter is authentic, Bank One did not intend or have any reason to
expect the letter would be shown to anyone other than Lincoln Partners in connection with
Robbins' efforts to buy Mongoose. Bank One is therefore entitled to summary judgment on
Bodell's fraud claim.
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DATED thisZ^'day of November, 2006.

JblmA. Beckstead
Tyler L. Murray
Emily V. Smith
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.
Attorneys for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A. successor to Bank One, Utah, National
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION OF JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON FRAUD CLAIM, postage prepaid, this
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day of November, 2006 to the following:
Robert Shelby
Burbidge & Mitchell
Parkside Tower
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Tab 3

Richard D. Burbidge (#0492)
Jefferson W. Gross (#8339)
Robert J. Shelby (#8319)
BURBIDGE MITCHELL & GROSS
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-6677
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a Utah corporation
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARX H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a
Utah limited liability company; JPMORGAN
CHASE BANK, N. A., a National
Association; and DOES 1 through 50,

PLAINTIFF BODELL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION OF JPMORGAN CHASE
BANK, N.A. FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON FRAUD CLAIM

Civil No. 030917018
Judge John Paul Kennedy

Defendants.

Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company ("Bodell") will respond in this memorandum to the
arguments asserted by Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("Chase") in support of its Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment dismissing Bodell's fraud claim.
INTRODUCTION
In the year 2000, Mark Robbins ("Robbins") attempted to raise funds to purchase Cherokee &
Walker's ownership interest in one of his bicycle businesses. Marc Jenson ("Jenson"), who was
involved with Robbins in his businesses, was attempting to raise funds to loan to Robbins to acquire
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Cherokee & Walker's ownership interest. Benjamin Lightner ("Lightner"), a wealth advisor in Bank
One's private banking group, was a personal friend of Robbins and had detailed knowledge concerning
Robbins' businesses. Among other things, Lightner was aware that Cherokee & Walker was a part
owner of at least one of Robbins' companies and that Robbins was going to buy out Cherokee &
Walker's ownership interest. Robbins was also attempting to purchase the bicycle division of
Brunswick Corporation. Robbins kept Lightner fully informed of his activities in those enterprises.
Lightner authored on Bank One letterhead an August 22, 2000 letter addressed "To Whom It
May Concern" in order to assist Robbins and Jenson in their fund-raising efforts. In that letter, Lightner
falsely stated that Robbins, Jenson and their company, MadTrax Group, LLC, would be depositing
$165 Million into Bank One, which funding was coming from a loan between MadTrax and Arimex
Investments, Ltd. and that the amount would be deposited into an interest-bearing account at Bank One
in the name of the company. This letter was absolutely false. As Lightner admitted in his deposition,
there was no basis for the statement that a $165 Million deposit would be made into Bank One for
Robbins and Jenson.
Jenson solicited Bodell to loan him $4 Million for the purpose of allowing Jenson in turn to loan
the $4 Million to Robbins to acquire Cherokee & Walker's ownership interest. Jenson represented to
Bodell that the loan would be promptly repaid, and in order to induce Bodell to make the loan Jenson
gave Bodell's President, Michael Bodell, a copy of the August 22 Bank One letter signed by Lightner.
Acting in reliance on the Bank One letter, Bodell did in fact make the loan and it was not repaid.
Bank One has now filed a motion for partial summary judgment asking the court to dismiss
Bodell's fraud claim against it on the sole basis that Bank One did not intend Bodell to rely on
2
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Lightner's August 22 letter and could not reasonably have anticipated that Bodell would do so. This
motion should be denied. There is substantial evidence that Lightner knew that Robbins was going to
acquire Cherokee & Walker's interest in at least one of Robbins' companies; that Robbins did not have
the assets to repurchase Cherokee & Walker's interest; that Robbins was seeking a source to loan him
funds for that purpose; and that Lightner intended the letter to be shown to any potential financiers
either of the Cherokee & Walker acquisition or of Robbins' efforts to acquire Brunswick bicycle
division. There are clearly unresolved questions of fact and the jury must determine the reliance issue at
trial after hearing and weighing the strength of the testimony and other evidence.
RESPONSE TO CHASE'S RECITATION OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Chase informs the Court its motion for partial summary judgment is filed in response to an
Order from the Court requiring Chase to file by November 30, 2006 any motions pertaining to Bodell's
common law fraud claim. The Court made no such order. [See Order Regarding Plaintiffs Motion for
Leave to Amend and Motion to Compel, attached hereto as Exhibit A.] To the contrary, the Court has
twice instructed Defendants in open court to file one consolidated motion for summary judgment. As
the Court explained at our January 6, 2006 law and motion hearing:
The Court:

Somebody said in their papers they were expecting to file several motions for
summary judgment and I'm not pointing finders, but I will let you know that I
will not let you do that. You've got one summary judgment Motion that I'm
going to let you file, I don't care who it is that's going to file it. You get one
bite at the apple and rules of page limitations apply and I'm really tough about
expanding because if I give it to one then I end up giving it to the other and
before I know it, I end up with another 10 more volumes with, you know, a lot
of it just being regurgitated of prior stuff So I'm just letting you know about
that right now while I'm thinking about it.

Mr. Beckstead (for Chase):

Thank you for that heads up.
3
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[Transcript of January 6, 2006 Law and Motion Hearing Transcript at 46-47, relevant portion
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B] Bodell assumes Chase has elected to file the instant motion as
its one and only summary judgment motion, per the Court's instructions.
RESPONSE TO CHASE'S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
For the purposes of this motion only, Bodell does not dispute the undisputed facts stated by
Chase in its memorandum except that Bodell does dispute the following facts:
Paragraph 10. Bodell does not dispute that Robbins testified that he asked Lightner to write
the August 22, 2000 letter for Lincoln Partners. However, Bodell does dispute the accuracy of that
testimony. As set forth in Bodell's statement of additional material facts, the letter was addressed "To
Whom It May Concern" and was not intended for Lincoln Partners. In fact, Lincoln Partners never
received the letter. Lightner wrote a different letter to Lincoln Partners dated October 19, 2000, which
was properly and directly addressed to Rob Brown at Lincoln Partners. That letter was received by
Lincoln Partners and formed the basis for at least one telephone call between Lightner and Lincoln
Partners concerning Lightner's authorship of the letter and the accuracy of Lightner's representations
therein. [Letter attached hereto as Exhibit C ] As detailed more fully below, a reasonable jury could
find that the August 22, 2000 letter addressed "To Whom It May Concern" was intended to be shown
to the class of potential financiers for Robbins' business dealings.
Paragraph 13. There is evidence in the record concerning the intent or expectation of Bank
One concerning the August 22, 2000 letter, which is set forth in Bodell's Statement of Additional
Material Facts below.
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Paragraph 21. Although Robbins self-servingly testified that he had no discussions with Jenson
concerning what Jenson intended to do with the August 22, 2000 letter, Jenson did not so testify.
Moreover, based upon the evidence set forth below, a reasonable jury could determine that it was
agreed and understood between Robbins and Jenson that Jenson would utilize the letter to assist in his
efforts in raising financing for Robbins to purchase Cherokee & Walker's interest in Robbins'
companies. Indeed, there was no other reason for Robbins to give the letter to Jenson, particularly if
the letter was intended only for Lincoln Partners, as Chase contends.
Paragraph 25. Lightner was aware of much more than the fact that Robbins and Jenson "had
some sort of business relationship." Lightner knew Robbins and Jenson were friends and partners who
were so close they often did deals on the strength of a mere handshake. [Lightner Deposition, attached
hereto as Exhibit D, at 199:11-21] Lightner also knew that Robbins and Cherokee & Walker were
business partners; that Cherokee & Walker owned a part of at least one of Robbins' companies; and
that Robbins was going to buy out Cherokee & Walker's ownership interest. [Id. at 42:2-4; 107:20 108:5; and 259:16 - 260:16] In fact, Lightner believes he was present when Robbins had discussions
with Cherokee & Walker about loans Bank One made to Vtrax, their joint venture. [203:11-21]
As evidenced by Bank One's refusal to loan additional money to Robbins in 2000 after
reviewing his financial information, Lightner and Bank One also knew that Robbins did not have the
resources to repurchase Cherokee & Walker's interest, and that Robbins would have to borrow the
money. Lightner even remembers taking checks to Cherokee & Walker at the direction of Robbins or
Jenson. [Id. at 40:17 - 41:3] Lightner knew Robbins received money from Jenson in 2000, testified he
did not know what Robbins did with the money, but stated Robbins may have paid off Cherokee &
5

Walker because Lightner knew Robbins was purchasing Cherokee and Walker's interest in the
company they jointly owned. [Id. at 259:16 - 260:11]
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS
1. During the year 2000, Benjamin Lightner ("Lightner") was employed by Bank One as a
wealth adviser in Bank One's private banking group. [Lightner Depo. at 10:8-13]
2. In 2000, Lightner was Bank One's number one private banker in the nation in total sales.
[Mat 179:1-21]
3. Lightner was the private banker for Mark Robbins ("Robbins") and Marc Jenson
("Jenson"). [Id. at 111:03 - 115:07] Lightner had frequent and regular communications with Robbins
during 2000. [Id. at 10:14-17]*
4. Lightner knew that Robbins and Jenson were partners who did business deals on a
handshake. [Id. at 199:24 - 200:3]
5. Robbins was a personal friend of Lightner's and offered Lightner a job while Lightner was
employed by Bank One. [Id. at 320:1-7; 109:19 - 110:2]
6. When Lightner left Bank One in late 2000 to take a job at Irwin Union Bank, he took
Robbins and Jenson with him as clients. [Id at 83:24 - 84:1; 114:11-15 and 115:14-17]
7. hi the summer and fall of 2000, Bank One was "terming" Jenson out of some loans. Bank
One required a rest period when the line-of-credit needed to be at a zero balance and he had not done
that. [Mat 270:25 -271:17]

1

Lightner testified as Chase's 30(b)(6) corporate representative in this case. [Lightner Depo.
at 6:20-7:1]
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8. Lightner characterized Bank One's relationship with Robbins in August 2000 as a growing
relationship. [Id. at 320:19-25]
9. Before Bank One would make a loan to a client, it would gather financial and business
information which would be sent to the National Credit Center where it would be analyzed. After that,
Lightner had the option of signing off on the transaction. [Id. at 274:1 - 275:2]
10. If Bank One was going to do a loan for a client in 2000, Bank One did due diligence to
find out about the borrower including what their credit report looked like, how their cash flow looked,
what the company did, and how the company operated. [Id. at 144:18-24]
11. During 2000, Robbins and his companies had loans with Bank One, including a $200,000
line-of-credit. [Id. at 261:17 - 262:5]
12. In connection with the loans made by Bank One to Robbins, Bank One received his
personal financial statements and tax returns. [Id. at 187:20-25]
13. Lightner understood that Robbins was associated with Vtrax, Madwagon, Wasatch Cycles
and MadTrax Group and received personal financial statements and tax returns in connection with
extending Robbins' credit. [Id. at 186:9 - 187:7]
14. In 2000, Bank One knew who owned Vtrax and Vtrax Sports based upon the
documentation received by the bank in connection with extensions of credit. [Id. at 196:22 - 197:4]
15. Lightner understood that Cherokee & Walker owned part of at least one of Robbins'
companies. [Id. at 107:20 - 108:5] hi fact, Cherokee & Walker and Robbins co-guaranteed a Bank
One loan to one of the companies. [Id. at 191:20 - 193:3] Bank One would have known which of
Robbins' companies Cherokee & Walker had an ownership interest in based upon the documentation
7

received by the bank. [Id. at 193:19-24] Lightner had meetings with Cherokee & Walker and Robbins
talking about what the company was doing. [Id. at 203:11 -16]
16. In the summer of 2000 Robbins sought to reacquire a 50 percent interest Cherokee &
Walker owned in their joint bicycle venture. [Deposition of Mark Robbins, attached hereto as Exhibit
E, at 145, 150-52]
17. Lightner understood that Robbins was acquiring Cherokee & Walker's interest and that
Cherokee & Walker therefore wanted the loan it had guaranteed closed out. [Lightner Depo. at
310:1-5]
18. Lightner wrote a letter on Bank One letterhead to Jim Jenkins, a principal at Cherokee &
Walker, dated July 3, 2000 in which he referred to "Shane" who was Shane Perry with Cherokee &
Walker. [Id. at 308:4-19; Letter attached hereto as Exhibit F] That letter stated in part:
Mr. Jim Jenkins
Cherokee & Walker, LLC
1245 East Brickyard Rd. #350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Dear Mr. Jenkins:
The purpose of this brief letter is to confirm my verbal conversation with Shane that the
following has occurred:
1)

2)

All loan documents using the name of James W. Jenkins, Cherokee &
Walker, LLC or Cherokee & Walker Investment Co., LLC (both
signed and unsigned) relating to Vtrax Sports, LLC have been
permanently destroy.
Cherokee & Walker, LLC, Cherokee & Walker Investment Co., LLC
and/or James W. Jenkins are not currently co-signers/guarantors on any
loan with Bank One in connection [sic] Vtrax Sports, LLC.

If I can be of any further assistance, please feel free to contact me at (801)481-5020.
8
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Sincerely,
Benjamin Lightner
Wealth Advisor
19. Lightner knew Robbins received money from Jenson in 2000, testified he did not know
what Robbins did with the money, but stated that Robbins may have paid off Cherokee & Walker
because Lightner knew that Robbins was purchasing Cherokee & Walker's interest in the company
they jointly owned. [Id. at 259:16 - 260:11] Lightner obtained that information from either Robbins or
Cherokee & Walker. [Id. at 260:12-16]
20. Lightner remembered taking checks to Cherokee & Walker at the direction of Robbins or
Jenson. [Id. at 40:17 - 41:3]
21. Lightner was aware in 2000 that Robbins was also interested in acquiring the bicycle
division of Brunswick Corporation, including the Mongoose Company. [Id. at 11:2-8]
22. Bank One declined any financing for Robbins and his companies with respect to the
Mongoose acquisition because Robbins did not have the necessary resources. [Id. at 217:10 - 218:7]
23. Lightner was personally involved in the efforts of Robbins and Jenson to acquire
Mongoose Bicycles from Brunswick. Among other things, as detailed below, he wrote letters at
Robbins' request falsely representing the financial strength of Robbins and Jenson and their companies.
Lightner also attended a meeting with Robbins and Arimex Investments, a potential lender for the
Brunswick deal. [Id. at 35:17 - 36:6 and 156:3-8]
24. Robbins kept Lightner informed of "everything that was going on" with respect to the
Mongoose deal and potential financing. [Robbins Depo. at 326:17-20; 330:5-7; and 331:13-15]
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25. As evidenced by the August 22, 2000 letter and other letters described below, Lightner
was well aware that Jenson and Robbins were working together to raise funding for the deal, and
Lightner remembers having had discussions with Robbins about financing for it. [Lightner Depo at
37:5-17]
26. As detailed below, Lightner authored at least four letters on Bank One letterhead for
Robbins in which Lightner made statements he admits were false at the time the letters were written.
Lightner also created a Form Verification of Deposit for Robbins falsely stating the value of Robbins'
accounts with Bank One. Lightner neither confirms nor denies that he wrote any of the letters, but as
detailed below, the sworn testimony of third-party witnesses independently ties Lightner to each of the
letters.
27. The first of the false letters Lightner drafted on Bank One letterhead is a letter dated July
27, 2000 to Brunswick Corporation. [Id. at 219:2-6; Letter attached hereto as Exhibit G] That letter
stated:
James Schenk
Vice President
Brunswick Corporation
Dear Mr. Schenk:
MadTrax Group, LLC (the Company) and several members of management have been
long-time customers with Bank One, Utah , NA (Bank One). Over the years, Bank
One and the Company have partnered together to complete several successful business
transactions.
Based on our discussions with the management of the Company, we confirm that the
Company has the financial resources to complete the acquisition of the bicycle segment
of Brunswick Corporation. Bank One is interested in the potential opportunity to
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finance the purchase of certain acquired assets. The management of the Company has
established several significant lines of credit with Bank One.
Please call me at (801) 481-5020 if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
Ben Lightner
Bank One, Utah, NA
Relationship Manager2
This letter was false. Bank One had not had a long-term relationship with Robbins, Jenson and
MadTrax Group. [Id. at 219:25 - 220:8] MadTrax Group had not even been formed yet and had not
been a long-time customer of Bank One, nor had the management of MadTrax Group been a long-time
customer of Bank One. [Id. at 220:16 - 222:7] In fact, Bank One did not even know for sure who the
management of MadTrax Group was at the time the letter was written. [Id. at 221-4-7] The statement
that Bank One and MadTrax Group had partnered to complete several transactions was also false.
[Mat 222:8-12]
28. In fact, as of July 2000, Bank One knew, contrary to Lightner's representations in the
letter, that MadTrax Group did not have the financial resources to acquire Mongoose. [Id. at 222:3-7]
29. It was also not true in July 2000 that Bank One was interested in any opportunity to
finance the purchase of Mongoose by MadTrax Group or its management. [Id. at 222:21-25]
30. Lightner next wrote an August 22, 2000 letter addressed 'To Whom It May Concern."
[Letter attached hereto as Exhibit H] In the letter, Lightner states:

2

Lightner did not deny that he wrote this letter and testified he did not know if he wrote the
letter or not. [Id. at 224:4-15]
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Re: MadTrax Group, LLC
Gentlemen:
MadTrax Group, LLC (the "Company") and its individual members Mark
Robbins, and Marc Jenson (the "members") will be depositing $165,000,000 into
Bank One, Utah NA. The funding is coming from a loan agreement between MadTrax
Group, LLC, a Utah limited liability company and Arimex Investments, LTD., a
Bahamian corporation. The sum of $165,000,000 will be deposited into an interest
bearing account in the name of the Company and managed by its Members.
Should you have any questions with respect to this matter, please contact the
Undersigned.
Ben Lightner
Wealth Advisor
Private Banking Group3
The statement in the letter that $165,000,000 would be deposited into Bank One was false and
there was no basis for that statement. [Id. at 238:19 - 241:12 and 325:1-17]
31. Lightner wrote the August 22, 2000 letter at Robbins' request. [Robbins Depo. at 322:22
-324:13]
32. Lightner gave the 'To Whom It May Concern" letter to Robbins who gave it to Jenson.
[Deposition of Marc Jenson, attached hereto as Exhibit I, at 216:1-3] Jenson gave the letter to Michael

3

Lightner did not deny that he wrote this letter but testified that because the letter was false he
didn't think he wrote the letter even though it was faxed from Bank One's Broadway branch where he
worked. [Id. at 238:19 - 241:12] Chase acknowledges in its memorandum that whether Lightner wrote
the letter presents a question of fact that must be resolved at trial. Overwhelming evidence will establish
that Lightner did in fact write the letter, including the testimony of Defendant Robbins that he requested
and received the letter from Lightner, and the testimony of disinterested third-parties that they discussed
with Lightner the other letters described herein containing similar (and in some instances, identical)
misrepresentations.
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Bodell, Bodell's President, as part of his solicitation for Bodell to lend $4 Million to Robbins. [Id. at
215:16-25]
33. Arimex never deposited $165,000,000 into Bank One and Bank One never became an
escrow agent to hold that money. [Lightner Depo. at 242:3 - 246:10]
34. Lightner understood that an employee of Bank One should not address a letter "To Whom
It May Concern" because you are uncertain who might read it and rely on it. [Id. at 255:24 - 256:4]
35. Chase acknowledges that writing a letter addressed "To Whom It May Concern" is
inappropriate and a violation of standard practice in the banking industry. [Deposition of Susan Mayo,
as Chase's Rule 30(b)(6) designee, attached hereto as Exhibit J, at 95:16 - 96:7] Chase concedes "you
don't generate 'to whom it may concern' letters at all in standard practice." [Id. at 104:2-4]
36. Chase acknowledges that such a letter is against standard practice in the industry because
there exists a risk that any person could claim to be "to whom it may concern." [Id. at 98:11 - 100:13]
37. Despite having record of other letters and correspondence from Robbins, MadTrax Group
and Lightner on behalf of Bank One, Lincoln Partners, whom Bank One contends was the intended
recipient of the August 22, 2000 letter, does not have the letter in its files and the investment bankers at
Lincoln Partners who worked on the Brunswick deal know nothing about it. [Deposition of Robert
Brown, attached hereto as Exhibit K, at 73:6-12; Deposition of David Houser, attached hereto as
Exhibit L, at 51:20-52:5]
38. Lincoln Partners, the investment banker for Brunswick, does have in its files and did
receive a different letter Lightner authored on Bank One letterhead dated October 19, 2000, addressed
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to Robert Brown at Lincoln Partners. [Lightner Depo. Ex. 215 and 225:20 - 226:4; Letter attached
hereto as Exhibit M]4
39. Lightner's October 19, 2000 letter to Lincoln Partners stated:
Rob Brown
Vice President
Lincoln Partners LLC
181 West Madison Street Suite 3750
Chicago, Illinois 60602
Dear Mr. Brown:
MadTrax Group, LLC (the "Company") and its individual members collectively have
on deposit with several financial institution [sic] including cash, government bonds and
marketable securities valued in excess of $971,716,000, of which $165,000,000 will
be deposited into Bank One, Utah, NA (Bank One) by December 1, 20000. Bank
One has received copies of all personal financials, tax returns, marketable securities,
government bonds, and pertinent documents to conclude and verify the value of the
MadTrax Group, LLC and its individual members.
Based on our recent discussions, and additional financial information provided by the
management of the Company, we confirm that the Company has the financial resources
in place to complete the acquisition of Brunswick Bicycles, with a purchase price of
$63,000,000.
Should you have any questions with respect to this matter, please contact the
undersigned.
Benjamin M. Lightner
Bank One, Utah, NA
Wealth Advisor
(801)481-50205
4

Again, Lightner would not deny that he wrote this letter, but because the content of the letter
was false he says he would not have written the letter. [Lightner Depo. at 226:5-14]
5

The handwriting on Exhibit M was placed there by David Houser, a Senior Vice President
with Lincoln Partners, during a telephone conversation with Lightner about the letter. [Houser Depo. at
38:17-41:8]
14
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40. Robert Brown with Lincoln Partners spoke with Lightner who confirmed he had written the
letter, that the information contained in the letter was tme and that MadTrax had the ability to finance
the purchase of Mongoose. [Brown Depo. at 81:12 - 82:11 and 55:22 - 56:8]
41. David Houser with Lincoln Partners testified that Lightner confirmed in telephone
conversations the financial wherewithal of Robbins and his companies to do the transaction. [Houser
Depo. at 15:11 - 18:9]
42. In fact, the information contained in the October 19, 2000 letter was false, as Lightner
admitted. [Lightner Depo. at 225:20 - 229:25]
43. Among other things discussed above, it was not true in October of 2000 that Bank One
was expecting $165 Million to be deposited by December 1, 2000. [Id. at 229:1-25]
44. In October 2000, it was untrue that MadTrax and its members had cash bonds and
securities in excess of $971 Million. [Id. at 227:14-19] It was not true that principals of MadTrax
Group had the funding to purchase Mongoose. [Id. at 225:7-13] It was not true that money would be
deposited from Arimex. [Id. at 227:20 - 228:2]
45. Nor was it true in October of 2000 that Bank One had received copies of personal
documents to verify the value of the MadTrax Group and its individual members. [Id. at 230:5-21]
46. Finally, Lightner authored another letter on Bank One letterhead dated October 19, 2000,
this one directed to the Union Bank of Switzerland ("UBS") and addressed to "Ladies and Gentlemen."
[Letter attached hereto as Exhibit N] Lightner's October 19, 2000 letter to UBS stated:
Union Bank of Switzerland
Bahnhofstrasse 45
Zurich, 8001
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Switzerland
41-1-234-1111
Re:

MadTrax Group, LLC

Ladies and Gentlemen:
MadTrax Group, LLC (the "Company") and its individual members collectively have
on deposit with several financial institution [sic] including cash, government bonds and
marketable securities valued in excess of $971,716,000, of which $165,000,000 will
be deposited into Bank One, Utah, NA (Bank One) by December 1, 20000. Bank
One has received copies of all personal Financials, tax returns, marketable securities,
government bonds, and pertinent documents to conclude and verify the value of the
MadTrax Group, LLC and its individual members.
Upon the execution of the Agreement between the Company and the Union Bank of
Switzerland, Bank One will establish a $100,000,000 ("Custodial Account") in
accordance with the provisions of the Agreement and the usage of the Companies funds
to activate the account.
Should you have any questions with respect to this matter, please contact the
undersigned.
Benjamin M. Lightner
Bank One, Utah, NA
Wealth Advisor
(801)481-5020
47. Michael Peterson, at the time a Vice President with Merrill Lynch, spoke with Lightner in a
telephone conversation within a day or so of the date of the letter, in which Lightner confirmed he had
written the UBS letter and vouched for the accuracy of the representations in it. [Deposition of Michael
Peterson, attached hereto as Exhibit O, at 38:1 - 39:4; 34:25 - 38:4 and 24:12 - 25:19]
48. Bank One did not do any due diligence with respect to the "To Whom It May Concern
letter" or any of the other letters authored by Lightner. [Lightner Depo. at 250:18-23]
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49. Lightner and Bank One understood that consumers and businesses have an expectation
that if banks make representations in letters the banks will first do their due diligence to make sure the
representations are correct and that if a bank makes a representation in correspondence that a
transaction will occur, the bank is obligated to do due diligence to ensure the representation is true and
accurate. [Id. at 25 - 26:14 and 30:8-13] Further, when a bank makes a representation in written
correspondence about the net worth or assets held by one of its customers, Lightner acknowledged that
the bank has the same duty. [Id. at 30:8-25] Lightner acknowledged that he understood that when he
authored a letter telling someone that a Bank One customer had a certain amount of money in the bank
that the recipient would rely upon that representation. [Id. at 95:20 - 96:8]
ARGUMENT
A.

THE RELIANCE ISSUE PRESENTS A QUESTION OF FACT THAT THE JURY
MUST RESOLVE AT TRIAL.
Chase erroneously argues that BodelFs common law fraud claim must be dismissed because

Bodell cannot prove that Bank One specifically intended to induce Bodell to rely on the August 22
letter or that Bank One had reason to expect that Bodell would act in reliance thereon. To the
contrary, there is substantial evidence that Lightner wrote the letter in order to assist Robbins and
Jenson in their fund-raising efforts and that Bodell was within the class of persons - - potential financiers
- - to whom the letter was directed or to whom Bank One could reasonably expect would receive the
letter. The reliance issue is clearly for the jury to decide at trial.
Chase argues that Bodell camiot show that Bank One intended to induce Bodell's reliance on
the August 22 letter because Lightner claims he did not even know of Bodell and because Robbins
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testified in his deposition that he requested Lightner draft the August 22 Letter to give to Brunswick's
investment banker, Lincoln Partners. These arguments are without merit and have been rejected by
courts considering them.
First, the fact that Chase claims Lightner did not intend that the representations contained in the
letter be given specifically to Bodell is unimportant.6 The letter was written "To Whom It May
Concern," not Lincoln Partners or any other specific person or entity. A reasonable jury could easily
conclude on that basis alone that the letter was written to assist the efforts of Robbins and Jenson and
their companies in their contemplated business transactions and/or to raise money in order to purchase
Cherokee & Walker's interest in the companies it owned jointly with Robbins and to fund the purchase
of Mongoose Bicycles. Bodell was in the class of potential financiers and the letter was given to Bodell
for the very purpose of inducing it to lend $4,000,000.00 to Jenson to be immediately paid by Jenson
to Robbins to fund the repurchase of Cherokee & Walker's interest. Lightner knew full well that
Jenson and Robbins were working together to raise funding, as the letter itself plainly demonstrates.
Indeed, Lightner states in his August 22 letter "MadTrax . .. and its individual members Mark Robbins
and Marc Jenson . . . will be depositing $165,000,000

"

Section 531 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability to the persons
or class of persons whom he intends or has reason to expect to act or to refrain
from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation, for pecuniary loss suffered by

6

Neither Lightner nor Chase offered any testimony concerning Lightner's intent when drafting
the letter requested by Robbins. Rather, Chase relies exclusively on the testimony of co-defendant
Robbins on this point.
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them through their justifiable reliance in the type of transaction in which he intends or
has reason to expect their conduct to be influenced. [Emphasis added]
The case of Soderberg v. McKinney, 44 Cal. App.4th 1760 (1996), is analogous to the
instant case. There, investors in a brokered loan sued the real estate appraiser who had been retained
by the mortgage broker to determine the value of real estate, asserting claims including negligent
misrepresentation and fraud. As here, the defendant claimed that he was not liable to the investors as a
matter of law because he did not know their names or identities at the time he made his
misrepresentations. The court of appeals rejected this argument and reversed summary judgment in
favor of the appraiser, observing:
McKinney contends that under Christiansen he owed no duty to plaintiffs as a
matter of law since he did not know their names or specific identities until after they had
relied on his report and invested in the loan . . . .
Further, we do not believe that a real estate appraiser hired by a mortgage broker
must know the potential investors by name or specific identity . . . . It is enough that the
maker of the representation intends it to reach and influence either a particular person
or persons, known to him, or a group or class of persons, distinct from the much larger
class who might reasonably be expected sooner or later to have access to the
information and forseeably to take some action in reliance upon it. It is enough,
likewise, that the maker of the representation knows that his recipient intends to
transmit the information to a similar person, persons or group. It is sufficient, in other
words, insofar as the plaintiffs identity is concerned, that the maker supplies the
information for repetition to a certain group or class of persons and that plaintiff proves
to be one of them, even though the maker never had heard of him by name when the
information was given. 44 Cal. App.4th at 640-641.
Accord, Reisman v. KPMG Peat MarwickL.L.P., 787 N.E.2d 1060, 1067-1068 (Mass. App.
2003) (accounting firm liable for false statements in the audit because plaintiffs were among those whom
the accounting firm had reason to expect would rely on the statements because they were potential
investors.); Texas Capital Securities, Inc. v. Sandefer, 58 S.W.3d 760, 772-773 (Tex. App. 2001);
19
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Woodward v. Dietrich, 548 A.2d 301, 309-310 (Pa. Supp. 1988); and Citizens State Bank
Moundridge v. Gilmore, 603 P.2d 605, 610-611 (Kan. 1979).
The mle enunciated by the Soderberg court is consistent with the sound policy expressed in the
language of the Restatement. This naturally raises the question to what class of persons Lightner's
August 22, 2000 Letter was intended? That is a question of fact the jury will have to decide after
hearing and weighing all the evidence at trial. The evidence shows that potential financiers for Jenson
and Robbins was the class and that Bodell was a member of that class.
In the case at bar, Lightner had substantial knowledge concerning Robbins' and Jenson's
business and was significantly involved in their financing efforts-Robbins himself testified he kept
Lightner fully informed of "everything that was going on" with respect to the financing for the deal, and
that he was "in constant contact" with Lightner about these transactions. [Robbins Depo. at 326, 33031] Lightner knew that Cherokee & Walker owned part of at least one of Robbins' companies and
that Robbins was going to buy out Cherokee & Walkers' interest. [Lightner Depo. at 41-42; 107-08]
Lightner believes it likely that Bank One had conversations with Cherokee & Walker and Robbins
about their business. [Id. at 203-04] As evidenced by Bank One's refusal to make additional funding
available to him, Lightner knew Robbins did not have the money needed to buy out Cherokee &
Walker's interest. Accordingly, Lightner knew Robbins would need to raise the funds. In fact,
Lightner knew that Robbins was seeking funding for his transaction. [Id. at 157-58]
Lightner knew that Robbins and Jenson were partners. [Lightner Depo. at 39; 199-200]
Lightner knew Robbins and Jenson were close enough that they did deals on the strength of merely a
handshake. [Id. at 199-200] Lightner knew that Jenson and Robbins were "always lending money to
20

August 22, 2000 Letter, however, was nowhere to be found. Confirming that Lincoln Partners never
received the August 22, 2000 Letter, David Houser and Robert Brown, both employed with Lincoln
Partners at the time, and working as Brunswick's agents on Robbins' transaction, testified they had no
recollection of ever having seen the letter. [Houser Depo. at 51-52; Brown Depo. at 73] They did,
however, have a clear recollection of other letters and documents sent by Lightner, and they
remembered telephone calls with Lightner concerning those documents. [Houser Depo. at 16-18, 3841; Brown Depo. at 55-61]
One of the documents that was in Lincoln Partners' files was a letter written by Lightner on
Bank One letterhead dated October 19, 2000, addressed to Brown at Lincoln Partners. [See Exhibit
C] That letter recites many of the same misrepresentations contained in the August 22, 2000 letter
relied upon by Bodell. [Compare Exhibit C and Exhibit H] The October 19, 2000 letter makes no
reference whatsoever to the August 22, 2000 letter. A reasonable jmy could conclude that Robbins
confused the two letters in his testimony, or simply disbelieve his testimony for any number of reasons
including bias or his claimed poor recollection of many of the related events. Indeed, there would be no
reason to send the October 19 letter to Lincoln Partners if the August 22 letter had already been sent.
The fact that the letter was addressed "To Whom It May Concern" is also persuasive evidence
from which a jury could reject Robbins's biased testimony and find that Lightner intended and
understood that the letter would be used to raise financing from any potential financier. The significance
of the fact that the Letter was addressed "To Whom It May Concern" is underscored by the fact that
the October 19, 2000 letter Lightner sent to Lincoln Partners making similar misrepresentations was
addressed to "Rob Brown, Vice President, Lincoln Partners, LLC" and that on July 27, 2000, nearly a
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each other." [Id. at 39] While denying having any specific memory of the reason, Lightner testified he
took numerous checks to Cherokee & Walker at the direction of Robbins or Jenson, likely in the year
2000, as an employee of Bank One. [Id. at 40-41] Lightner knew that Robbins received money from
Jenson in 2000, and though admittedly fuzzy on the details, Lightner even admits he believed Robbins
used that money to re-acquire Cherokee & Walker's interest in Robbins's companies. [Id. at 259-60]
A reasonable jury could easily conclude based on these facts that Lightner intended the letter to be
shown to potential financiers or had reason to expect that would occur.
In this regard, the fact that Robbins testified in his deposition that he wanted the letter for the
purpose of (falsely) demonstrating his financial strength to Lincoln Partners is not conclusive on that
issue. It is obviously in Robbins's interest as a Defendant in this case named in a separate fraud count
to attempt to establish that Bodell has no claims based on the letter because, as Robbins has already
testified, he knew that the statements contained in the letter were false and he has potential liability
based on those false statements. A jury may simply believe, especially in light of the contradictory
evidence, that Robbins' claim is self-serving and not credible. Notably, when asked directly if he told
Lightner he intended to show the August 22, 2000 Letter to potential investors, Robbins reply was "I
don't recall." [Robbins Depo. at 325-326] Moreover, Lightner (for Chase) did not testify that he
intended that the letter be given only to Lincoln Partners.
Chase can offer no explanation why the August 22, 2000 letter is not in Lincoln Partners' files
if, as Chase contends, Lincoln Partners was the intended recipient. Chase subpoenaed Lincoln
Partners' records in this case and received documents in response. Those responsive documents
include numerous other letters and documents, including other letters from Lightner and Bank One. The
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month prior to writing the August 22 Letter, Lightner signed a letter making similar misrepresentations
addressed specifically to "James Schenk, Vice President, Brunswick Corporation." [See Exhibit G] A
reasonable jury could certainly conclude that if Lightner only intended that his August 22 Letter be given
to Lincoln Partners he would have specifically addressed the letter to Lincoln Partners as he specifically
addressed the other two letters to the companies to which they were directed.
Finally, Chase acknowledges through its Rule 30(b)(6) designees that the problem with writing
a letter addressed "To Whom It May Concern," and the reason standard banking practice dictates
such letters not be written, is that any number of people may rely on such a letter. To this end Lightner
himself testified:
Q:

Is there a reason that you wouldn't write such a letter as a private banker at Bank One
in 2000?

A:

It would be stupid. Point blank, it would be stupid because you don't know who-you
don't know who the letter is going to. You're writing to whom it may concern, that
could be a person out here on the street, and it would have no purpose for writing it.

[Lightner Depo. at 248]
Susan Mayo, Chase's other Rule 30(b)(6) designee agreed:
Q:

I think the reason-I'm just trying to establish the reason that the bank does not publish
a letter "To Whom It May Concern." What's the reason for that?

A:

Just what you said, the risk. There's risk when you have something in print, in
circulation and you don't know enough about it. We agree.

Q:

And the risk is that any person could claim, "I am to whom it may concern?"

A:

Depending on their education level, I guess you could. You could

[Mayo Depo. at 100]
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Lightner obviously intended some person or class of persons receive and rely on the
misrepresentations he made in the August 22, 2000 Letter. Clearly, whether Lightner intended his
August 22 Letter to be given only to Lincoln Partners or to anyone in the class of potential financiers
and/or whether he had reason to expect that it would be given to a member of the class of potential
financiers are questions of fact for the jury to decide based on all the evidence at trial, and particularly
after the jury has an opportunity to assess for themselves the credibility of Robbins' testimony in light of
all the contradictory evidence.
DATED this 8th day of January, 2007.
BURBIDGE MITCHELL & GROSS

RICHARD D. BUTpOGE
ROBERT J. SHELBY
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the date below written, the undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing PLAINTIFF BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION OF JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON FRAUD CLAIM was sent in the manner shown below:
VIA HAND DELIVERY TO:

VIA FIRST-CLASS MAIL TO:

John A. Beckstead
Tyler L. Murray
Emily V. Smith
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004

Jeffrey M. Jones
David W. Tufts
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
dtufts(S>,diplaw.com

jbeckstead(g),swlaw.com

DATED this ( Y

day of January, 2007.
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FILED DISTHICT CG^IT
Third Judicial n u t r i a

By„

Deputv Clorl

John A. Beckstead (0263)
Tyler L. Murray (10308)
Emily Smith Hoffman (10212)
Snell & Wilmer L L P
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., successor to Bank One, N.A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION OF JPMORGAN CHASE
BANK, N.A. FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON FRAUD CLAIM

vs.

Case No. 030917018

MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE & WALKER, L.L.C., a Utah
limited liability company; BANK ONE,
UTAH, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a
national banking association, and DOES 1
through 50,

Honorable John Paul Kennedy

Defendants.

Summary of Reply
Bank One's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Fraud Claim centers upon a letter
dated August 22, 2000 purportedly sent by Ben Lightner of Bank One (the "8-22-00 Letter"). To

establish a claim for fiaud, Bodell must prove, by cleai and convincing evidence, that, among
other things, Bank One intended or had reason to expect that Bodell, 01 a class of persons which
includes Bodell, would rely on the 8-22-00 Letter This expectation element requires that Bank
One must have had information that would lead a teasonable peison to conclude that there is an
"especial likelihood" that the letter would reach Bodell and influence its conduct

This is the

sole issue presented in Bank One's Motion
Bodell's response to the Motion is to attempt to introduce additional evidence to cieate a
genuine issue of fact as to whether Bank One had such intent or expectation, thereby precluding
summaiy judgment Much of the evidence that Bodell attempts to introduce is not material - it
does not go to the issue of Bank One's intent or expectation or it goes to events that occurred
after the date of the 8-22-00 Letter and after the Bodell loan had been made - and Bodell's
chaiactenzation of the testimony frequently oveistates what the testimony actually was
Nonetheless, even viewing all of the matenal evidence in the light most favorable to Bodell,
reasonable peisons could not conclude, by cleai and convincing evidence, that Bank One had
information demonstiating it was especially likely that the 8-22-00 Letter would influence
Bodell Theiefoie summaiy judgment is proper
Statement of Undisputed Facts
Bodell's opposition does not dispute any of the facts set forth in Bank One's Statement of
Undisputed Facts Bodell's only response is to assert that additional facts Bodell claims need to
be consideied l
Bank One does not dispute the documents oi deposition excerpts attached to Bodell's
opposition Bank One does, however, object to many of the chaiactenzations of that evidence by
Bodell as ovei statement or inaccuiate and as assuming as facts matteis that aie cleai ly disputed
1

Bodell disputes Paragraph 13 of Bank One's Statement of Undisputed Facts, which states, 'There is no other
evidence in the recoid concerning the intent or expectation of Bank One concerning the August 22, 2000 letter
(assuming the letter is authentic),' by simply stating that theie is other evidence, without any specific citation
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Bank One asks that the Couit consider only the actual testimony and documents, not Bodell's
characteiizations.2 The Paiagiaphs in Bodell's Opposition to which this applies are 23, 26, 27,
28, 30,37,38, 39, 40, 46, and 48.
Furthermore, the points asserted in the following Paragraphs of the Opposition are not
mateiial because they occuired after the date of the 8-22-00 Letter and after the Bodell loan was
made or do not go to the fraud issues- 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48,
and 49.
Most importantly, there are no genuine issues as to the facts upon which the Motion is
based and upon which Bodell relies. This matter is therefore ripe for summary judgment.
For purposes of this Motion only, Bank One assumes that Bodell can prove all elements
of its case except the intent to cause reliance and expectation of reliance requirement. Therefore,
the Court does not need to decide the numerous factual issues injected by Bodell - whether
Lightner wrote the 8-22-00 Letter or the other letters, whether the letters are false, whether the
letters should have been sent, etc.
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Bodell (and avoiding chaiacterizations
and conclusions - sticking to the facts), the Statements of Facts submitted by both paities show
that there is no genuine issue as to the following:

For example, Paragraph 13 of the Opposition states, ' Bank One did not do any due diligence, with respect to the
T o Whom It May Concern Letter' oi any of the othei letteis authored by Lightnei" The fust ptoblem is that, as
cited in Bank One's Memorandum, Lightnei does not admit to authonng the letteis and challenges their validity
Second, Bodell cites to the Lightnei Deposition at 250 18-23 to suppoit its statement but this passage does not
suppoit Bodell's chaiactenzation This passage states
Q Is it true that because you deny having wntten the letters that we just looked at, you're not awaie of
any due diligence performed by Bank One concerning any statements in those letteis9
A

Well, if- because I didn't- I didn't write the letteis, then it would be true

In other woids, Mr Lightnei meiely agieed with this convoluted question that if he did not send the letteis, then
obviously he would not have done any due diligence before not sending the letters This is very different than how
Bodell chaiactenzes this exchange
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1.

Mark Robbins testified that the 8-22-00 Letter was intended solely for Lincoln

Partners to be used in connection with the potential acquisition of the Mongoose Bicycle
Division and was never intended to be shown to anyone else. Mr. Shelby's cross-examination
repeatedly tried to shake this testimony but Mr. Robbins never wavered.
2.

The testimony of Mr. Robbins is the only direct evidence on the issue of the intent

for which the 8-22-00 Letter was written. There is no other direct evidence of this intent.
3.

Since Mr. Lightner does not acknowledge authoring the 8-22-00 letter, he

obviously does not have any knowledge of the intent in preparing the letter.
4.

Marc Jenson testified he was not involved in requesting the 8-22-00 Letter; he

received a copy of the 8-22-00 Letter from Robbins; he had no discussions with Robbins
regarding what Jenson intended to do with the letter, and Jenson had no discussions with
Lightner or anyone else at Bank One concerning the letter.
5.

Bank One has no relationship whatsoever with Bodell. Bodell was not a customer

of Bank One and had no accounts with Bank One. Michael Bodell and Ben Lightner have never
met or spoken (except in this litigation). Lightner did not even know that Bodell existed.
6.

Bank One had no knowledge whatsoever that Bodell was considering a loan to

Jenson or his company.
7.

Lightner testified that he had no idea where Robbins was going to get the money

to buy out Cherokee & Walker.
8.

Additional facts added in Bodell's Opposition:
a.

The 8-22-00 Letter was addressed "To Whom It May Concern".

b.

When Lightner allegedly wrote a second letter for Lincoln Partners dated

October 19, 2000, the letter was addressed to Rob Brown at Lincoln Partners.
c.

Lightner knew that Robbins and Jenson were friends and did business

together, often on a handshake.
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d.

Lightner knew Robbins received money from Jenson in 2000 but did not

know what was done with the money.
e.

When Lightner later moved to another bank, Robbins and Jenson moved

their business with him to the new bank.
f.

Bank One made loans to Robbins and his companies during 2000. Bank

One received financial statements and tax returns for Robbins and his companies. Bank One
conducted due diligence on their credit worthiness.
g.

Lightner knew Robbins was buying Cherokee & Walker's interest in his

h.

Lightner knew Robbins would need to borrow money to buy out the

companies.

interest of Cherokee & Walker.
i.

Lightner knew Robbins was attempting to acquire the Mongoose Bicycle

Division from Brunswick Corporation. Robbins kept Lightner advised of developments in this
transaction.
j.

Lightner attended a meeting with Robbins and Arimex International

concerning funding for Robbins to purchase the Mongoose Division.
k.

Lightner allegedly authored a letter to Brunswick Corporation dated July

27, 2000 which falsely characterized the relationship between Bank One and MadTrax Group
and falsely stated that MadTrax had the financial resources to acquire the Mongoose Division.
1.

After the 8-22-00 Letter and after the Bodell loan was made, Lightner

allegedly authored three other documents that falsely portrayed Robbins' financial condition.
Those letters were addressed to Lincoln Partners or Union Bank of Switzerland.
m.
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The files of Lincoln Partners do not contain the 8-22-00 Letter.
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Argument
I.

Legal Standards for Summary Judgment on a Fraud Claim

In its Memorandum in support of the Motion, Bank One cited authority establishing that
a fraud claim must be proved by clear and convincing evidence and this standard of proof must
be applied in ruling on a summary judgment motion. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All
U.S.242, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court explained that summary judgment
should be granted when the evidence opposing the motion is merely colorable or is not
significantly probative and is not sufficient for a jury to return a verdict for the party opposing
the motion. 477 U.S. at 249. The Court also ruled, "[W]e are convinced that the inquiry
involved in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. . . necessarily implicates the substantive
evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits." Id. at 252. When a
clear and convincing standard is required at trial, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment
the trial court must consider whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the element of
the case had been shown by a clear and convincing standard. Id. at 252. See, also, Applied
Genetics International Inc. v. First Affiliated Securities, Inc., 912 F.2d 1288 (10 n Cir. 1990)
("[T]o succeed on it fraud claim at trial, [Plaintiff] would have had to prove each element of
fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Similarly, the clear and convincing standard must be
considered in determining whether defendant's motion for summary judgment should have been
granted on the fraud claim." 912 F.2d at 1243.)
II.

Intent to Cause Reliance and Expectation of Reliance

There is no genuine dispute as to the legal standard applicable in this case. It has been
stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 531 and accompanying comments and followed in
a number of cases. Bank One has shown a prima facia case that the required evidence is not
present. To defeat the Motion, Bodell must demonstrate the existence of admissible evidence
from which a reasonable person could conclude, under a standard of clear and convincing
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evidence, that Bank One intended or had reason to expect that Bodell, or a class of persons
which includes Bodell, would rely on the 8-22-00 Letter. To establish this, the jury must be able
to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that Bank One had information that would lead a
reasonable man to conclude that there is an "especial likelihood" that the letter would reach
Bodell and influence its conduct.
The sole issue this Court needs to decide is whether Bodell has marshaled sufficient
evidence to convince this Court that a reasonable person, acting under a clear and convincing
standard, could find a special likelihood that the 8-22-00 Letter would be expected to reach
Bodell.
Other cases that have addressed this issue are instructive. In Ernst & Young LLP v.
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company, 51 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. 2001) (cited in Bank One's
Memorandum), the Plaintiff claimed to have relied on financial statements issued by Ernst &
Young in purchasing $8.5 million of notes. The Plaintiff put on evidence from financial experts
showing that international accounting firms like Ernst & Young knew and expected that people
would rely on their audit reports to make investment decisions. Nonetheless, the Texas Supreme
Court granted summary judgment for Ernst & Young finding that the intent or expectation
requirement had not been met.
In Strong v. Retail Credit Company, 552 P.2d 1025 (Colo. App. 1976), Fidelity Mutual
Life Insurance Company hired Retail Credit Company to prepare a background report on Angel
Canino to determine Canino's fitness for employment as an insurance agent. Retail Credit gave
a favorable report and failed to disclose criminal convictions of Canino. Based on the favorable
report, Fidelity then hired Canino as an insurance agent. Subsequently, Strong entrusted money
to Canino in his capacity as an insurance agent for Fidelity which Canino stole. Strong then sued
Retail Credit for fraud for providing the inaccurate report. The Court upheld the trial court's
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granting of summary judgment in favor of Retail Credit, finding that Strong was not within the
class of persons that Retail Credit would expect to be influenced by the report.
In The Colonial Bank of Alabama v. Ridley & Schweigert, et. al, 551 So. 2d 390 (Ala.
1989), the Defendants were auditors who provided annual financial statements. The auditors
provided multiple copies of the financial statements, suggesting knowledge that the audit would
be provided to others. In the course of performing the audit, the auditors sent a standard bank
confirmation to Colonial Bank of Alabama, showing the auditors lcnew of the relationship with
the bank. The bank made loans to the plaintiff in reliance on the financial statements. The bank
sued the auditors for fraud based on inaccurate information in the financial statements. The trial
court granted summary judgment for the auditors. The Alabama Supreme Court upheld the
summary judgment, finding there was insufficient evidence to show that the auditors were aware
that the bank would rely on the audited financial statements.
Tar a Capital Partners I LP. v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 2004 WL 1119947 (Tex. App.
2004) also sustained summary judgment in favor of the defendant auditors. Evidence that the
auditors were generally aware of the investor's reliance on financial statements and that
corporate management held conference calls with those investors to discuss financial information
was not sufficient to raise a fact issue on intent to induce reliance.
The evidence cited by Bodell is less compelling than the evidence in the above cases.
Bodell has not shown sufficient evidence that a reasonable person could conclude, by clear and
convincing evidence, that there was a special likelihood that the 8-22-00 Letter would reach
Bodell and influence its conduct.
The only evidence on the purpose of the 8-22-00 Letter is the testimony of Mark Robbins
that the letter was intended solely for Lincoln Partners, not Bodell. Robbins' testimony did not
change under repeated cross-examination. The subject matter of the 8-22-00 Letter is a loan to
Robbins and associates from Arimex International, which was to be used for the Mongoose

428547 1
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acquisition. The content of the letter reinforces that the letter was intended only for Lincoln
Partners. The only rebuttal Bodell can offer is that a jury might decide not to believe Robbins.
Bodell relies on evidence that Bank One knew Robbins and Jenson were involved in
businesses together and Bank One knew that Robbins was buying out the interest of Cherokee &
Walker in his businesses and would need to borrow money to do this. But Bank One knew
nothing about how this buy-out would be financed. Bank One did not know that Jenson would
loan the funds to Robbins. Bank One had no information that Jenson would borrow the money
from Bodell. Bank One had never heard of Bodell and didn't even know Bodell existed. There
was no relationship whatsoever between Bank One and Bodell. There is no evidence that Bank
One expected the 8-22-00 Letter would be used for any purpose other than the Mongoose
acquisition.
The fact that the 8-22-00 Letter is addressed "To Whom It May Concern" does not
change this analysis. The undisputed testimony of Mark Robbins is that the letter was intended
solely for Lincoln Partners.

Even without that testimony, this form of address does not

demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a letter discussing the financing from Arimex
International, which was to be used to finance the Mongoose acquisition, was expected to be
used to solicit investors for totally unrelated projects.
Other documents allegedly authored by Bank One subsequent to when the Bodell loan
was made are not relevant or material to the intent to induce or expectation requirement
concerning the 8-22-00 Letter. Bodell cites deposition testimony from Bank One representatives
that the 8-22-00 Letter should not have been sent and did not meet banking standards of practice,
apparently in an attempt to show breach of a duty. Breach of duty is an element of a negligence
claim, not a fraud claim. The elements of intent to induce and expectation of reliance are legal
doctrines, determined by the law and not by testimony of witnesses as to whether a letter was
appropriate.

428547 1
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Bank One's situation is identical to the illustration given in the official commentary to
Restatement § 531 (cited in Bank One's Memorandum at p. 17):
A [Bank One] [allegedly] makes fraudulent statements concerning the
financial standing of B [MadTrax Group LLC, Robbins, and Jenson] to C
[Robbins] and asks him to repeat them to D [Lincoln Partners] for the
purpose of inducing D [Lincoln Partners] to [sell the Mongoose Bike
Division] to B [MadTrax Group LLC, Robbins, and Jenson]. A [Bank One]
does not intend and has no reason to expect that C [Robbins] will repeat the
statements to anyone other than D [Lincoln Partners]. C [Robbins] repeats
them to [Jenson, who in turn,] repeats them to E [Bodell], who relies upon
the statements and extends credit to B [Jenson], A [Bank One] is not liable
to E [Bodell] under the rule stated in [Restatement (Second) of Torts § 531].
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 531 illus 2. (modified).
The only direct evidence of Bank One's intent is the testimony of Mark Robbins that
unequivocally maintains that the 8-22-00 Letter was intended only for Lincoln Partners. Bank
One did not know that Bodell even existed and did not know that Robbins would give the 8-2200 Letter to Jenson, who would in turn give it to Bodell to induce a loan. There is no evidence,
particularly under a clear and convincing standard of proof, that Bank One had any expectation
of a special likelihood that the 8-22-00 Letter would be used for any other purpose. Just as in the
illustration to the Restatement, Bank One is not liable to Bodell.
Conclusion
There is no genuine issue as to the facts pertinent to Bank One's Motion, only disputes as
to the characterizations of those facts by Bodell. There is no genuine dispute as to the legal
requirements for Bank One to be liable to Bodell based on the 8-22-00 Letter. The motion to
dismiss the fraud claim is ripe for summary judgment. The only issue is whether a reasonable
person could find, by clear and convincing evidence, that Bank One intended or had reason to
expect that Bodell, or a class of persons which includes Bodell, would rely on the 8-22-00 Letter.
To meet this test, the reasonable person must conclude that there was an "especial likelihood"
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that the letter would reach Bodell and influence its conduct Bodell has failed to demonstrate the
existence of such evidence and thetefoie the Motion should be granted
Dated J a n u a i y ^ 2007

Jora-Wv Becksteld
Tyler L Murray
Emily Smith Hoffman
Snell & Wilmer L L P
Attorneys for Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N A , successor to Bank One, N A

3

Bodell s Opposition asserts that Bank One is only entitled to file one summary judgment in this action and having
filed its Motion for Paitial Summaiy Judgment on Fiaud Claim, is now piecluded from filing any othei summaiy
judgment motion Opposition Memo , pp 3 4 Since Bank One has only filed one motion, it is pecuhai that Bodell
has laised this aigument However, Bank One will lespond to this point lest its silence be constiued as a concession
As cited by Bodell, at the heaiing more than a year ago on Januaiy 6, 2006, the Court expiessed its piefeience for
the handling of summary judgment motions Counsel for Bank One and Robbins have discussed how to appioach
the complex issues in this case in a way that will be lesponsive to the Court's direction, including filing a joint
statement of material facts At the heaiing on Bodelfs Motion to Amend on Septembei 18, 2006, after granting the
Motion to Amend, the Court expiessly duected the parties to file any summary judgment motions on the new fiaud
claim by November 30, 2006, which Bank One did In diaftmg the Oidei for that heaiing, Mr Tufts did not include
this direction in the Older Bank One is not cleai what the Court intended by its statements on Januaiy 6 but the
Court was clear in its duection on Novembei 30, which Bank One interpieted as superseding any limitations
imposed on Januaiy 6 At the appiopnate time, the parties need to discuss with the Court the possible summary
judgment motions in this case and how the Court wants the parties to proceed But that is a matter for another day
-P8M7 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
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day of January, 2007, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was mailed via first class United States mail, postage pre-paid, to the following:
Richard D. Burbidge
Jefferson W. Gross
Robert J. Shelby
Burbidge Mitchell & Gross
Parkside Tower
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jeffrey M. Jones
David W. Tufts
Durham Jones & Pinegar
111 E.Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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John A. Beckstead (0263)
H. Douglas Owens (7762)
Romaine C. Marshall (9654)
HOLLAND & HART LLP
60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)799-5800
Facsimile: (801)799-5700
Attorneys for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., successor to Bank One, N.A.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

BANK ONE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S FRAUD
AND NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS
Case No. 030917018

MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE & WALKER, L.L.C., a Utah
limited liability company; BANK ONE,
UTAH, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a
national banking association, and DOES 1
through 50,

Honorable John Paul Kennedy

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A., as successor by merger to Bank One, N.A. ("Bank One"), moves this Court for

3732317.1

summary judgment on the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims of Plaintiff Bodell
Construction Company on the following grounds:
1.

There was no representation of a past or presently existing fact.

2.

The representations were not false.

3.

Any reliance was unreasonable.

4.

All claims have been previously satisfied by an accord and satisfaction.

5.

Bank One did not have the required pecuniary interest in the loan made by

Plaintiff (negligent misrepresentation claim only).
6.

Bank One was not in a superior position to ascertain the facts (negligent

misrepresentation claim only).
7.

Plaintiff was not a foreseeable recipient of the letter from Bank One (negligent

misrepresentation claim only).1
This Motion is supported by a Memorandum in Support of Bank One's Motion for
Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims filed herewith
and the Exhibits thereto.
Bank One requests that summary judgment be entered in its favor on all claims and
causes of action, the Complaint be dismissed upon the merits, and Bank One be awarded its
costs.

1

Bank One previously filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Fraud Claim dated November 29,
2006 seeking summary judgment on Plaintiffs fraud claim, also on the theory that Plaintiff was not a
foreseeable recipient of the letter. This Motion has been fully briefed, argued and is under advisement.
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Dated: July 2, 2007.

John A. Beckstead
'H. Douglas Owens
Romaine C. Marshall
Holland & Hart LLP
Attorneys for Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., successor to Bank One, N.A.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of July, 2007, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was mailed via email and first class United States mail, postage pre-paid, to the following:
Richard D. Burbidge, rburbidge@bmgtrial.com
Jefferson W. Gross, jwgross@bmgtrial.com
Robert J. Shelby, rshelby@bmgtrial.com
Burbidge Mitchell & Gross
Parkside Tower
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David W. Tufts, dtufts@diplaw.com
Jason R. Hull, ihull@diplaw.com
Durham Jones & Pinegar
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Tab 6

•'iiL'.D DISTRICT CGU'K:

John A. Beckstead, #0263
H. Douglas Owens, #7762
Romaine C. Marshall, #9654
HOLLAND & HART LLP

60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1031
Telephone: (801)799-5800
Fax: (801)799-5700
Attorneys for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
as successor to Bank One, N.A.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, L.L.C.,
a Utah limited liability company; CHEROKEE
& WALKER, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; BANK ONE, UTAH, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, a national banking association,
and DOES 1 through 50,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
BANK ONE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
PLAINTIFF'S FRAUD AND
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
CLAIMS
Civil No. 030917018
Judge John P. Kennedy

Defendant.

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A., as successor by merger to Bank One, N.A. ("Bank One"), respectfully submits this
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Fraud and
Negligent Misrepresentation Claims.
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As the Court knows from past hearings, this case is factually and legally complex. After
some four years of discovery, depositions, motions and rulings, the case is now set for a jury trial
commencing October 22, 2007. The Court has also set a deadline of July 1, 2007 for the filing of
dispositive motions.

The summary judgment theories in this Motion are also complex.

Notwithstanding this complexity, the facts and issues can be distilled into clear points as to
which there is no genuine issue of material fact. This case is ripe for summary judgment on
numerous alternative theories.

The parties should not be subjected to the very substantial

expense and time of a lengthy trial when the case can and should be resolved by summary
judgment.1
Early in this case, just six weeks after filing its Answer to the Complaint, Bank One filed
its Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 29, 2003, based on the argument that the
settlement agreement between Bodell Construction Company and MSF Properties/Marc Jenson
was an accord and satisfaction which satisfied and extinguished the debt upon which Bodell now
attempts to sue Bank One. The Motion was denied by the Hon. William H. Bohling. Bank One
reasserts this argument as part of this Motion.2

1

In the Scheduling Order and Order on Motions filed May 29, 2007, the Court ordered: "Motions for
summary judgment based on multiple theories may be filed as separate motions or as consolidated
motions. If consolidated motions are filed, the memorandum in support of the consolidated motion and
the memorandum opposing consolidated motions may be overlength, not to exceed 10 pages of argument
for each theory advanced, and the reply memorandum may be over-length, not to exceed 5 pages of
argument for each theory." Bank One has elected to file this consolidated motion, the length of which is
well below the limits ordered by the Court,
2
This argument is still ripe and Bank One again asserts this argument. A trial judge has discretion to
reconsider a summary judgment argument. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah 1996).
vu

Bank One also filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Fraud Claim dated
November 29, 2006, based on the theory that Plaintiff was not a foreseeable recipient of the letter
upon which Plaintiff claims to have relied. Hearing on that Motion was held April 6, 2007 and
the Motion was taken under advisement and no ruling has been issued. This Motion presents a
parallel argument on the negligent misrepresentation claim.
Oral argument on all dispositive motions is set for September 10, 2007, at 9:00 a.m.
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2000, Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company ("Bodell") made a loan in
the amount of $4 million (the "Bodell Loan") to MSF Properties, L.C. (UMSF"), a company
owned and managed by Marc Jenson ("Jenson"), a long-time acquaintance of Bodell's president,
Michael Bodell. This loan promised an incredible return of 1% per week - 52% per annum plus an $80,000 loan origination fee to Bodell. This wildly profitable loan was evidenced only
by a promissory note and personal guarantee from Jenson. Bodell neither requested nor received
any security for repayment of the loan. Thus, when MSF and Jenson defaulted on the Bodell
Loan, Bodell's remedy was limited to seeking repayment under the note and guaranty. Three
years later, Bodell settled its claims with MSF and Jenson for $3 million.
During that three year period, Bodell never made a claim against Bank One. In fact,
Bodell never even advised Bank One of the situation. Bank One did not even know the Bodell
Loan existed. Finally, just before expiration of the statute of limitations, without a prior demand
letter or any other communication, Bodell filed this lawsuit against Bank One and other third
"Moreover, a judge is free to change a ruling until a final decision is formally rendered." Tremblay v.
Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
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parties unrelated to the Bodell Loan, seeking to recoup money in addition to what had already
been accepted from Jenson.
misrepresentation.

Bodell's claims against Bank One are for fraud and negligent

Bodell's sole allegation in support of its claims is that Bodell relied on

statements about a future event made in a letter on Bank One letterhead that was not addressed to
Bodell and which Bodell never verified or investigated.
Bank One now seeks summary judgment on the following theories and grounds (in
addition to the pending summary judgment motion on the fraud claim which is under
advisement):
1.

There was no representation of a past or presently existing fact.

2.

The representations were not false.

3.

Any reliance was unreasonable.

4.

All claims have been previously satisfied by an accord and satisfaction.

5.

Bank One did not have the required pecuniary interest in the Bodell Loan

(negligent misrepresentation claim only).
6.

Bank One was not in a superior position to ascertain the facts (negligent

misrepresentation claim only).
7.

Bodell was not a foreseeable recipient of the Lightner Letter (negligent

misrepresentation claim only).
Bodell's tale of loss is a pointed reminder that if a deal appears too good to be true, it
probably is. But Bodell's desire to recoup losses in addition to those already recovered from
Jenson do not justify its unsubstantiated claim against Bank One. As set forth below, Bodell has

IX

not offered any evidence to satisfy the essential elements of its fraud or negligent
misrepresentation claims. Bank One is therefore entitled to summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
A.

Mark Robbins and His Bicycle Businesses
1.

Defendant Mark Robbins was involved in the bicycle business. In 1998, Mark

Robbins and others formed Wasatch Cycle, Inc. ("Wasatch Cycle"), which designed, sold and
distributed bicycles to LDS missionaries. Ex. 1, Robbins Dep. at 40-45, 49. In 2000, Robbins
started a company known as Vtrax Sports LLC ("Vtrax Sports"). Vtrax's plan was to sell and
distribute high-end bicycles through various channels, including large mass-merchandisers like
Sears and Wal-Mart. Ex. 2, Robbins Dep. at 59-60; 67-70. Also in 2000, Robbins founded a
company called madwagon.com LLC (sometimes referred to in the Robbins deposition as
Madwagon, LLC) which attempted to sell bicycles on college campuses and via the Internet, Ex.
3, Robbins Dep. at 76.
B.

Mark Robbins' Attempt to Acquire Mongoose, the August 22, 2000 Letter, and Its
Intended Use in Connection With the Planned Mongoose Transaction
2.

In the summer of 2000, Robbins also began pursuing an opportunity to buy the

Mongoose Bicycle Division from Brunswick Corporation. Robbins formed a company called
MadTrax Group LLC ("MadTrax") to pursue this acquisition.

He sent letters on behalf of

MadTrax confirming its interest in the acquisition. Ex. 4, Robbins Dep. at 81; 194-95; Ex. 5,
July 11, 2000 Letter from MadTrax to Brunswick;3 Ex. 7, July 13, 2000 Letter from MadTrax to

3

For an evidentiary foundation for this document, see Ex. 6, Robbins Dep. at 486-487.
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Brunswick.
3.

In response, Brunswick required MadTrax to agree to maintain the confidentiality

of the materials Brunswick provided to enable MadTrax to evaluate the Mongoose Bicycle
Division. Ex. 8, July 13, 2000 Confidentiality Letter Agreement.5
4.

In addition, on August 9, 2000, Lincoln Partners, the investment banking firm

representing Brunswick in the sale of the Mongoose Division, sent a letter to Trevor Larson,
MadTrax CFO, asking for, among other things, "a description of your sources and level of
financing for the proposed transaction." Ex. 9, August 9, 2000 Letter from Lincoln Partners to
Trevor Larson.6
5.

Robbins was a client of Bank One's private banking services at this time. Bank

One employee Benjamin Lightner was Mr. Robbins' private banker. Robbins testified that in
August 2000, he had conversations with Lightner about the fact that "Lincoln Partners and all of
the investment bankers were, you know, looking for verification of funding and stuff like that."
Robbins testified that he asked Lightner to draft a letter for Lincoln Partners regarding potential
funding sources for MadTrax. Ex. 11, Robbins Dep. at 308-310, 316-17, 324-25.
6.

One of Robbins' potential funding sources for the Mongoose acquisition was a

loan from Arimex Investments, Ltd. ("Arimex"). Robbins (with Lightner in attendance on at
least one occasion) had discussions with Arimex about a potential loan. Ex. 12, Robbins Dep. at
255-257; Ex. 13, Lightner Dep. at 156-57.
For an evidentiary foundation for this document, see id.
* For an evidentiary foundation for this document, see Ex. 6.
6
For an evidentiary foundation for this document, see Ex. 10, Robbins Dep. at 488.
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7.

Robbins claims that Lightner produced a letter dated August 22, 2000 in response

to the request regarding funding sources. The letter reads:
To:

Whom it May Concern

Re:

Mad Trax Group, LLC

MadTrax Group, LLC (the "Company") and its individual
members Mark Robbins and Marc Jenson (the "Members") will be
depositing $165,000,000 into Bank One, Utah NA. The funding is
coming from a loan agreement between MadTrax Group, LLC, a
Utah limited liability company and Arimex Investments, LTD., a
Bahamian corporation.
The sum of $165,000,000 will be
deposited into an interest bearing account in the name of the
Company and managed by its Members.
Should you have any questions with respect to this matter,
please contact the Undersigned.
Ben Lightner
Wealth Advisor
Private Banking Group
Ex. 14, August 22, 2000 Letter (the "Lightner Letter").7
8.

As of the date of the Lightner Letter, Robbins believed that Arimex was willing

and able to make the Arimex Loan to MadTrax as described in the letter. Ex. 16, Robbins Dep.
at 286, 447-448. Indeed, a loan agreement had been signed by Arimex. Id. at 448; Ex. 17,
o

Arimex Loan Agreement.

7

Lightner testified that he was "unable to say either way" whether he wrote the August 22 letter but noted
that his signature looked strange. Ex. 15, Lightner Dep. at 239. No copies of the August 22 Letter or any
other evidence of the letter, or any of the other letters allegedly authored by Lightner have been found in
the files of Bank One. The authenticity and validity of the Lightner Letter is a major, disputed issue in
this case. However, for purposes of this Motion, it can be assumed arguendo that the letter is authentic
and was authored by Lightner.
8
For an evidentiary foundation for this document, see Ex. 18, Robbins Dep. at 85.
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9.

At all times, Robbins believed that Arimex would fund the Arimex Loan if

Robbins asked Arimex to do so. Ex. 16, Robbins Dep. at 286, 447- 448.
10.

Bank One was not a party to the Arimex Loan Agreement. Ex. 17, Arimex Loan

Agreement.
11.

The Lightner Letter was intended for Lincoln Partners in connection with the

proposed Mongoose acquisition, and was not intended for other potential investors or for use in
any other transaction. Under examination, Robbins testified:
Q: You told Mr. Lightner that you needed a letter like this to show
potential investors as evidence of, you know, your financial backing.
A: Potential investors—its Lincoln Partners.

Q: And what do you remember discussing with Ben Lightner about what
use you intended to make of this letter?
A: That the letter was being used for Lincoln Partners and - I mean we
were having to do verifications and all that kind of stuff through that period.

Q: Was it your intention in obtaining a letter like this that you would show
it to potential investors as needed?
A: No. I mean, I don't recall that, but I mean, this letter was intended for
Lincoln Partners.
***

Q: When you asked for this letter, was it your intention that be shown to
anyone other than Lincoln Partners?
A: No.

xin

Ex. 19, Robbins Dep. 324, 326-327, 446.
12.

On September 27, 2000, Lincoln Partners informed Trevor Larson that Brunswick

"would like to invite [MadTrax] to submit a proposal to acquire [Mongoose.]"

Ex. 20,

September 27, 2000 Letter from Lincoln Partners to V-Trax.9
13.

MadTrax hired Duff & Phelps to assist in its efforts to bid for the Mongoose

Division, but despite help from Duff & Phelps, and despite making several offers for Mongoose
ranging from $63 million to $76.6 million, MadTrax was not the winning bidder and was
therefore unable to make the purchase. Ex. 22, Robbins Dep. at 200-03; Ex. 23, October 10,
2000 Letter from MadTrax to Lincoln Partners;10 Ex. 25, November 3, 2000 Letter from
MadTrax to Lincoln Partners;11 Ex. 27, November 8, 2000 Letter from MadTrax to Lincoln
Partners.12
14.

There is no other evidence in the record concerning the intent or expectation of

Bank One concerning the use to be made of the Lightner Letter.
C.

Robbins Agrees to Purchase Cherokee & Walker LLC's Interest in Wasatch Cycle,
Madwagon, and Vtrax
15.

In 2000, around the same time he was working on the potential Mongoose

transaction, Robbins was also working on a transaction through which he would purchase the
50% interest in Wasatch Cycle, Madwagon, and Vtrax owned by Cherokee & Walker LLC
("Cherokee & Walker"). Ex. 29, Robbins Dep. 145, 150-52.

9

For an evidentiary foundation for this document, see Ex. 21, Robbins Dep. at 226.
For an evidentiary foundation for this document, see Ex. 24, Robbins Dep. at 228.
11
For an evidentiary foundation for this document, see Ex. 26, Robbins Dep. at 243.
12
For an evidentiary foundation for this document, see Ex. 28, Robbins Dep. at 503.
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16.

Cherokee & Walker had purchased its 50% interest in these companies on January

7, 2000. Ex. 30, January 7, 2000 Membership Interest Purchase Agreement.13
17.

By June 10, 2000, Robbins and Cherokee & Walker had negotiated an agreement

through which Robbins would repurchase Cherokee & Walker's 50% interest for approximately
$8 million. Ex. 32, June 10, 2000 Purchase and Settlement Agreement;14 Ex. 34, Robbins Dep.
at 172-73.
18.

Robbins needed to borrow or raise the $8 million to pay Cherokee & Walker, and

ultimately identified an individual named Marc Jenson as a potential source of funds for the
Cherokee & Walker buyout. Ex. 35, Robbins Dep. at 182-83.
D.

Marc Jenson and the Bodell Loan
19.

Jenson was in the business of borrowing funds and then loaning those funds to

others. Jenson profits on the difference between the interest he pays to borrow the money and
the interest he receives from lending the money. Ex. 36, Jenson Dep. at 305.
20.

In mid-2000, Jenson met Robbins and learned that Robbins needed $8 million to

buy out Cherokee & Walker's interest. After negotiations, Jenson agreed to loan Robbins the $8
million. Ex. 37, Jenson Dep. at 43-46; 48.
21.

Jenson's plan was to fund the Robbins loan with $4 million of Jenson's own

money and $4 million from someone else.

Accordingly, Jenson approached Mike Bodell,

president of Bodell Construction Company, about the possibility of borrowing $4 million that

13
14

For an evidentiary foundation for this document, see Ex. 31 Robbins Dep. at 190-191.
For an evidentiary foundation for this document, see Ex. 33, Robbins Dep. at 169-170.
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Jenson would, in turn, loan to Robbins for the Cherokee & Walker buyout. Ex. 38, Jenson Dep.
at 72-73; 102; Ex. 39, Bodell Dep. at 42-45.
22.

Bodell had known Jenson for nearly twenty years, and had previously lent Jenson

$1 million. Ex. 40, Bodell Dep. at 10, 18-20, 31.
23.

Jenson testified that he received a copy of the Lightner Letter from Robbins.

Jenson, however, had no discussions with Robbins regarding what Jenson intended to do with the
letter. Ex. 41, Jenson Dep. at 215-16; Ex. 42, Robbins Dep. at 329.
24.

Jenson likewise recalls no discussions with Lightner, or anyone else at Bank One,

about the letter and was not involved in requesting that it be drafted. Nevertheless, as part of the
discussion between Jenson and Bodell, Jenson provided a copy of the Lightner Letter to Bodell.
Ex. 43, Jenson Dep. at 187, 215-16, 219, 227; Ex. 44, Bodell Dep. at 49-50.
25.

Prior to making the Bodell Loan, no representation was made to Bodell that the

$165 million deposit described in the Lightner Letter had been made. Ex. 45, Bodell Disc. Resp.
at 6, Response to Req. for Adm. No. 5 (emphasis in original).
26.

Bodell testified that he does not know whether the representations made in the

Lightner Letter were false when made. Ex. 46, Bodell Dep. at 97.
27.

Bodell Construction Company's Chief Financial Officer, Merrill Weight, testified

that as far as he knows, the Lightner Letter is a "valid letter." Ex. 47, Weight Dep. at 94.
28.

Bodell did not contact Bank One to verify the contents of the Lightner Letter. Ex.

48, Bodell Dep. at 56, 71,73.
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29.

Similarly, Bodell did not conduct any due diligence relating to Arimex or its

principals. Ex. 49, Bodell Dep. at 55-56.
30.

On August 30, 2000, Bodell Construction Company loaned $4 million to MSF

Properties, LC (a company owned by Marc Jenson) and obtained a personal guaranty from
Jenson. Bank One was not a party to this loan. Ex. 50, August 30, 2000 Promissory Note;15 Ex.
52, August 30, 2000 Guaranty16 (collectively the "Bodell Loan").
31.

The terms of the Bodell Loan required Jenson to pay a loan fee of $80,000 and to

pay interest of 1% per week or 52% per year. The loan was due in 30 days. Ex. 40, Bodell Dep.
at 19-20.
E.

There Is No Relationship Whatsoever Between Bank One and Bodell
32.

At the time of the Lightner Letter, Bodell had no relationship whatsoever with

Bank One. Neither he nor his company was a customer and they had no accounts at Bank One.
Bodell does not even know who Bank One employee Lightner is. Before making the loan to
Jenson, Bodell never contacted Lightner or anyone else at Bank One. Ex. 54, Bodell Dep. at 1112, 56; Ex. 55, Weight Dep. at 65; Ex. 56, Bodell Disc. Resp. at 5, Response to Req. for Adm.
No. 2.
33.

Similarly, while Lightner was aware that Robbins and Jenson had some sort of

business relationship, Lightner recalls no discussions about Jenson loaning Robbins $8 million in
connection with his bicycle business. Ex. 57, Lightner Dep. at 39.

15
16

For an evidentiary foundation for this document, see Ex. 51, Weight Dep. at 97-98.
For an evidentiary foundation for this document, see Ex. 53, Weight Dep. at 31-32.
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34.

Bank One knew nothing about Bodell, or the loan that Bodell planned to make to

Jenson, and had no discussions with Jenson about Bodell or Bodell Construction.

Ex. 58,

Lightner Dep. at 39, 205, 259.
35.

Indeed, when asked directly about whether he knew where Jenson was getting

money to loan to Robbins so that Robbins could buy out Cherokee & Walker, Lightner
responded that he had "no idea." Lightner further testified that "I wouldn't know [Bodell] if he
walked in here today." Ex. 59, Lightner Dep. at 259.
36.

None of the funds from the Bodell Loan were paid to Bank One or were for Bank

One's benefit. Ex. 60, Bodell Disc. Resp. at 18, Response to Int. No. 14; Ex. 61, Robbins Dep.
at 449-450.
F.

Jenson Settles with Bodell
37.

Jenson failed to repay the Bodell Loan. First Amended Compl. ^ 18.

38.

For many months, Bodell sought repayment from Jenson—sometimes going so

far as to make hourly calls to Jenson. Ex. 62, Jenson Dep. at 329-331. Jenson made several
preliminary payments on the note. Ex. 63, Jenson Dep. 333-336.
39.

Finally, on or about March 18, 2003, Bodell and Jenson entered into a Settlement

Agreement (the "Settlement Agreement"). Ex. 64, Settlement Agreement.17
40.

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Jenson paid Bodell $3 million and Bodell

accepted those funds as payment in full of the Bodell Loan. Ex. 64, Settlement Agreement, ^[ 12.
17

For an evidentiary foundation for this document, see Ex. 65, Jenson Dep, at 246.
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41.

Paragraph 2 of the Settlement Agreement states:
Each of Bodell and BCC [Bodell Construction Company], for
himself, itself, their affiliates and for all persons or entities claiming by,
through or under him, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and
forever discharges MSF, its affiliates and their respective members,
managers, officers, employees and agents (each, including without
limitation Jenson, an "MSF Party") from any and all claims, allegations of
fraud, charges, demands, losses, damages, obligations, liabilities,
grievances, causes of action, or suits at law and equity of whatsoever kind
and nature, expenses, costs and attorney fees, whether known or unknown,
suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated (each, a "Claim"),
arising out of all past affiliations and transactions among Bodell, BCC and
any MSF Party, including, but not limited to, the Loans and all related
arrangements and transactions, (b) without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, acknowledges and agrees that the obligations of the MSF
Parties in connection with the Loans, including all principal and
interest that may have been deemed to have accrued thereon, are
hereby deemed fully satisfied and repaid in full; provided that such
releases shall not apply to any obligation of MSF or Jenson set forth in this
Agreement to be performed or observed after the execution and delivery
hereof.

Ex. 64, Settlement Agreement f 2 (emphasis added).
42.

Just over four months after executing the Settlement Agreement, Bodell sued

Bank One, claiming that it was wrongfully induced to loan money to Jenson based on the
Lightner Letter. Complaint, dated July 31, 2003.
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Schafir
v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). In
addition, summary judgment should be entered if a party who fails to establish an element
essential to that party's case "because the complete failure of proof on an essential element of the
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."

Id. at 1393 (citing

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
Further, "the elements of fraud . . . must be proven by 'clear and convincing evidence."'
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exck, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991). The same rule applies to negligent
misrepresentation. See Jar dine v. Brunswick Corp., 423 P.2d 659, 663 (Utah 1967) (reversing
judgment on claim for negligent misrepresentation because it was not proven "by the required
quantum of clear and convincing evidence."). This burden applies at the summary judgment
stage, meaning that a plaintiff "must be able to prove each element of fraud by clear and
convincing evidence" to prevail at summary judgment. Andalex Resources v. Myers, 871 P.2d
1042, 1046 (UtahCt. App. 1994). See also Applied Genetics MX Inc. v. First Affiliated Secur.,
Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that "the clear and convincing standard must
be considered in determining whether defendant's motion for summary judgment should have
been granted on the fraud claim").
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ARGUMENT
The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Bodell cannot satisfy several elements on
which it must shoulder the burden of proof to establish its claims for fraud and negligent
misrepresentation against Bank One.
To obtain relief on a fraud claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant made a
representation, (2) concerning a presently existing material fact, (3) which was false, (4) which
the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he or she had
insufficient knowledge on which to base such representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the
other party to act upon it; and that (6) the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its
falsity, did in fact rely upon it to his injury. Robinson v. Tripco Investment, Inc., 21 P.3d 219,
223 (Utah Ct. App. 2000).
To obtain relief on a negligent misrepresentation claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the
defendant had a pecuniary interest in a transaction, (2) the defendant was in a superior position to
know material facts about that transaction, (3) the defendant carelessly or negligently made a
false representation concerning such facts, (4) the defendant expected the plaintiff to rely and act
on such representation, (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on such representation, and (6) suffered
harm as a result thereof. Jardine, 423 P.2d at 662. Additionally, the defendant's representation
must concern a past or presently existing fact, Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 7, 645
P.2d 608, 612 (Utah 1982), and the plaintiff must have been a foreseeable recipient of the
representation. Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 305 n.l (Utah
1983).
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Bodell's claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation fail because the facts unearthed
in discovery establish that (1) there was no representation of a presently existing fact, (2) the
representations were not false when made, (3) the reliance placed on the statements was not
reasonable, and (4) there was an accord and satisfaction. The negligent misrepresentation claim
fails for the additional reasons that (5) Bank One had no pecuniary interest in the alleged
fraudulent transaction, (6) Bank One was not in a position superior to Bodell to know of the
alleged falsity of the statements, and (7) Bodell was not the foreseeable recipient of the alleged
fraudulent statements.

I.

THE FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS FAIL
BECAUSE THE ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATION DOES NOT RELATE TO
A PAST OR PRESENTLY EXISTING FACT.
Bodell's fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims against Bank One are based on a

statement in the Lightner Letter that a certain sum uwill be" deposited into an account at Bank
One. See Exhibit 14. The Lightner Letter does not contain a representation that a certain sum
was on deposit with Bank One or that a loan to MadTrax was ever made. To be clear, the
Lightner Letter does not contain a representation that a deposit had been verified by Bank One.
Rather, it is undisputed that the only representations made in the Lightner Letter refer to funds
that were believed to be loan proceeds coming from a third party, Arimex, that were merely
intended to be deposited into a Bank One account. Because the alleged misrepresentation relates
only to a possible future event, Bodell cannot produce evidence of an element essential to its
misrepresentation claims.
In order to prevail on a fraud or negligent misrepresentation claim, the representation
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must relate to a past or presently existing fact.

Robinson, 21 P.3d at 223 (fraud); Cerritos

Trucking Co., 645 P.2d at 612 (negligent misrepresentation). In Cerritos Trucking, the Court
explained that a company's representation regarding its intention to enter into a transaction was
not actionable because the company was making a good faith statement about a future event.
645 P.2d at 612. The court distinguished cases in which there was a representation that clearly
related to a past or presently existing fact, stating that "[defendants do not cite to us any case
law or authority, and we are aware of none, wherein the law concerning negligent
misrepresentations has been extended to fact situations involving the state of a person's mind."
Id.
Similarly, in Jardine, the court explained that where the representation at issue was a
statement regarding a party's ability to build and finance a commercial building in the future,
such a statement "could well be understood as reflecting an opinion only." 423 P.2d at 662. The
court went on to state that "there is actually no way of knowing whether [the statement of
opinion] was true or false when it was made . . . ." Id. As in Cerritos Trucking and Jardine, the
representation at issue in this case relates to the occurrence of an event in the future. Nothing in
the Lightner Letter can be construed as a representation of a past or presently existing fact.
Decisions from other jurisdictions also hold that a representation relating to a future event
cannot give rise to a claim for misrepresentation. For example, in Bank of Shaw v. Posey, 573
So.2d 1355 (Miss. 1990), the plaintiffs, customers of the defendant bank, alleged that the bank
negligently misrepresented its willingness to extend future financing to the plaintiffs. In holding
that the trial court should have granted the bank's motion for a directed verdict, the Mississippi

3

Z2r*zm

Supreme Court explained that even if the representation was made, "it was a promise of future
conduct and not a statement of fact sufficient to constitute the kind of representation which
would support a claim of negligent misrepresentation." Id. at 1360. The court continued by
stating that "[i]t is well settled law that . . .

the first element of the tort of negligent

misrepresentation must involve a representation concerning a past or present fact," and that "the
promise of future conduct is, as a matter of law, not such a representation as will support
recovery under a theory of negligent misrepresentation"

Id. (emphasis added). See also Hydro

Investors, Inc. v. Trafalgar Power Inc., 227 F.3d 8, 20-21 (2d Cir. 2000) (defendant engineering
firm's "overly optimistic estimates" to plaintiff about power plant's expected output were merely
promises about future events as opposed to present representations of existing fact); Murray v.
Xerox Corp., 811 F.2d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming summary judgment because alleged
misrepresentations regarding employment promotions and transfers depended on future
circumstances and were no more than alleged breaches of promises of future conduct); Koontz v.
Thomas, 511 S.E.2d 407, 413 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (summary judgment granted because alleged
breaches of plans and designs in a construction contract were subject to the defendant's future
approval and, therefore, there could be no misrepresentation as to performance of the same); City
of Beaumont v. Excavators & Constructors, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 123, 139 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993)
(company sued for inefficiency and delay damages by excavator held not liable for negligent
misrepresentation because its representations about possible completion dates "were guesses as
to future, unknown happenings, they were not information.").
For a representation to form the basis for a fraud or negligent misrepresentation claim,
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the representation must relate to a past or presently existing fact. Statements about future events,
such as the statement in the Lightner Letter regarding a future deposit that "will be" made into a
Bank One account, are not actionable as a matter of law.
II.

THE FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS FAIL
BECAUSE BODELL CANNOT PRODUCE ANY EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT
THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE IN THE LIGHTNER LETTER WERE FALSE
WHEN MADE.
Bodelfs fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims fail as a matter of law because the

representations made in the Lightner Letter were true when made.

Bodell, who bears a

plaintiffs burden of proof, can not produce any evidence disputing the fact that the
representations made in the Lightner Letter were true at the time they were made. The President
of Bodell and the Chief Financial Officer of Bodell have even testified that they are unsure
whether the statements made in the Lightner Letter are false. See Ex. 66, Bodell Dep. at 96-97;
Ex. 67, Weight Dep. at 94. Furthermore, all that stood in the way of MadTrax receiving its $165
million from Arimex was the signature of Mark Robbins on the Arimex Loan Agreement. See
Ex. 68, Robbins Dep. at 447-48. Arimex had executed the Arimex Loan documents and all that
was necessary to consummate the loan was for Robbins/MadTrax to sign them and deliver the
note to Arimex. See id. Clearly, at the time the Lightner Letter was purportedly written, it was
contemplated that Arimex was going to loan MadTrax $165 million pursuant to the loan
documents signed by Arimex as stated in the letter. Accordingly, nothing in the Lightner Letter
was false when written and there are no facts to rebut this.
The misrepresentation of a fact is the most elementary requirement for a fraud or
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negligent misrepresentation claim. Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1994),
holds that "[c]hief among [the elements of a misrepresentation claim] . . . is the requirement that
one party misrepresent a material fact to the other party." Id. at 1393; see also Robinson, 21 P.2d
at 223 (requiring same in fraud context).

Thus in Schafir, where the defendants made

representations as to the condition of pipes in their home, and defendants believed such
representations to be true based on the information provided to them, there was no actionable
misrepresentation even though plaintiffs claimed to have detrimentally relied on the
representations (which later turned out to be untrue). Schafir, 879 P.2d at 1393.
Further, Bodell has the burden of offering evidence that the representation was false at
the time it was made. It is insufficient to allege that the representation was false because facts
arising after the making of the representation rendered it untrue. In Loosle v. First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n of Logan, 858 P.2d 999 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed summary
judgment in favor of a bank that was sued for negligent misrepresentation based upon its
appraisal of real estate. Id. at 1001. Even though the value of the real estate at issue was later
determined to be significantly different from the value represented in the bank's appraisal, the
court explained that "plaintiffs have proffered no evidence that the [original] appraisal made by
[the defendant bank] was faulty." Id. See also Reimsnyder v. Richardson, 846 So.2d 1264, 1266
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming summary judgment in favor of a bank sued for negligent
misrepresentation because there was no evidence that the statements of the bank representative
were false at the time they were made).
There is no evidence that the representations made in the Lightner Letter were false at the
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time the representations were made. As is clear from the facts existing at the time the Lightner
Letter was allegedly drafted, it was anticipated that the Arimex loan was actually going to be
made.

Without presenting facts to dispute that the representations in the Lightner Letter were

true at the time they were made, Bodell cannot establish a necessary element of its claims.
III.

THE FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS FAIL BECAUSE
BODELL'S RELIANCE ON THE LIGHTNER LETTER IN MAKING A $4
MILLION UNSECURED LOAN WAS UNREASONABLE.
While the question of reasonable reliance is usually a factual determination, Utah courts

have held that "there are instances where courts may conclude that, as a matter of law, there was
no reasonable reliance." Larsen v. Exclusive Cars, Inc., 97 P.3d 714, 715 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)
(citations omitted).

;i

[I]n order to successfully bring an action for negligent misrepresentation,

the [plaintiffs] must demonstrate that they at least took reasonable steps to ascertain the truth of
[the defendant's] representation . . . or, worded, differently, that the [plaintiffs'] reliance on [the
defendant's] statement without some further inquiry was reasonable under the circumstances."
Maack v. Res. Design & Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). See also
Robinson, 21 P.2d at 223 (requiring reasonable reliance for fraud claim). Granting summary
judgment for defendants, the Maack court held that it was unreasonable as a matter of law for
homebuyers to rely on a real estate agent's representations regarding the existence of a home
warranty without further due diligence by the homebuyers. IcL at 577-78. See also Jardine v.
Brunswick Corp., 423 P.2d 659, 662-63 (Utah 1967) ('The one who complains of being injured
by such a false representation cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever is told him, but has the
duty of exercising such degree of care to protect his own interests as would be exercised by an
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ordinary, reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances; and if he fails to do so, is
precluded from holding someone else to account for the consequences of his own neglect.");
Forsberg v. Burningham & Kimball, 892 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (same); Brown v.
Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 564 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that because plaintiffs were sophisticated
businessmen and did not conduct sufficient due diligence regarding the subject of the alleged
misrepresentations, their reliance was not reasonable as a matter of law).
In a case very similar to this one, Liggett v. Levy, 136 S.W. 299 (Mo. 1911), the
defendant bank was sued by a plaintiff alleging that it relied on a letter from the bank addressed
"To Whom it May Concern." The body of the letter stated as follows: "This letter will be
presented to you by J. B. Levy in the interest of the Preferred Bond and Investment Company,
who are valued customers of this bank. Their business has always been very satisfactory to us
and we consider them wide-awake businessmen.
appreciated."

Any favors shown to him will be highly

Plaintiff alleged that he relied on the letter in making a loan to Mr. Levy. The

court, in upholding dismissal of the plaintiffs claims, stated that:
[the] vagueness [of the letter] indelibly stamps it on its face as an
unstable and insufficient foundation for commercial credit as a
borrower of money. There is no hint given by the writer of the
extent or line of credit, if any, that should be given the bearer. It
invites no loan at all, let alone one of the amount here [$3,000.00] .
. . . In other words, reliance and faith upon the borrower's ability to
repay so large a loan could not in reason spring as a natural and
fair conclusion for a letter couched in the terms of this one.
Id at 302-03 (emphasis added).
Bodelfs reliance on the Lightner Letter is just as unreasonable as the reliance on the
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letter in Liggett. Bodell characterized his reliance as follows:
Q.
Can you give me a list of the factors that you relied on that led you
to the conclusion to make that loan?
A.
Well, the overwhelming one was the confirmation of funds going
into their account, the source of repayment.
Q.
The letter from Mr. Lightner?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
What else?
A.
Well, the assurances from Jenson that he would see that he was «
that as soon as this money came in, he would pay us immediately.
Q.
What else did you rely on?
A.
Nothing, really.
Ex. 69, Bodell Dep. at 61. This testimony makes clear that Bodell was really relying on Jenson's
characterization of the letter rather than the letter itself, which on its face was not a
"confirmation of funds" and which gave no indication in any way that Jenson owned the funds
(in fact the letter makes clear that they are loan proceeds) or that Jenson would have any right to
direct any part of the deposit to Bodell. Quite the contrary, the letter states that the funds would
be deposited into an account "in the name of the Company [i.e. MadTrax Group] and managed
by its Members." Any reasonable person would surely have made further inquiry to satisfy
himself that Jenson had the right to control the disposition of loan proceeds deposited into the
account of another entity. Under these circumstances, Bodell's reliance on the Lightner Letter
was not reasonable; indeed it was brazenly foolhardy.
Additional factors also establish how far-fetched Bodell's claimed reliance was. The
Lightner Letter (a) was not addressed to Bodell, (b) was not intended by Bank One to be read by
Bodell, (c) did not refer to the then-current status of Jenson's, Robbins', and/or MadTrax's
ability to repay debts, (d) was not coupled with any supporting documentation (i.e., an executed
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loan agreement from Arimex), (e) was not verified by Bodell—neither as to its authenticity nor
as to the validity of the statements made therein, and (f) was from a bank with whom Bodell had
no relationship and knew nothing about the author of the letter This is precisely the type of case
m which the Court should decide that, as a matter of law, Bodell's reliance was unreasonable
IV.

THE FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIMS FAIL
BECAUSE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES AN ACCORD
AND FULL SATISFACTION OF THE CLAIMS IN THIS ACTION AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
An accord and satisfaction is an agreement to give and accept some performance other

than that which is actually due as full satisfaction of a claim or obligation ProMax Dev Corp v
Raile, 998 P 2d 254, 259 (Utah 2000)

Put another way, "[a]n accord and satisfaction arises

when the parties to a contract agree that a different performance, to be made in substitution of the
performance originally agreed upon, will discharge the obligation created under the original
agreement" Id The elements of an accord and satisfaction are "(1) an unliquidated claim or a
bona fide dispute over the amount due, (2) a payment offered as full settlement of the entire
dispute, and (3) an acceptance of the payment as full settlement of the dispute " Id (citing
Marton Remodeling v Jensen, 706 P 2d 607, 609-10 (Utah 1985))
The law is well settled that there can be but one satisfaction of a debt or obligation See
Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co v Professional United World Travel Assoc, Inc , 592 P 2d 586,
588 (Utah 1979), Blodgett v Zions First National Bank, 752 P 2d 901, 903 (Utah App 1988)
The rationale behind this "one satisfaction" rule is that "the wrong is single and entire, and the
injured party is entitled to one, and only one, satisfaction, no matter how many parties may have
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joined in the act." Jukes v. North American Van Lines, 309 P.2d 692, 699 (Kan. 1957); see also
Luxenburg v. Can-Tex Industries, 257 N.W.2d 804, 807-808 (Minn. 1977) (holding that "if the
injured party has accepted satisfaction in full for the injury suffered by him, the law will not
permit him to recover again for the same injury . . ."). To hold otherwise would allow claimants
to obtain multiple recoveries for the same injury, as Bodell attempts to do in this action.
An accord and satisfaction bars claims against third parties who are not parties to the
agreement creating the accord and satisfaction. In Luxenburg v. Can-Tex Industries, 257 N. W.2d
804 (Minn. 1977), the Court ruled that "if the injured party has accepted satisfaction in full for
the injury suffered by him, the law will not permit him to recover again for the same injury . . . ."
257 N.W.2d at 807-808. In a footnote, the Court acknowledged that an amount less than the full
damages may represent "full compensation" where the lesser amount reflects a discount due to
the fact that the liability is disputed.

See also, Havard v. Kemper National Insurance

Companies, 945 F.Supp. 953 (D. Miss. 1995) (An accord and satisfaction between the insured
and the insurer discharged all claims of plaintiff and therefore plaintiffs claims against
appraisers were dismissed).
When an accord and satisfaction is reached, the debt is discharged by substitute
performance. There is no further question of what parties remain liable. The debt is gone.
There can only be one satisfaction of an obligation. The Settlement Agreement satisfies the
obligations on the loan and any tort claims.
The language of the Settlement Agreement in this case is clear and unambiguous because
it is not "capable of more than one reasonable interpretation." Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813
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P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). There was clearly a dispute over an unliquidated sum of money that
Bodell claimed to be due under certain loans to MSF which were guaranteed by Jenson. A
payment was offered and accepted. The intent of the parties as to whether the $3,000,000
payment was a full settlement of the entire dispute can be readily and conclusively determined
from the clear and unambiguous language of the Settlement Agreement:
[Bodell] acknowledges and agrees that the obligations of the MSF Parties in
connection with the Loans, including all principal and interest that may have
been deemed to have accrued thereon, are hereby deemed fully satisfied and
repaid in full;
Exhibit 64, ^ 2. The language could not be more clear. The loan is "fully satisfied and repaid in
full." There is nothing else owing on the debt by anyone.
Furthermore, Paragraph 2 of the Settlement Agreement contains two parts, designated (a)
and (b). Part (a) states that Bodell releases MSF and Jenson from any and all claims and
obligations, including the loans. Part (b) states that the loans are "fully satisfied and repaid in
full." Obviously, Parts (a) and (b) were intended to accomplish two different things. Part (b) is
not merely a release of MSF and Jenson. That was already provided in Part (a). Part (b) must
have been intended to mean something different than Part (a) - there is no other way to reconcile
these provisions. Part (b) provides that the debt is "fully satisfied and repaid in full." The
inescapable conclusion is that there was an accord and satisfaction. Bodell cannot now assert
claims against Bank One on a satisfied debt. The absence of any provision reserving rights
against third parties from the Settlement Agreement further demonstrates the intent that all loans
were "fully satisfied and repaid in full."
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Because of the clarity of the Settlement Agreement, "extrinsic evidence need not and
should be considered. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991) ("A court may
only consider extrinsic evidence, if after careful consideration, the contract language is
ambiguous or uncertain."). There is no reservation of rights against others. The only conclusion
is that claims based on the Bodell Loan are extinguished and satisfied and cannot now be
asserted against Bank One or anyone else. Bodell has no remaining claims on the Bodell Loan.
V.

BODELL'S NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE
BANK ONE DID NOT HAVE A PECUNIARY INTEREST IN THE BODELL
LOAN.
In order to establish a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show that

the defendant had a "pecuniary interest" in the transaction in which the claimant incurred its
loss.18 Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265, 1271 (Utah 1998). In this case,
there are no facts to support the proposition that Bank One somehow had a pecuniary interest in
the Bodell Loan transaction. Instead, the facts are undisputed that Bank One did not even know
about the Bodell Loan at the time it was made to Jenson. Ex. 70, Bodell Dep. at 56, 71, 73
(testifying that Bodell never contacted anyone at Bank One with respect to the Bodell Loan or
the Lightner Letter); Ex. 57, Lightner Dep. at 39 (testifying that as of the date of the Lightner
Letter, neither Lightner nor any other representative at Bank One had any knowledge of the
Bodell Loan or Jenson's and/or Robbins' intention to secure the same). It is hard to imagine how
Bank One could have a pecuniary interest in a loan transaction it knew nothing about.
18

The appropriate focus of this element is the transaction in which the recipient claims to have incurred
its loss. Therefore, in order to satisfy this element, Bodell must prove facts showing that Bank One had a
pecuniary interest in the Bodell Loan transaction (as opposed to some other transaction).
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Furthermore, Bank One was never intended as, nor was it ever, a beneficiary—direct or
otherwise—of the Bodell Loan. Ex. 61, Robbins Dep. at 449-50 (testifying that Bank One did
not receive any of the $8 million that Robbins borrowed from Jenson, $4 million of which
represented Jenson's loan from Bodell, nor did Bank One receive any other benefit from the
Bodell Loan). There are no facts to suggest otherwise.
The Utah cases which have found a pecuniary interest are those where the defendant was
itself a party to the transaction and therefore stood to gain some benefit from the consummation
of the transaction. For example, in Christenson v. Commonwealth, 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983),
the court explained that the alleged negligent misrepresentor—an escrow agent accused of
providing inaccurate information regarding the title and status of certain properties—had a
pecuniary interest in the transaction because it was paid for its services as the escrow agent. Id.
at 305. See also Maack v. Res. Design & Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 576 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(seller's real estate agent found to have a pecuniary interest in a home sale because the agent
stood to profit from the transaction and could therefore be liable for a negligent
misrepresentation concerning home's warranty).
Reimsnyder v. Southtrust Bank, 846 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), is a case
presenting facts remarkably similar to the one at bar. There, a bank was sued for negligently
misrepresenting the financial condition of one of the bank's customers. Allegedly in reliance on
the bank's representations, the third party invested in the company, which subsequently suffered
financial setbacks costing the investor the majority of his investment. In affirming summary
judgment for the bank, the court explained that because there were no facts showing that the
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bank received compensation as a result of the investment, the bank could not be considered to
have had a pecuniary interest in the investment transaction. Id. at 1267-68. The court also noted
that there was no evidence that the bank had even an indirect pecuniary interest in the investment
transaction, such as the repayment of a bank loan from the investment proceeds. Similarly, Bank
One had nothing to gain or lose from Bodell's decision to make the loan to Jenson and/or MSF.
Absent facts to establish the pecuniary interest element of its negligent misrepresentation claim,
Bodell's claim against Bank One fails as a matter of law.
VI.

THE NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE BANK
ONE WAS NOT IN A "SUPERIOR POSITION" TO ASCERTAIN THE
VALIDITY OR STATUS OF THE ARIMEX LOAN.
Bodell's claim for negligent misrepresentation fails as a matter of law because there are

no facts demonstrating that Bank One was in a "superior position" to ascertain the truthfulness or
accuracy of the representations contained in the Lightner Letter. Bank One was not a party to the
Arimex loan. Bank One was only asked to be a depositary of the loan proceeds. Bank One had
no relationship with Arimex. All of the due diligence, investigation and review that could be
done concerning the Arimex loan was equally available to Bodell and Bank One. Bodell could
have contacted Arimex, obtained references on Arimex, requested information from Robbins,
and done all the other things that Bank One could have done to verify that there would be a loan
from Arimex. Bank One did not have access to any information that was not equally available to
Bodell. Bank one was not in a superior position to determine whether the Arimex loan would be
made.
The superior position of the alleged representor is essential to a claim for negligent
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misrepresentation. See Fennell v. Green, 11 P.3d 339, 345 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (u[A]n effective
claim for negligent misrepresentation requires that the party making the misrepresentation was in
a superior position to know of the material fact."). A party with specialized skills or knowledge
related to the subject matter of the representation will be considered to occupy such a position of
superiority. For example, in Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d
55 (Utah 1986), the court explained that an engineering firm is expected to have specialized
knowledge when making survey representations. Id. at 59. Unlike the defendant in Price-Orem,
Bank One had no additional skills or knowledge providing it with a superior ability to determine
whether the Arimex Loan would be consummated.

Bank One was a third-party completely

unrelated to the Arimex Loan transaction and therefore was not in a "superior position" to know
whether the Arimex Loan would close. After being informed by Jenson of the Arimex Loan,
Bodell could have and should have inquired further and requested more information about the
Arimex Loan. Instead, Bodell did nothing and chose to make a $4 million unsecured loan based
on statements made by Jenson and a letter addressed "To Whom it May Concern" that stated that
MadTrax and its members "will be" depositing $165 million to be loaned by Arimex to
MadTrax.
Other cases hold that unless the defendant has an established relationship with the subject
of the representation or access to information that the plaintiff does not, the defendant will not be
considered to be in a "superior position." In Hit Products Corp. v. Anchor Fin. Corp., I l l F.
Supp. 2d 723 (D. S.C. 1999), for example, a bank was sued for negligent misrepresentation
based on statements made by a bank representative regarding the financial condition of one the
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bank's customers. In granting the bank's motion for summary judgment, the court found that the
bank was not in a superior position with respect to the representations at issue because the
plaintiff had an established relationship with the bank's customer and even had knowledge
regarding the customer's finances that the bank did not. Id. at 727-28; cf, First Interstate Bank
of Texas v. S.B.FI, Inc., 830 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming finding of
negligent misrepresentation where defendant bank had access to information not available to
recipient).
As in Hit Products, Bodell had a previously-existing relationship with Jenson - they had
known each other for almost 20 years, had been neighbors, and Bodell had previously lent
Jenson $1 million. Ex. 40, Bodell Dep. at 10, 18-20, 31. There is no evidence to conclude that
Bank One was in the superior position. Bodell's claim therefore must fail as a matter of law.
VII.

BODELL'S NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE
BODELL WAS NOT A FORESEEABLE RECIPIENT OF THE LIGHTNER
LETTER.
In cases where a plaintiff alleges reliance on the negligent misrepresentations of another

to its detriment, Utah law limits liability to damages suffered by parties who were reasonably
foreseeable recipients of the alleged misrepresentations. This limitation is reflected in Section
552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which is followed by Utah courts. See Christenson v.
Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 305 n.l (Utah 1983). Section 552 states, in
relevant part, that liability for a negligent misrepresentation is "limited to loss suffered . . . by the
person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance [the representor]
intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it." Id. (citing
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§ 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977)). Therefore, in order for Bodell to succeed
on its claim for negligent misrepresentation, Bodell must show that it was intended by Bank One
to be a recipient of the Lightner Letter or that Bank One knew the intended recipient would
supply the Lightner Letter to Bodell. See Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown and Gunnell,
Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59-60 (Utah 1986) (requiring foreseeability of injured party as an element of a
negligent misrepresentation claim).
Robbins was adamant in his testimony that the Lightner Letter was intended solely for
Lincoln Partners, the investment advisor for Brunswick Corporation, and not for anyone else.
%\ 1, Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. Bank One had no knowledge whatsoever about the
existence of Bodell or the contemplated Bodell Loan, fl 32-26, Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts. There is no other evidence on this issue. Clearly Bodell was not a foreseeable
recipient of the Lightner Letter.

It is worth noting again that Lightner had absolutely no

knowledge of Bodell, the Bodell Loan, or Jenson's solicitation of the same. Ex. 71, Lightner
Dep. at 39 (testifying that as of the date of the Lightner Letter, neither Lightner nor any other
representative at Bank One had any knowledge of the Bodell Loan or Jenson's and/or Robbins'
intention to secure the same). Furthermore, the purpose of the Lightner Letter was to confirm
MadTrax's financial ability to acquire a large bicycle company, not to be used to solicit funds
from third parties such as Bodell. Ex. 21, Robbins Dep. at 226. Finally, the Lightner Letter
reached Bodell only because Robbins (who requested the letter for Lincoln Partners), gave the
letter to Jenson, who in turn gave the letter to Bodell. Thus, it was unforeseeable that even
Jenson, let alone Bodell, would receive (and then further distribute) the Lightner Letter. Because
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these undisputed material facts demonstrate both that Lightner had no knowledge of Bodell or
the Bodell Loan and that Bodell was not a foreseeable recipient of the Lightner Letter, Bodell
cannot establish an essential element of its claim against Bank One.
This case contrasts sharply from those in which courts have found that the recipient was
foreseeable.

In those cases, the recipient was known to the defendant and was an intended

recipient of the representations at issue. For example, in Christenson, the court explained that
because the recipient had requested information regarding the title of certain properties from the
defendant title company, the defendant knew that the recipient would receive and therefore likely
rely on the representations at issue. 666 P.2d at 306. Similarly, in Price-Orem Inv. Co., the
court found that a property owner was considered to be a reasonably foreseeable recipient of a
survey relating to the owner's property. 713 P.2d at 60. In this case, Bodell did not request the
Lightner Letter and Bank One knew nothing of Bodell as of the date Jenson showed the letter to
Bodell.
The facts of the instant case fall closely in line with decisions finding no foreseeability.
See e.g. Ballance v. Rinehart, 412 S.E.2d 106, 107-08 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (real estate appraisal
was prepared for a specific bank and because the appraiser did not know that the home owner
would show the appraisal to potential buyers, the appraiser could not be held liable by the home
buyer for representations made in the appraisal); Beall Plumbing & Heating Co. v. First Nat'I
Bank of Keystone, 847 F. Supp. 1307, 1315 (S.D. W. Va. 1994) (granting summary judgment in
favor of the defendant bank on a negligent misrepresentation claim because the plaintiff was not
the intended recipient of a certificate relating to a bank customer); Goldman Serv. Mech.

19

Contracting, Inc. v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. ofPaducah, 812 F. Supp. 738, 743 (W.D. Ky.
1992) (same).
Because Bodell cannot bring forth any evidence to show that it was an intended or
foreseeable recipient of the Lightner Letter, the Court must grant summary judgment in favor of
Bank One as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment should be granted in favor of Bank One on
both the fraud and negligent misrepresentation causes of action (as well as on the pending
summary judgment motion of Bank One on the fraud claim), the Complaint dismissed upon the
merits, and Bank One awarded its costs.
Dated this 2nd day of July, 2007.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

t/

/ ' / J o h n A. Beckstead
H. Douglas Owens
Romaine C. Marshall
Attorneys for Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., successor to Bank One, N.A.
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a Utah corporation
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vs.
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
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PLAINTIFF BODELL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
BANK ONE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. 030917018
Judge John Paul Kennedy

Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company ("Bodell") will respond in this memorandum to
the arguments asserted by Defendant Bank One in support of its third motion for summary
judgment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In early 2000 Defendant Mark Robbins ("Robbins") sold 50 percent of his bicycle
operation to Cherokee & Walker ("C&W"), a private equity firm, in exchange for a $4.5 million
personal loan and a $500,000 capital contribution in Robbins's bicycle companies (collectively
"Vtrax"). The marriage never had a chance. Robbins failed to provide information to C&W
about the operation of Vtrax, and made important business decisions without the knowledge or
consent of C&W. Only weeks after entering into their partnership both C&W and Robbins
wanted out. By early May 2000 the parties had an agreement providing that Robbins would
repurchase C&W's interest in Vtrax and repay the personal loan. The problem was that Robbins
did not have $8 million, which he promised to pay C&W. Over the next several months,
Robbins continuously missed payment deadline after payment deadline. C&W became
increasingly impatient and aggressive with Robbins, anxious to recover its investment before
Vtrax collapsed - which C&W believed to be the direction in which Robbins and Vtrax were
headed.
C&W could not have known at the time how accurate their predictions were. Vtrax was
falling apart as it was dramatically under-capitalized at the same time Robbins was hiring
relatives and close friends at hugely inflated salaries. Because of its financial condition, Vtrax
was unable even to perform on any purchase orders it received for bicycles.
During the same period, Robbins learned that Brunswick Corporation was auctioning its
bicycle division, together with its popular "Mongoose" brand. Robbins had dreams of acquiring
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Mongoose. He secretly created a new "group" to pursue the acquisition of Mongoose without the
knowledge of C&W. Robbins needed to maintain control of his bicycle company in order to be a
legitimate candidate in the Mongoose auction. For this reason, he could not afford to have C&W
seize control of his bicycle companies. He also wanted to buyout C&W so that in the unlikely
event he was the successful bidder for Mongoose, he would not have to share the spoils of his
new acquisition.
By early August, C&W (unaware of the Mongoose auction) was finished with Robbins's
broken promises. C&W retained attorneys and set in motion the legal process to seize control of
Vtrax under the terms of the initial lending agreements with Robbins. Robbins became desperate
to get $8 million to payoff C&W and get them out of the picture before literally everything
collapsed. Robbins needed someone to help him get other people's money with which he could
payoff C&W. That someone was Bank One and specifically its officer Benjamin Lightner
("Lightner') who assisted Robbins by preparing and signing letters from the Bank making
outrageous false representations concerning Robbins' wherewithal and Robbins' access to large
sums of money from which to repay the people Robbins was trying to draw into his transactions.
One of the false letters written by Lightner and Bank One is a letter addressed "To Whom it May
Concern." That letter was provided to Bodell for the purpose of convincing Bodell to make a $4
million loan it had been considering, but which it had not yet committed to make due to the large
sum of money involved. Bodell reasonably relied on the letter from Bank One and its officer,
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and made a $4 million loan to Robbins' partner, Marc Jenson ("Jenson") for and on behalf of
Robbins.
Bodell brings the instant action against Bank One for fraud and negligent
misrepresentation for its assistance in and complicity with this scheme to cause Bodell to lend
the $4 million that Robbins needed in August 2000. At the outset of its motion for summary
judgment, Bank One faces some overwhelming problems. First, there are substantial facts
demonstrating that Bank One and Lightner knew or reasonably should have known that Bodell or
other potential lenders would see and rely on the letter to lend money to Robbins that Bank One
knew he needed and was trying to raise. Most importantly, however, Bank One does not dispute
that the letter was authored and signed by its officer Lightner. The Bank does not dispute
Lightner provided the letter to Robbins, nor does the Bank dispute that the letter contains
substantial false representations.
As will be shown below, Bank One has not begun to meet its burden to establish the
absence of genuine issues of material fact. What the evidence will show is that not only did
Lightner and Bank One provide Robbins the "To Whom it May Concern" letter, which allowed
Jenson and Robbins to trick Bodell into lending $4 million, but the evidence will show that
literally at every point in Robbins' high flying scheme, Bank One and Lightner were there to
assist with letters of confirmation making outrageous false representations to help Robbins
pursue his unrealistic goals.
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Further, it will be undisputed that Bank One had, was required by law to have, and did
not produce in this litigation substantial volumes of banking records and files relating to
Robbins, Jenson, and their transactions which form the core of this case. Worse, Bank One will
not tell Bodell or the Court what it did to try to locate the volumes of missing documents it either
lost or destroyed. All of this gives rise to the negative inference, as a matter of law, that had
those documents which were undisputedly in the exclusive custody and control of Bank One
been produced, they would have supported the allegations by Bodell against Bank One.
Fortunately, substantial other evidence has been obtained which paints a surprisingly clear
picture of the Bank's participation and complicity in the scheme and for which a reasonably jury
likely will hold them accountable.
Bank One's third motion for summary judgment must be denied.
II. RESPONSE TO BANK ONE'S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS.
Bodell responds here to each discrete numbered paragraph in Bank One's statement of
undisputed facts. Where Bodell admits facts below, it does so only for the purpose of responding
to the instant motion, and under a reservation of right to challenge these or other facts at trial or
in other briefing.
For the convenience of the Court and the parties, cites to depositions throughout this brief
may be found attached as the corresponding exhibits listed here:
Trevor Larsen - Exhibit A
Mark Robbins - Exhibit B
David Babcock - Exhibit C
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Benjamin Lightner - Exhibit D
Michael Bodell - Exhibit E
Gregg Christensen - Exhibit F
Marc Jenson - Exhibit G
Susan Wilson - Exhibit H
Robert Brown - Exhibit I
David Houser - Exhibit J
Michael Petersen - Exhibit K
Susan Mayo - Exhibit L
Merrill Weight - Exhibit M
Defendant Bank One's Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts

Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's
Response to Statement of Undisputed Facts
Undisputed.

1.
Defendant Mark Robbins was
involved in the bicycle business. In 1998,
Mark Robbins and others formed Wasatch
Cycle, Inc. ("Wasatch Cycle"), which
designed, sold and distributed bicycles to
LDS missionaries. In 2000, Robbins started a
company known as Vtrax Sports LLC ("Vtrax
Sports"). Vtrax's plan was to sell and
distribute high-end bicycles through various
channels, including large mass-merchandisers
like Sears and Wal-Mart. Also in 2000,
Robbins founded a company called
madwagon.com LLC (sometimes referred to
in the Robbins deposition as Madwagon,
LLC) which attempted to sell bicycles on
college campuses and via the Internet.

1.

2.
In the summer of 2000, Robbins also
began pursuing an opportunity to buy the
Mongoose Bicycle Division from Brunswick
Corporation. Robbins formed a company
called MadTrax Group LLC ("MadTrax") to
pursue this acquisition. He sent letters on
behalf of MadTrax confirming its interest in
the acquisition.

2.
Partially disputed. There is no
evidence in the record that MadTrax was ever
formally organized. To the contrary, the
evidence is that MadTrax was merely an
"idea" hatched by Robbins in 2000. (See,
e.g., LarsenDepo. at 19:6 - 20:12; 22:19-24;
118:1-8; 123:17-25.)
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3.
In response, Brunswick required
MadTrax to agree to maintain the
confidentiality of the materials Brunswick
provided to enable MadTrax to evaluate the
Mongoose Bicycle Division.

3.

Undisputed.

4.
In addition, on August 9, 2000,
Lincoln Partners, the investment banking firm
representing Brunswick in the sale of the
Mongoose Division, sent a letter to Trevor
Larson, MadTrax CFO, asking for, among
other things, "a description of your sources
and level of financing for the proposed
transaction."

4.

Undisputed.

5.
Robbins was a client of Bank One's
private banking services at this time. Bank
One employee Benjamin Lightner was Mr.
Robbins' private banker. Robbins testified
that in August 2000, he had conversations
with Lightner about the fact that "Lincoln
Partners and all of the investment bankers
were, you know, looking for verification of
funding and stuff like that." Robbins testified
that he asked Lightner to draft a letter for
Lincoln Partners regarding potential funding
sources for MadTrax.

5.
Partially disputed. Robbins so
testified, but the evidence overwhelmingly
establishes that the letter Robbins requested
of Bank One on or about August 22, 2000
was not intended for Lincoln Partners. (See
Bodell's Statement of Additional Material
Facts at I t 1-49; 74-78; and 98-104.)

6.
One of Robbins' potential funding
sources for the Mongoose acquisition was a
loan from Arimex Investments, Ltd.
("Arimex"). Robbins (with Lightner in
attendance on at least one occasion) had
discussions with Arimex about a potential
loan.

6.
Partially disputed. Arimex was never
a legitimate funding source for the Mongoose
acquisition. There was at no time a fully
executed loan agreement between MadTrax
and Arimex. (Robbins Depo. at 331:16 332:1.) Members of the MadTrax team
working on the Mongoose acquisition
testified that Arimex was not something
MadTrax wanted to be involved with.
(LarsenDepo. at 188:14-25.) David
Babcock, president of Vtrax and part of the
MadTrax team described the meeting with
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Arimex as "crazy." (Babcock Depo. at 81:22
- 82:10.) Babcock did not believe anything
would come from the meeting. (Babcock
Depo. at 140:25 - 141:5.) Babcock and
Trevor Larsen, chief financial officer of Vtrax
and member of the MadTrax team working on
the Mongoose acquisition, had a discussion
after meeting with Arimex about the fact that
Arimex was not a company that could do
anything for MadTrax. (Larsen Depo. at
189:14-22.) Moreover, the Arimex loan
proposal required before any loan to MadTrax
that MadTrax first establish and deposit into
an escrow account $16.5 million, which
neither Robbins nor MadTrax had at its
disposal. (See Arimex Agreement, attached
as Exhibit 1 at f 1.6; Arimex Escrow
Agreement with MadTrax and Bank One,
attached as Exhibit 2; Robbins Depo. at
266:23 - 269:16.) Larsen testified that
number was "just too big" for MadTrax.
(Larsen Depo. at 223:13-21.) MadTrax never
had any assets, never had any bank accounts,
was never capitalized and never had any cash
flow. (Larsen Depo. at 126:15 - 127:7.)
Robbins himself concedes MadTrax had no
assets of its own. (Robbins Depo. at 204:1620.) Even if Arimex had been a legitimate
source of financing for the Mongoose
acquisition, Robbins had decided not to use
Arimex, but instead decided to pursue
financing with Unisource Cap. (Robbins
Depo. at 306:13-23.)
7.
Robbins claims that Lightner
produced a letter dated August 22, 2000 in
response to the request regarding funding
sources. The letter reads:

7.
Undisputed, though the evidence
overwhelmingly establishes that Robbins did
not request the August 22, 2000 letter as a
response to Lincoln Partners' request for
information concerning financing for the
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| To:

Whom it May Concern

Re:

Mad Trax Group, LLC

Mongoose bid. (See Response to ^| 5, above.)

MadTrax Group, LLC (the
"Company") and its individual members
Mark Robbins and Marc Jenson (the
"Members") will be depositing $165,000,000
into Bank One, Utah NA. The funding is
coming from a loan agreement between
MadTrax Group, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company and Arimex Investments, LTD., a j
Bahamian corporation. The sum of
$165,000,000 will be deposited into an
interest bearing account in the name of the
Company and managed by its Members.
Should you have any questions with
respect to this matter, please contact the
Undersigned.
Ben Lightner
Wealth Advisor
Private Banking Group
8.
As of the date of the Lightner Letter,
Robbins believed that Arimex was willing
and able to make the Arimex Loan to
MadTrax as described in the letter. Indeed, a
loan agreement had been signed by Arimex.

8.
Disputed and irrelevant. The loan
agreement produced by Robbins purportedly
bearing the signature of Arimex's officer is
devoid of foundation. Not one witness in this
case has identified the signature or otherwise
provided foundation for the document.
Accordingly, the document cannot support a
motion for summary judgment and must be
disregarded. Moreover Robbins's belief
about the ability of Arimex to perform is
irrelevant, lacks foundation and is
inadmissible for the proposition offered.
Robbins himself admits he is unable to recall
any due diligence performed concerning
!
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Arimex's ability to perform. (Robbins Depo.
at 447:14-23.) Accordingly, it must re
disregarded. Notably, there is no testimony or
evidence in this case concerning the ability of
Arimex to fund a $165 million loan, even if
MadTrax wished to pursue the loan.
9.
At all times, Robbins believed that
Arimex would fund the Arimex Loan if
Robbins asked Arimex to do so.

9.
Disputed and irrelevant. See generally
the response to Paragraph 8. Robbins's
subject belief is not admissible evidence
concerning whether or not Arimex would
have funded a $165 million loan if asked to
do so, or even whether Arimex was capable
of funding such a loan. Accordingly, this
alleged "fact" may not support a motion for
summary judgment and must be disregarded.

10.
Bank One was not a party to the
Arimex Loan Agreement. Ex. 17, Arimex
Loan Agreement.

10.
Disputed. Attached as Exhibit 1 is
what Robbins offers in support of his motion
for summary judgement as a draft loan
agreement between Arimex and MadTrax and
purportedly bearing the signature of Arimex's
officer. Paragraph 1.6 of the Agreement
refers to and incorporates by reference an
escrow agreement (attached hereto as Exhibit
2) between MadTrax, Bank One and Arimex.
The escrow agreement provides that Bank
One had agreed to serve as escrow agent both
for a $16.5 million deposit by MadTrax, and a
subsequent $165 million deposit by Arimex.
(Id.) Bank One is listed in the "Notices"
section of the agreement, and a signature line
is provided for William Jennings, escrow
agent for Bank One. (Id.) Bank One's
corporate designee testified the escrow
agreement was a document prepared by Bank
One. (Lightner Depo. at 162:24 - 163:2.) To
that end, Lightner and Bank One had
discussions with Robbins about Bank One
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serving as escrow agent for the proposed
transaction. (Lightner Depo. at 164:1-8;
Robbins Depo. at 326:21 - 327:4.)
11.
The Lightner Letter was intended for
Lincoln Partners in connection with the
proposed Mongoose acquisition, and was not
intended for other potential investors or for
use in any other transaction.

11.
Disputed. The evidence
overwhelmingly establishes that Robbins and
Bank One intended the letter for potential
financiers, specifically including Bodell. (See
Statement of Add'1 Material Facts atfflf1-49;
74-78; 98-104.)

12.
On September 27, 2000, Lincoln
Partners informed Trevor Larson that
Brunswick "would like to invite [MadTrax] to
submit a proposal to acquire [Mongoose.]"
Ex. 20, September 27, 2000 Letter from
Lincoln Partners to V-Trax.

12.

13.
MadTrax hired Duff & Phelps to
assist in its efforts to bid for the Mongoose
Division, but despite help from Duff &
Phelps, and despite making several offers for
Mongoose ranging from $63 million to $76.6
million, MadTrax was not the winning bidder
and was therefore unable to make the
purchase.

13.
Partially disputed. There are many
reasons why MadTrax could not perform the
proposed purchase of Mongoose, including
the fact that at the time the bidding ended
MadTrax had obtained no firm commitments
for funding the purchase and MadTrax had no
assets of its own with which to make the
purchase. (See e.g., Statement of Addt'l
Material Facts, 1fl[ 79, 85-87, 89-93, and 9597; Letter from GE Capital sent with
preliminary term sheet, letter attached as
Exhibit 3.)

14.
There is no other evidence in the
record concerning the intent or expectation of
Bank One concerning the use to be made of
the Lightner Letter.

14.
Disputed. There is overwhelming
evidence that Bank One intended or could
reasonably expect a class of potential
investors, including Bodell, would see and
rely on the Bank One letter. (See Statement
of Addt'l Material Facts,ffi[1-49, 74-78, and
98-104.)

15.
In 2000, around the same time he was
working on the potential Mongoose

15.

Undisputed.

Undisputed.

transaction, Robbins was also working on a
transaction through which he would purchase
the 50% interest in Wasatch Cycle,
Madwagon, and Vtrax owned by Cherokee &
Walker LLC ("Cherokee & Walker").
|
16.
Cherokee & Walker had purchased its
50% interest in these companies on January 7,
2000. Ex. 30, January 7, 2000 Membership
Interest Purchase Agreement.

16.

17.
By June 10, 2000, Robbins and
Cherokee & Walker had negotiated an
agreement through which Robbins would
repurchase Cherokee & Walker's 50%
interest for approximately $8 million. Ex. 32,
June 10, 2000 Purchase and Settlement
Agreement.

17.
Undisputed, though this was not the
first agreement between Robbins and
Cherokee & Walker concerning the proposed
buyout. (See Statement of Addt'l Material
Facts, Iffl 1-12.)

18.
Robbins needed to borrow or raise the
$8 million to pay Cherokee & Walker, and
ultimately identified an individual named
Marc Jenson as a potential source of funds for
the Cherokee & Walker buyout.

18.

Undisputed.

19.
Jenson was in the business of
borrowing funds and then loaning those funds
to others. Jenson profits on the difference
between the interest he pays to borrow the
money and the interest he receives from
lending the money.

19.

Undisputed.

20.
In mid-2000, Jenson met Robbins and
learned that Robbins needed $8 million to buy
out Cherokee & Walker's interest. After
negotiations, Jenson agreed to loan Robbins
the $8 million.

20.

Undisputed.

21.
Jenson's plan was to fund the Robbins
loan with $4 million of Jenson's own money
and $4 million from someone else.

21.

Undisputed.
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Undisputed.

Accordingly, Jenson approached Mike
Bodell, president of Bodell Construction
Company, about the possibility of borrowing
$4 million that Jenson would, in turn, loan to
Robbins for the Cherokee & Walker buyout.
22.
Bodell had known Jenson for nearly
twenty years, and had previously lent Jenson
$1 million.
23.
Jenson testified that he received a
copy of the Lightner Letter from Robbins.
Jenson, however, had no discussions with
Robbins regarding what Jenson intended to
do with the letter.

22.

I 23.
Partially disputed. Jenson believes he
told Robbins that he intended to show the
letter to Bodell. Moreover, the evidence
overwhelmingly supports the inference that
Robbins, Jenson and Bank One conspired to
obtain the letter from Bank One for the
specific purpose of convincing Bodell to
agree to loan $4 million to Jenson, who
would in turn combine Bodell's $4 million
with $4 million of his own to make an $8
million loan to Robbins. (See Statement of
Addt'l Material Facts, fl[ 1-49, 74-78, and 98-

104.)
24.
Jenson likewise recalls no discussions
with Lightner, or anyone else at Bank One,
about the letter and was not involved in
requesting that it be drafted. Nevertheless, as
part of the discussion between Jenson and
Bodell, Jenson provided a copy of the
Lightner Letter to Bodell.

Undisputed.

J

24.
Partially disputed. As noted, the
evidence overwhelmingly supports the
inference that Robbins, Jenson and Bank One
conspired to obtain the letter from Bank One
for the specific purpose of convincing Bodell
to agree to loan $4 million to Jenson, who
would in turn combine Bodell's $4 million
with $4 million of his own to make an $8
million loan to Robbins. (See Statement of
Addt'l Material Facts, ^flj 1-49, 74-78, and 98-

1 104.)
25.
Prior to making the Bodell Loan, no
representation was made to Bodell that the
$165 million deposit described in the
Lightner Letter had been made.

25.
Undisputed, but Bodell's complete
response to Bank One's Request for
Admission No. 5 further provides: "Bodell
!
admits that prior to making the $165 million
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Bodell Loan, no specific representation was
made to Bodell that the $165 million deposit
described in the Lightner Letter had been
made. However, the letter from Bank One
states as a matter of fact that the $165 million
will be deposited in Bank One and then
further makes the direct objective
representation 'The funding is coming from a
loan agreement between MadTrax Group
LLC, a Utah limited liability company and
Arimex Investments, LTD, a Bahamian
company. The sum of $ 165 million will be
deposited into an interest bearing account in
the name of the Company and managed by its
Members.' [] Those direct objective
representations clearly confirm that Bank One
has done the confirmation necessary to make
those representations."
26.
Bodell testified that he does not know
whether the representations made in the
Lightner Letter were false when made.

J 27.

Bodell Construction Company's Chief

26.
Undisputed but irrelevant. Moreover,
Bodell provided that testimony early in
discovery in this case, before Bodell had an
opportunity to examine Defendants about the
facts and circumstances underlying the
Lightner Letter and the false statements
contained therein. The testimony and
evidence later obtained in discovery plainly
establishes that the Lightner Letter contains
material false representations and omits other
facts plainly material to a party like Bodell
considering whether or not to make a loan
based upon the representations in the Letter.
Bank One itself concedes the Lightner Letter
contains false representations and that Bank
One had no basis for many of the
representations in the Letter. (See Statement
1 of Addt'l Material Facts,ffi[46 - 59.)
27.
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Undisputed but irrelevant. Moreover,

Financial Officer, Merrill Weight, testified
j that as far as he knows, the Lightner Letter is
a 'Valid letter."

Weight provided that testimony early in
discovery in this case, before Bodell had an
opportunity to examine Defendants about the
facts and circumstances underlying the
Lightner Letter and the false statements
contained therein. The testimony and
evidence later obtained in discovery plainly
establishes that the Lightner Letter contains
material false representations and omits other
facts plainly material to a party like Bodell
considering whether or not to make a loan
based upon the representations in the Letter.
Bank One itself concedes the Lightner Letter
contains false representations and that Bank
One had no basis for many of the
representations in the Letter. (See Statement
of Addt'l Material Facts,ffif46-59.)
|

28.
Bodell did not contact Bank One to
verify the contents of the Lightner Letter.

28.

29.
Similarly, Bodell did not conduct any
due diligence relating to Arimex or its
principals.

29.
Disputed. Bodell performed due
diligence in connection with the loan.
Among other things, Jenson reported to
Bodell that Jenson and the other parties had
done their due diligence and legal work on the
transaction and Bodell knew that Jenson was
putting up $4 million of his own money to
match Bodell's $4 million. (Bodell Depo. at
45:15-24; 52:9-53:12.) Jenson stated his
attorneys had "checked out" the transaction.
(Bodell Depo. at 52:6 - 53:12.) Bodell had
previously performed due diligence
concerning Jenson and Jenson's business,
including meetings with Jenson concerning
Jenson's borrowers, repayment, collateral on
loans Jenson made, and the like. (Bodell
Depo. at 29:3 - 30:8.) Bodell also had
discussions about Jenson with others,
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Undisputed.

including Jim Morse, with whom Bodell has
done business. (Bodell Depo. at 33:16 34:13.) Bodell had additional meetings with
Jenson to learn about the purpose for the
proposed $4 million loan and the source of
funds for repayment. (Bodell Depo. at 42:12
-49:12.) Bodell also requested and obtained
from Jenson a personal financial statement.
(Bodell Depo. at 48:11-23.) Jenson also
provided Bodell copies of financial
statements for some of Robbins' bicycle
companies showing "many millions" in value.
(Bodell Depo. at 56:22 - 59:14.) Jenson also
provided the Lightner Letter as evidence that
the loan with Arimex was a "done deal" and
that $165 million would be coming in within
30 days. (Bodell Depo. at 49:4 - 50:7.)
Bodell testified he relied on the Bank One
letter as part of his due diligence concerning
the Arimex transaction. (Bodell Depo. at
55:25-56:12.)
|
30.
On August 30, 2000, Bodell
Construction Company loaned $4 million to
MSF Properties, LC (a company owned by
Marc Jenson) and obtained a personal
guaranty from Jenson. Bank One was not a
party to this loan.

30.

Undisputed.

31.
The terms of the Bodell Loan required 31.
Jenson to pay a loan fee of $80,000 and to pay
interest of 1% per week or 52% per year. The
loan was due in 30 days.

Undisputed.

32.
At the time of the Lightner Letter,
32.
Bodell had no relationship whatsoever with
Bank One. Neither he nor his company was a
customer and they had no accounts at Bank
One. Bodell does not even know who Bank
One employee Lightner is. Before making the

Undisputed.
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loan to Jenson, Bodell never contacted
Lightner or anyone else at Bank One.
33.
Similarly, while Lightner was aware
that Robbins and Jenson had some sort of
business relationship, Lightner recalls no
discussions about Jenson loaning Robbins $8
million in connection with his bicycle
business.

33.
Partially disputed. Lightner was the
private banker for both Robbins and Jenson.
(Lightner Depo. at 111:03 - 115:07.) Lightner
had frequent and regular communications
with Robbins during 2000. (Lightner Depo.
at 10:14-17.) Lightner knew Robbins and
Jensen were partners who did business deals
on a handshake. (Lightner Depo. at 199:24 200:3.) Robbins was also a personal friend of
Lightner's and offered Lightner a job while
Lightner was employed by Bank One.
(Lightner Depo. at 320:1-7; 109:19 - 110:2.)
Lightner understood that Cherokee & Walker
owned part of at least one of Robbins'
companies. (Lightner Depo. at 107:20 108:5.) Cherokee & Walker and Robbins had
co-guaranteed a Bank One loan to one of the
companies. Lightner had meetings with
Cherokee & Walker talking about what their
company was doing. (Lightner Depo. at
203:11-16.) In the summer of 2000 Robbins
sought to reacquire Cherokee & Walker's 50
percent interest in their joint bicycle venture.
(Robbins Depo. at 145, 150-52.) Lightner
understood that Robbins was acquiring
Cherokee & Walker's interest. (Lightner
Depo. at 310:1-5.) Lightner knew Robbins
received money from Jenson in 2000, testified
he did not know what Robbins did with the
money, but stated that Robbins may have paid
off Cherokee & Walker's interest in the
company they jointly owned. (Lightner Depo.
at 259:16 - 260:11.) Lightner obtained that
information from either Robbins or Cherokee
& Walker. (Lightner Depo. at 260:12-16.)
Lightner remembered taking checks to
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Cherokee & Walker at the direction of
Robbins or Jenson. (Lightner Depo. at 40:17
-41:3.) During this period Robbins was in
contact with Lightner both in person and on
the phone several times a week. (Robbins
Depo. at 319:11-18.) Robbins kept Lightner
informed about "what was going on" with the
Arimex transaction. (Robbins Depo. at
326:15 - 20.) Robbins testified that he and
Lightner "were in constant contact with each
other about what was going on." (Robbins
Depo. at 330:13-23.) Moreover, as shown
below, the evidence in this case strongly
supports the conclusion that Lightner wrote
the August 22, 2000 letter at Robbins' request
for the express purpose of inducing Bodell to
loan $4 million to Jenson, so that Jenson
could fulfill his commitment to loan $8
million to Robbins for the purpose of buying
out Cherokee & Walker's interest in their
joint bicycle venture with Robbins. (See
Statement of Addt'l Material Facts at ^ 1-49,
74-78 and 98-104.)
|
34.
Bank One knew nothing about Bodell,
or the loan that Bodell planned to make to
Jenson, and had no discussions with Jenson
about Bodell or Bodell Construction.

35.
Indeed, when asked directly about
whether he knew where Jenson was getting
money to loan to Robbins so that Robbins

34.
Partially disputed. The evidence in
this case strongly supports the conclusion that
Lightner wrote the August 22, 2000 letter at
Robbins' request for the express purpose of
inducing Bodell to loan $4 million to Jenson,
so that Jenson could fulfill his commitment to
loan $8 million to Robbins for the purpose of
buying out Cherokee & Walker's interest in
their joint bicycle venture with Robbins. (See
Statement of Addt'l Material Facts at Iffl 1-49,
J 74-78 and 98-104.)
35.
Disputed. Lightner so testified, but
the evidence in the case stronly supports the
conclusion that Lightner wrote the August 22,
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could buy out Cherokee & Walker, Lightner
responded that he had "no idea." Lightner
further testified that "I wouldn't know
[Bodell] if he walked in here today."

2000 letter at Robbins' request for the express
purpose of inducing Bodell to loan $4 million
to Jenson, so that Jenson could fulfill his
commitment to loan $8 million to Robbins for
the purpose of buying out Cherokee &
Walker's interest in their joint bicycle venture
with Robbins. (See Statement of Addt'l
Material Facts at fl 1-49, 74-78 and 98-104.)

36.
None of the funds from the Bodell
Loan were paid to Bank One or were for Bank
One's benefit.

36.
Disputed. Bank One had agreed to
serve as the escrow agent on for the Arimex
loan transaction. (See Response to Paragraph
10, Bank One's Statement of Undisputed
Facts.) Bank One stood to benefit financially
if Robbins accepted the Arimex loan
proposal. Before that could happen, Robbins
first wanted to buyout Cherokee & Walker's
interest in their joint bicycle venture. (See
Statement of Addt'l Material Facts,ffi[1-49.)
The $4 million loan from Bodell was used for
that purpose. (Robbins Depo. at 381:6-12;

391:11-13.)
37.
Jenson failed to repay the Bodell
Loan.

37.

1

Undisputed.

38.
For many months, Bodell sought
j 38.
Partially disputed. Jenson only ever
repayment from Jenson—sometimes going so made one payment, on May 2, 2001, in the
far as to make hourly calls to Jenson. Jenson
amount of $250,000, on the $4 million loan.
made several preliminary payments on the
(See Expert Report of Merrill Weight,
note.
attached as Exhibit 4, and Exhibit 10 thereto;
Weight Depo. at 98:17 - 99:2; 103:14-

1 104:6.)

1

39.
Finally, on or about March 18, 2003,
Bodell and Jenson entered into a Settlement
Agreement (the "Settlement Agreement").

39.

40.
Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement,
Jenson paid Bodell $3 million and Bodell
accepted those funds as payment in full of the

40.
Partially disputed. As the Court has
already determined, Jenson paid Bodell $3
million pursuant to the terms of the settlement
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Undisputed.

Bodell Loan.

agreement, in exchange only for a release of
Bodell's claims against Jenson. {See March
18, 2003 Settlement Agreement, attached as
Exhibit 5.)

41.
Paragraph 2 of the Settlement
Agreement states:

41.
The Settlement Agreement speaks for
itself. The effect in this case of the cited
language has already been determined by the
Court. {See Judge Bohling's March 15, 2004
Order, attached as Exhibit 6.)

Each of Bodell and BCC [Bodell
Construction Company], for himself, itself,
their affiliates and for all persons or entities
claiming by, through or under him, it or them,
hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and
forever discharges MSF, its affiliates and
their respective members, managers, officers,
employees and agents (each, including
without limitation Jenson, an "MSF Party")
from any and all claims, allegations of fraud,
charges, demands, losses, damages,
obligations, liabilities, grievances, causes of
action, or suits at law and equity of
whatsoever kind and nature, expenses, costs
and attorney fees, whether known or
unknown, suspected or unsuspected,
liquidated or unliquidated (each, a "Claim"),
arising out of all past affiliations and
transactions among Bodell, BCC and any
MSF Party, including, but not limited to, the
Loans and all related arrangements and
transactions, (b) without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, acknowledges
and agrees that the obligations of the MSF
Parties in connection with the Loans,
including all principal and interest that
may have been deemed to have accrued
thereon, are hereby deemed fully satisfied
and repaid in full; provided that such
releases shall not apply to any obligation of
MSF or Jenson set forth in this Agreement to
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be performed or observed after the execution
and delivery hereof.
42.
Just over four months after executing
the Settlement Agreement, Bodell sued Bank
One, claiming that it was wrongfully induced
to loan money to Jenson based on the
Lightner Letter.

42.
Partially disputed. Bodell's claims in
this case include considerably more than just
that Bodell was wrongly induced to loan
money to Jenson based on the Lightner Letter.
(See First Amended Complaint, attached
hereto as Exhibit 7.)

III. STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS
1.

In late 1999 Mark Robbins ("Robbins") was the owner of a entity named Vtrax,

Inc. (Vtrax, Inc. was later reformed under the name Vtrax Sports, LLC - collectively referred to
as "Vtrax" throughout). (Robbins Depo. at 67:7-13.)
Needing Cash, Robbins Convinces Cherokee & Walker to Make a Capital Contribution in a
Joint Bicycle Venture
2.

Cherokee & Walker ("C&W") had an initial meeting with Robbins on or about

November 30, 1999 to discuss whether C&W would agree to invest capital in Vtrax.
(Christensen Depo. at 93:23 - 94:8; 97:12-14.)
3.

C&W ultimately agreed to make a capital investment of $500,000 for a 50 percent

interest in Vtrax (and its related interest in Wasatch Cycles). C&W made at the same time a $4.5
million personal loan to Robbins. The investment and loan were effected on January 7, 2000.
[See Membership Interest Purchase Agreement, attached as Exhibit 8; Term Promissory Note,
attached as Exhibit 9; Receipt, attached as Exhibit 10; Registration Rights Agreement, attached
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as Exhibit 11; Robbins Depo. at 109:21 - 110:25 and 111:5-25; Christensen Depo. at 37:21 - 38:7
and 115:22-25.)
4.

At the time C&W made its investment in Vtrax it anticipated being quite involved

in the management of Vtrax. (Christensen Depo. at 108:19 - 109:5.) Among other things, C&W
anticipated bringing in operators, putting a board in place, obtaining regular reporting on both the
business and financial aspects of the company, and expected to be involved in counseling and
decision making. (Id.) Robbins represented to C&W he was agreeable to that level of
involvement. (Id. at 109:6-8.)
5.

As of January 7, 2000, Robbins and C&W were the only owners of Vtrax and

Wasatch Cycles. (Id. at 120:25 - 121:8.)
Robbins Fails to Keep His End of the Bargain with Cherokee & Walker
6.

Within weeks of making its investment ,C&W was having less than ideal

communication flow with Robbins. (Id. at 126:2-12.) Robbins was making business decisions
unilaterally, and without any input from C&W, "right out of the gate." (Id. at 127:16 - 128:1.)
Through the first several months in business together, C&W was experiencing growing
frustration with Robbins. (Id. at 136:1-16.)
7.

C&W was never satisfied that it was receiving relevant information from Robbins,

and as a result never felt it had a good grasp on the financial affairs of the company or the
company's operations. (Id. at 137:7-15.) At some point Robbins prevented C&W from even
having any direct contact with any Vtrax employees. (Id. at 152:9 - 153:17.) C&W became
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quite concerned about the management team in place at Vtrax pretty early in its relationship with
Robbins. (Id. at 139:19 - 140:1.)
Robbins Learns that Brunswick Corporation Plans to Auction its Bicycle Division
8.

At around this same time Robbins learned that Brunswick Corporation

("Brunswick") intended to sell its bicycle division, including its Mongoose brand. (Robbins
Depo. at 144:7-25.)
Robbins and Cherokee & Walker Agree to Terminate their Partnership
9.

As a result of C&W's insistence that Robbins operate Vtrax in accordance with

sound business principles, and the growing conflict between Robbins and C&W, Robbins
approached C&W the first week in April 2000 asking C&W whether it would agree to sell its
interest in Vtrax back to Robbins. {See Christensen letter dated July 1, 2000, attached as Exhibit
12.) Robbins and C&W mutually understood by early May 2000 that they were both interested
in going different ways and that one or the other had to buy out the other's interest. (Christensen
Depo. at 149:6-18.)
10.

C&W and Robbins reached in the first week or two of May 2000 an agreement in

principle about Robbins' repurchase of C&W's interest. (Id. at 162:8-11.) On May 17, 2000
Robbins sent C&W an e-mail with a proposed Redemption and Settlement Agreement, proposing
that Robbins would make payment to C&W within 90 days. (Id. at 155:2-20; see also May 17,
2000 E-mail, attached as Exhibit 13.) In the e-mail Robbins reports he has been "working
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extremely hard to try to find a way to bridge the money" and would "continue to figure out a
way" to get C&W paid. (Id.)
Robbins is Unable to Meet His Payment Obligation to Cherokee & Walker
11.

C&W initially agreed to a $10 million buyout of its interest in Vtrax and

repayment of the personal loan it had made to Robbins. (See Christensen July 1 letter, Exhibit
12.) C&W was not, however, willing to wait 90 days for payment of the repurchase price due to
concerns about the way Vtrax was being run. (Id.) As a result, Robbins agreed to obtain a $5
million loan by June 2, 2000, with payment of the remaining $5 million balance on or before
January 8, 2001. (Id.) Robbins failed to make the promised $5 million payment on June 2, 2000.
(id.)
Robbins Renegotiates His Agreement with Cherokee & Walker
12.

Robbins requested C&W agree to allow him three additional weeks to raise

money for the $5 million payment on better terms. (Id.) Robbins also asked that C&W agree to
a $2 million reduction in the proposed repurchase price, from $10 million to $8 million. (Id.) As
a personal accommodation to Robbins, C&W agreed to a new payment date of June 30, 2000,
and agreed to the reduced repurchase price. (Id.)
Robbins Strikes a New Deal with Cherokee & Walker, then Defaults a Second Time
13.

On June 10, 2000 Robbins and C&W executed a Purchase and Settlement

Agreement calling for Robbins to make payments totaling $8 million by June 30, 2000.
(Purchase and Settlement Agreement attached as Exhibit 14.) Robbins made partial payment by
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the end of June, but failed to make the payments required under the June 10 Agreement, leaving
at least $5.8 million outstanding on the date payment in full was due. (Christensen July 1, 2000
letter, Exhibit 12.) This was at least the second time Robbins defaulted on payment obligations
to C&W for the repurchase of its interest in Vtrax.
14.

Late in the afternoon on June 29, 2000 Robbins called C&W to request an

additional 45 days to make the remaining June 30 payment required under the June 10
Agreement. (Id.) C&W refused Robbins request and provided on July 1 a letter detailing
C&W's concerns with Robbins' failures to make promised payments for the repurchase of
C&W's interest in Vtrax, as well as C&W's concerns about the viability of Vtrax as a company
given the way it was being managed. (Id.)
Robbins Misses Third Payment Deadline with Cherokee & Walker
15.

By letter dated July 1, 2000 C&W provided Robbins a new July 6, 2000 deadline

to pay C&W $3 million, with an additional $3.5 million due by August 15, 2000. (Id.)
Alternatively, Robbins could choose to pay C&W $6 million by July 6, 2000. (Id.) If Robbins
failed to make these payments, C&W explained they would exercise their rights under the initial
January 7, 2000 agreements to take immediate possession of Vtrax and Wasatch Cycle, including
all accounts receivable, inventory and proceeds. (Id.) In short, C&W explained they were
"willing to take whatever steps [were] necessary to stop the bleeding and protect [their]
investment." (Id.)
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16.

Robbins failed to make the required payment by July 6, 2000. (See July 12, 2000

E-mail, attached as Exhibit 15.) This was at least the third time Robbins had defaulted on
required payments to C&W. (Id.) Based upon additional representations by Robbins about
sources for repayment, C&W agreed on July 12 to a new payment deadline of July 14, 2000.
(id.)
Robbins Misses Fourth Payment Deadline with Cherokee and Walker
17.

Robbins failed to make the promised July 14, 2000 payment. (See July 18, 2000

E-mail, attached as Exhibit 16.) This was at least the fourth time Robbins had defaulted on
promised payments to C&W. Robbins represented to C&W that: 1) the loan to him from which
he was going to make the promised payment to C&W had been finalized on July 13, 2000; 2)
that there was a three day right of rescission that did not expire until July 17, 2000; 3) that
Robbins had already delivered to his brother Danny on July 15, 2000 a check for the full amount
outstanding and owing to C&W; and 4) that Danny would deliver the check to C&W no later
than 5:00 p.m. on July 18, 2000. (Id.)
18.

In response to Robbins' representations, C&W informed Robbins that if he failed

to make the promised payment on July 18, it would physically appear at Vtrax first thing on the
July 19, 2000 to "examine all financial records and to evaluate the current organizational
structure, compensation and operational status of all the companies." (Id.)
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Robbins Defaults for Fifth Time on Payment Obligation; Cherokee & Walker Retains
Lawyers to Seize Control of the Bicycle Companies
19.

Robbins failed to make the promised payment to C&W on July 18, 2000. (See

July 23, 2000 E-mail, attached as Exhibit 17.) This was at least the fifth time Robbins failed to
make payment to C&W when promised. As a result, C&W decided to turn the matter over to its
attorneys to initiate legal proceedings to recover the money owed by Robbins. (Id.) In a July 23,
2000 e-mail to C&W, Robbins made new promises that he would be able to make payment in
full to C&W. (Id.) Robbins acknowledged in the same e-mail that Vtrax was struggling. (Id.)
20.

In an e-mail dated July 25, 2000, C&W expressed to Robbins its concern with the

status of the company and the financial drain Robbins was placing on himself by virtue of hiring
approximately 15 individuals in the preceding two-and-a-half months and incurring substantial
expenses, including exorbitant salaries, while Vtrax had no revenues. (See July 25, 2000 E-mail,
attached as Exhibit 18.) As a result, C&W informed Robbins it felt it had "limited options."
(Id.)
21.

Robbins met with C&W over lunch on July 25, 2000. (See July 26, 2000 E-mail,

attached as Exhibit 19.) C&W informed Robbins the next day (July 26) that if several specific
conditions were not satisfied by 5:00 the following day "the legal process will commence to seek
protection of our investment." (Id.) C&W expressly told Robbins that it intended to proceed
with a lawsuit if Robbins defaulted on the agreement to repurchase C&W's interest.
(Christensen Depo. at 204:18 - 205: 4.)
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22.

Robbins responded in an e-mail the following day, July 27, 2000. (July 27, 2000

E-mail attached as Exhibit 20.) In the e-mail, Robbins represented that everything was in place
to close with C&W and provide a cashier's check four days later. {Id.) Robbins also represented
to C&W that he was "left with a company that's going to go under" and he was going to be
"stuck with millions of dollars in debt." {Id.)
23.

On July 28, 2000 attorney Jill Pohlman, with Stoel Rives in Salt Lake City, sent a

letter to Robbins on behalf of C&W in which she informed Robbins that C&W intended to move
against the collateral securing the promissory note Robbins provided C&W in exchange for their
initial investment and loan. {See August 2, 2000 response from David Hardy, attached as Exhibit
21.) Robbins' attorney, David Hardy, responded with a letter dated August 2, 2000. (Id.)
Robbins is Introduced to Jenson as a Potential Source of Funding to
Payoff Cherokee & Walker
24.

Robbins and Jenson were introduced in July 2000 by Becky Mendenhall, a mutual

acquaintance. (Robbins Depo. at 339:10-23; 341:3-9; Jenson Depo. at 43:16-25.) Robbins met
with Jenson for the sole purpose of trying to obtain an $8 million loan from Jenson from which
Robbins could pay C&W the money he owed and had repeatedly promised to pay. (Robbins
Depo. at 344:6-9; 344:22 - 345:20.)
25.

Robbins provided at the meeting with Jenson background about the bicycle

companies, his deal with C&W, the Mongoose purchase he was pursuing, and his need to get
C&W out. (Jenson Depo. at 45:2-11; Robbins Depo. at 344:10-21; 346:4-17; 347:11 - 348:7.)
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During the course of a series of meetings between the two, Robbins told Jenson that C&W knew
that Robbins was about to take over Mongoose and make "a lot of money," and if it took too long
to get C&W paid, they were going to back out of their agreement to sell their interest in Vtrax
back to Robbins so that they could participate in the Mongoose deal. (Jenson Depo. at 50:21 51:8.)
26.

In connection with his efforts to persuade Jenson to make the loan, Robbins

provided Jenson financial statements for the bicycle companies. (Jenson Depo. at 61:18-24.)
Robbins also told Jenson he wanted C&W out so Robbins would own all of Mongoose, instead
of just 50 percent. (Jenson Depo. at 67:19 - 68:6.)
Benjamin Lightner, Private Banker at Bank One for Robbins and Jenson, is Heavily Involved
in Business Dealings with Robbins and Jenson, and is Kept Fully Informed of their
Transactions
27.

During the year 2000, Benjamin Lightner ("Lightner") was employed by Bank

One as a wealth advisor in Bank One's private banking group. (Lightner Depo. at 10:8-13.)
28.

In 2000 Lightner was Bank One's number one private banker in the nation in total

sales. (Lightner Depo. at 179:1-21.)
29.

Lightner was the private banker for both Robbins and Jenson. (Lightner Depo. at

111 :03 - 115:07.) Lightner had frequent and regular communications with Robbins during 2000.
(Lightner Depo. at 10:14-17.)
30.

Lightner knew that Robbins and Jenson were partners who did business deals on a

handshake. (Lightner Depo. at 199:24 - 200:3.)
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31.

Robbins was a personal friend of Lightner's and offered Lightner a job while

Lightner was employed by Bank One. (Lightner Depo. at 320:1-7; 109:19-110:2.)
32.

When Lightner left Bank One in late 2000 to take a job at Irwin Union Bank, he

took Robbins and Jenson with him as clients. (Lightner Depo. at 83:24 - 84:1; 114:11-15;
115:14-17.)
33.

Lightner characterized Bank One's relationship with Robbins in August 2000 as a

growing relationship. (Lightner Depo. at 320:19-25.)
34.

Lightner visited Robbins and the Vtrax offices very regularly, as often as daily or

several times a week. (Larsen Depo. at 119:9 - 120:16.)
35.

Robbins was in constant contact with Lightner and kept Lightner and Bank One

fully informed about the status of Robbins' negotiations with Arimex, Unisource and the
Mongoose bid efforts described below. (Robbins Depo. at 330:1-23.)
36.

Lightner was personally involved in the efforts of Robbins and Jenson to acquire

Mongoose. Among other things, as detailed below, he wrote letters at Robbins' request falsely
representing the financial strength of Robbins and Jenson and their companies. Lightner also
attended a meeting with Robbins and Arimex, a potential lender for the Mongoose deal.
(Lightner Depo. at 35:17 - 36:6; 156:3-8.)
Lightner Makes Representations to Jenson on Behalf of Robbins
37.

As part of his due diligence, Jenson had a couple conversations with Lightner,

Robbins' private banker at Bank One. {Id. at 60:15 - 61:3; 63:16 - 66:2.) Lightner made
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representations to Jenson on behalf of Robbins concerning the financial condition of Robbins and
his companies. (Id. at 63:16 - 64:15.)
Jenson Approaches Bodell for $4 Million to Combine with $4 Million from Jenson to Make
the $8 Million Loan Robbins Sought
38.

Jenson then met with Michael Bodell in August 2000 to try to induce Bodell to

lend $4 million to be coupled with an additional $4 million from Jenson to make an $8 million
loan to Robbins. (Jenson Depo. at 102:7-16; Bodell Depo. at 45:9-24.) At the meeting Jenson
explained to Bodell what Robbins had told Jenson, including that the $8 million was going to be
used by Robbins to buy out C&W so Robbins could acquire Mongoose and obtain the entire
benefit of that transaction for himself. (Jenson Depo. at 103:9 - 104:6; Bodell Depo. at 45:9 46:23.) Jenson also shared with Bodell the financial statements provided by Robbins showing
the companies had worth of many millions of dollars. (Jenson Depo. at 103:9-18.) Jenson also
relayed to Bodell what Lightner had told Jenson about Robbins and his companies. (Jenson
Depo. at 105:12-21.)
39.

Jenson first met Michael Bodell in May 1982 when they became neighbors.

(Jenson Depo. at 92:2-10.) Jenson approached Mr. Bodell in June 2000 and secured a $1 million
loan for use in Jenson's hard-money lending business. (Id. at 92:11 - 93:14; 94:6 - 95:19..) Mr.
Bodell and Jenson had maintained since meeting in 1982 a friendly relationship. (Id. at 92:23 93:6.) Mr. Bodell liked Jenson. (Id.)
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Jenson Commits to Lend $8 Million to Robbins Before Bodell Agrees to Make the $4 Million
Loan to Jenson, Which Money Jenson Needed to Satisfy His Commitment to Robbins
40.

After performing his due diligence, Jenson agreed to provide Robbins with an $8

million loan for the purpose of buying out C&W's interest in the bicycle companies. {Id. at
45:15-19.) To that end, Jenson provided Robbins a commitment letter dated August 9, 2000
calling for Jenson to make payment of $8 million to Robbins by August 15, 2000. {See August 9
Commitment Letter, attached as Exhibit 22.) The agreement with Robbins provided that Jenson
would acquire a five percent interest in MadTrax Group upon funding. {See August 15, 2000
Loan Agreement, attached as Exhibit 23.)
41.

It was Jenson's intention from the beginning that some of the money for the $8

million loan would come from Jenson and the rest would come from Bodell. (Jenson Depo. at
72:17 - 73:4.) While he was negotiating with Robbins, Jenson told Robbins about the sources of
funding Jenson would use to make the $8 million loan to Robbins. (Id. at 72:7-11.) Jenson
specifically told Robbins that some of the funds were coming in off another transaction, and
Jenson identified Bodell as a source of some of the funds. (Id. at 72:7-16.) Jenson even told
Robbins that Bodell would be contributing $4 million. (Id. at 73:5-9; 75:9-21.)
Based On Jenson's Commitment to Make an $8 Million Loan, Robbins Again Promises
Payment In Full to Cherokee & Walker
42.

The same day Jenson signed the commitment letter to Robbins agreeing to lend $8

million, Robbins exchanged e-mails with C&W disclosing the commitment letter from Jenson
and falsely explaining that MadTrax Group was merely a holding company in which Robbins
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intended to keep Vtrax and Wasatch Cycle. (See August 9, 2000 E-mails, attached as Exhibit
24.)
43.

C&W subsequently had direct communications with Jenson and Lightner about

Jenson's intention to perform under the August 9, 2000 commitment letter and Jenson's ability to
do so. (Christensen Depo. at 214:8 - 216:7; 218:17 - 219:7.) Presumably based upon Lightner's
knowledge that Jenson was receiving $4 million from Bodell, Lightner confirmed to C&W
Jenson's ability to perform a transaction this size (i.e. $8 million loan to Robbins). (Id.)
44.

On August 15, 2000, Robbins and C&W entered into a Settlement Agreement

calling for Robbins to make payment to C&W that same day in an amount totaling
$6,061,209.72. (August 15, 2000 Settlement Agreement attached as Exhibit 23.) Robbins failed
to make that payment. (Christensen Depo. at 224:4 - 225:12.) This was at least the sixth time
Robbins had defaulted on a payment obligation to C&W in connection with the repurchase of
C&W's interest in the bicycle companies.
Having Already Committed Payment to Cherokee & Walker, Robbins is Desperate for the
Money from Jenson and Commits to Helping Jenson Persuade Bodell to Loan $4 Million
45.

In the meantime, Bodell was concerned about and struggling with the amount of

money at issue in the proposed transaction and had not yet committed to lend $4 million to
Jenson to give to Robbins. (Bodell Depo. at 53:21 - 54:8.) Bodell's primary concern was where
the funds were coming from to repay the loan Jenson was asking Bodell to make. (Id. at 49:1 12.) At the same time, Robbins was asking Jenson about reasons for the delay funding the $8
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million loan. (Jenson Depo. at 75:9-21.) Jenson testified he explained to Robbins it was taking
longer to get the money from Bodell. (Id.)
Robbins Obtains a False Letter from Bank One to Convince Bodell to Make the $4 Million
Loan to Jenson
46.

With that knowledge, Robbins requested and received from Lightner at Bank One

a letter dated August 22, 2000 addressed "To whom it may concern" (the "Lightner Letter").
(August 22, 2000 Lightner Letter attached as Exhibit 25; Robbins Depo. at 322:22 - 324:6.) That
letter falsely represented that Jenson was a member of MadTrax Group, and falsely stated that
$165 million was coming into a Bank One account to be managed by Robbins and Jenson. (See
Lightner Letter, attached as Exhibit 25; Statement of Addt'l Material Facts,ffif47-59 below.)
47.

The August 22, 2000 Lightner Letter from Bank One, on Bank One letterhead and

bearing a fax header that reads "Bank One Broadway"provides:
August 22, 2000
To:

Whom it may concern

Re:

MadTrax Group, LLC

Gentlemen:
MadTrax Group, LLC (the "Company") and its individual members Mark
Robbins and Marc Jenson (the "Members") will be depositing $165,000,000 into Bank
One, Utah NA. The funding is coming from a loan agreement between MadTrax Group,
LLC, a Utah limited liability company and Arimex Investments, LTD., a Bahamian
corporation. The sum of $165,000,000 will be deposited into an interest bearing account
in the name of the Company and managed by its Members.
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Should you have any questions with respect to this matter, please contact the
Undersigned.
Ils/I
Ben Lightner
Wealth Advisor
Private Banking Group
(Lightner Letter, Exhibit 25.)
48.

Robbins dictated for Lightner the information he wanted in the Lightner Letter.

(Robbins Depo. at 446:5-20.) Lightner then drafted the letter. (Id.)
49.

Bank One, through its Rule 30(b)(6) designee, and the author of the August 22,

2000 Lightner Letter concedes there was no verification by Bank One of the statements in the
Letter. (Lightner Depo. at 240:10-19.)
The Lightner Letter is False
50.

Bank One and Lightner did not know in August 2000 who the members of

MadTrax Group were. (Id. at 240:20 - 241:3.) Jenson was not a member of MadTrax Group in
August 2000, and that representation in the letter was false. (Jenson Depo. at 217:5-15.) The
Lightner Letter confirms, however, that the Bank considered Robbins and Jenson partners and
would reasonably expect that Jenson would received and use the Letter. (See Lightner Letter,
attached as Exhibit 25.)
51.

Bank One and Lightner concede they did not have in August 2000 proof that $ 165

million was going to be deposited into Bank One, Utah. (Lightner Depo. at 241:4-12.)
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52.

As evidenced by the August 22, 2000 letter and the other letters described below,

Lightner was well aware that Jenson and Robbins were working together to raise funding for the
deal, and Lightner remembers having discussions with Robbins about financing for it. (Lightner
Depo. at 37:5-17.)
53.

Bank One declined any financing for Robbins and his companies with respect to

the Mongoose acquisition because Robbins did not have the necessary resources. (Lightner
Depo. at 217:10-218:7.)
54.

David Babcock, president of Vtrax and a member of the MadTrax team working

on the Mongoose bid, testified that MadTrax had secured no lending arrangement with outside
lenders as of August 23, 2000, the day after the letter was signed by Lightner and Bank One.
(Babcock Depo. at 166:23 - 164:1.)
55.

The $165 million loan agreement referenced in the Lightner Letter purportedly

related to a draft loan agreement with Arimex. (Robbins Depo. at 329:16-22.) At no time was
there a fully executed loan agreement between MadTrax and Arimex that guaranteed $165
million would be available for deposit into Bank One, as represented in the Lightner Letter.
(Robbins Depo. at 331:16 - 332:1.) In fact, MadTrax did not and would not sign any agreement
with Arimex unless MadTrax was selected as the winning bidder for Mongoose. (Robbins Depo.
at 331:16 - 332:1.) Robbins discussed that fact with Lightner and Bank One. (Id.) MadTrax
never had any agreement with Brunswick about what result MadTrax could expect in its bid for
Mongoose - i.e., that it would be selected as the winning bidder. (Robbins Depo. at 210:3-6.)
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56.

Robbins was in constant contact with Lightner and kept Lightner and Bank One

fully informed about the status of MadTrax's negotiations with Arimex, Unisource and the
Mongoose bid efforts. (Robbins Depo. at 330:1-23.) To that end, Lightner visited Robbins and
the Vtrax offices very regularly, as often as daily or several times a week. (Larsen Depo. at 119:9
-120:16.)
57.

Lightner was personally involved in the efforts of Robbins and Jenson to acquire

Mongoose. Among other things, as detailed below, he wrote additional letters at Robbins'
request falsely representing the financial strength of Robbins and Jenson and their companies.
Lightner also attended a meeting with Robbins and Arimex, a potential lender for the Mongoose
deal. (Lightner Depo. at 35:17 - 36:6; 156:3-8.)
58.

Lightner and Bank One knew that MadTrax was merely bidding for Mongoose,

and that its acquisition of Mongoose was never a done deal. (Robbins Depo. at 331:9-15.)
59.

The Lightner Letter contains no qualification or disclaimer concerning any

conditions precedent to the $165 million being deposited into Bank One to be managed by
MadTrax Group. (See Lightner Letter, Exhibit 25.) Neither does the Lightner Letter indicate
that the loan agreement between MadTrax and Arimex was contingent on some other event
happening first, be it MadTrax winning its bid for Mongoose or any other event. (Id.) The
Lightner Letter makes no disclosure that the Arimex loan was contingent on MadTrax Group
first raising and depositing into an escrow account $16.5 million that MadTrax did not have.
(Id.)
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Lightner and Bank One Knew in August 2000 that Robbins was Working with Jenson to
Raise Funds to Buyout Cherokee & Walker fs Interest in their Joint Bicycle Venture
60.

Before Bank One would make a loan to a client, it would gather financial and

business information which would be sent to the National Credit Center where it would be
analyzed. After that, Lightner had the option of signing off on the transaction. (Lightner Depo.
at 274:1-275:2.)
61.

If Bank One was going to do a loan for a client in 2000, Bank One did due

diligence to find out about the borrower, including what their credit report looked like, how their
cash flow looked, what the company did, and how the company operated. (Lightner Depo. at
144:18-24.)
62.

During 2000, Robbins and his companies had loans with Bank One, including a

$200,000 line of credit. (Lightner Depo. at 261:17 - 262:5.)
63.

In the summer and fall of 2000, Bank One was "terming" Jenson out of some

loans. Bank One required a rest period when the line of credit needed to be at zero and Jenson
had not done that. (Lightner Depo. at 270:25 - 271:17.)
64.

In connection with the loans made by Bank One to Robbins, Bank One received

Robbins's personal financial statements and tax returns. (Lightner Depo. at 187:20-25.)
65.

Lightner understood Robbins was associated with Vtrax, Madwagon, Wasatch

Cycles and MadTrax Group and received personal financial statements and tax returns in
connection with extending credit to Robbins. (Lightner Depo. at 186:9 - 187:7.)

xxxviu

66.

In 2000, Bank One knew who owned Vtrax based upon the documentation

received by the Bank in connection with extensions of credit. (Lightner Depo. at 196:22 197:4.)
67.

Lightner understood that Cherokee & Walker owned part of at least one of

Robbins' companies. (Lightner Depo. at 107:20 - 108:5.) In fact, Cherokee & Walker and
Robbins co-guaranteed a Bank One loan to one of the companies. (Id. at 191:20 - 193:3.) Bank
One would have known which of Robbins' companies Cherokee & Walker had an ownership
interest in based upon the documentation received by Bank One. (Id. at 193:19-24.) Lightner
had meetings with Cherokee & Walker and Robbins talking about what the company was doing.
(Mat 203:11-16.)
68.

Lightner understood that Robbins was acquiring Cherokee & Walker's interest in

the bicycle companies jointly owned with Robbins, and therefore wanted the loan at Bank One it
had guaranteed closed out. (Lightner Depo. at 310:1-5.)
69.

To that end, Lightner wrote a letter on Bank One letterhead to Jim Jenkins, a

principal at Cherokee & Walker, dated July 3, 2000 in which he referred to "Shane" who was
Shane Peery with Cherokee & Walker. (Lightner Depo. at 308:4-19; July 3, 2000 Lightner Letter
attached as Exhibit 26.) The letter stated:
Mr. Jim Jenkins
Cherokee & Walker, LLC
1245 East Brickyard Rd. #350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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Dear Mr. Jenkins:
The purpose of this brief letter is to confirm my verbal conversation with Shane that the
following was occurred:
(1)

(2)

All loan documents using the name of James W. Jenkins, Cherokee & Walker,
LLC or Cherokee & Walker Investment Co., LLC (both signed and unsigned)
relating to Vtrax Sports, LLC have been permanently destroyed.
Cherokee & Walker, LLC, Cherokee & Walker Investment Co., LLC and/or
James W. Jenkins are not currently co-signers/guarantors on any loan with Bank
One in connection [sic] Vtrax Sports, LLC.

If I can be of any further assistance, please feel free to contact me at (801) 481-5020.
Sincerely,
//s//
Benjamin Lightner
Wealth Advisor
70.

Lightner knew Robbins received money from Jenson in 2000, testified he did not

know what Robbins did with the money, but stated that Robbins may have paid off Cherokee &
Walker because Lightner knew that Robbins was purchasing Cherokee & Walker's interest in the
companies they jointly owned. (Lightner Depo. at 259:16 - 260:11.) Lightner obtained that
information either from Robbins or Cherokee & Walker. (Lightner Depo. at 260:12-16.)
71.

Lightner even remembered taking checks to Cherokee & Walker at the direction

of either Robbins or Jenson. (Lightner Depo. at 40:17 - 41:3.)
Robbins Defaults on Payment Obligations to Cherokee & Walker for the Seventh Time
72.

The same day he requested and obtained the false Bank One letter from Lightner,

Robbins sent an e-mail to C&W informing C&W that they could go to Bank One to obtain from
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Lightner a cashier's check for the outstanding payment due C&W from Robbins. (August 22,
2000 E-mail attached as Exhibit 27.)
73.

C&W went to Bank One the same day that Robbins obtained the August 22, 2000

Lightner Letter and waited for four hours for a check that never came. (Christensen Depo. at
87:8 - 91:6; 225:20 - 226:25.) This was at least the seventh time Robbins had promised payment
to C&W on a specific day and failed to perform.
Robbins and Jenson Use the Lightner Letter to Persuade Bodell to Make the $4 Million Loan
to Jenson, Which Loan Robbins and Jenson Needed to get $8 Million to Robbins to Buyout
Cherokee & Walker
74.

Robbins gave a copy of the false August 22, 2000 Lightner Letter to Jenson.

(Jenson Depo. at 216:1-3.) Jenson told Robbins that he intended to show that Letter to Bodell.
( M a t 225:10-226:1.)
75.

Jenson presented the false August 22, 2000 Lightner Letter to Bodell in

connection with his efforts to induce Bodell to loan Jenson $4 million to be coupled with another
$4 million from Jenson and made part of an $8 million loan to Robbins. (Jenson Depo. at
215:16-25.) Jenson told Bodell Bank One had provided the Lightner Letter to Robbins and
Jenson to help them solicit funds by proving that $165 million was forthcoming, from which
investors would be repaid. (Bodell Depo. at 60:13-22.) Jenson also told Bodell that his attorneys
had already checked everything out. (Bodell Depo. at 52:9 - 53:4.)
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The False August 22, 2000 Lightner Letter Accomplishes Robbins's Purpose
76.

Relying primarily upon the representations in the Lightner Letter from Bank One

confirming the funds going into the MadTrax account as a source of repayment, Bodeil agreed to
make the $4 million loan, but only if Jenson agreed to pay a higher interest rate than Jenson
initially proposed. (Id. at 61:2 - 62:7; Jenson Depo. at 106:2-19.) Jenson got on the phone with
Robbins and explained that Bodeil was requiring one percent per week interest on the loan.
(Jenson Depo. at 106:2-19.) Robbins told Jenson he would take care of the extra expense
associated with the higher rate Bodeil was insisting on. {Id.\ See also Jenson Depo. at 323:19 324:3) Robbins knew going into the loan with Jenson that the term of Bodell's loan was only 30
days, with one percent per week interest, and likely to default into the penalty phase of the
agreement. (Jenson Depo. at 139:11-25.)
77.

On August 30, 2000, Bodeil loaned $4 million to Jenson, the terms of the loan are

memorialized in a Promissory Note and a Guaranty, both bearing the same date. (See Promissory
Note, attached as Exhibit 28; and Guaranty, attached as Exhibit 29.)
78.

The very next day, on August 31, 2000, Robbins paid C&W $1 million. (Copy of

August 31, 2000 check attached as Exhibit 30.) On September 8, 2000, Robbins paid C&W
another $1 million, with the remaining payment of $4,079,862.52 made on September 11, 2000.
(Copy of checks attached as Exhibit 31.)

xlii

As Further Evidence that the Representations in the Lightner Letter Concerning an Arimex
Loan were False, Robbins Continues to Seek Real Financing for the Mongoose Transaction
79.

Notwithstanding the representations in the false August 22, 2000 Lightner Letter

that the $165 million loan was coming from Arimex, MadTrax Group subsequently sought in
September 2000 financing for a $165 million loan with a company called Unisource Cap.
(Robbins Depo. at 287:16-25.) Even had MadTrax won its bid for Mongoose, Robbins and
MadTrax had decided not to execute the loan agreement with Arimex, but had decided instead to
pursue financing with Unisource Cap. (Robbins Depo. at 306:13-23.) There exists no executed
loan agreement with Unisource Cap for $165 million, and Unisource Cap is not mentioned in the
Lightner Letter. (See Lightner Letter, Exhibit 25.)
The CFO of Robbins's Bicycle Company Admits the Arimex Loan Arrangement was not
Something MadTrax Wanted Anything to do With
80.

Trevor Larsen ("Larsen") was during the relevant period the chief financial officer

of Vtrax and spent a significant amount of time working on the MadTrax efforts to acquire
Mongoose. (Larsen Depo. at 17:13-15; 117:16-25.) Larsen considered himself the "potential
chief financial officer" for MadTrax Group and signed letters on MadTrax letterhead using that
title. (Id. at 203:19 - 204:8.) Larsen was the principal contact at MadTrax with respect to the
bid. (Id. at 177:7-10.) Among other things, Larsen made initial calls to Brunswick, obtained
documents from Brunswick, attended meetings at Brunswick, attended meetings with potential
lenders for the transaction and met with investment bankers. (Id. at 174:6-18.)

xliii

81.

Larsen also met with Arimex concerning the Arimex proposal for financing.

(Larsen Depo. at 188:14-25.) After hearing the Arimex sales pitch, it quickly became apparent
that any lending arrangement with Arimex was not something MadTrax wanted to be involved
with. (Id.) As Arimex was going through its sales pitch, Larsen just "shut down." (Id. at
192:18-24.)
MadTrax Group Had no Cash, was not Capitalized, Had no Assets, was Unable to Fill
Purchase Orders, and Had no Inventory
82.

David Babcock ("Babcock") was at all relevant times the president of Vtrax

(Babcock Depo. at 22:4-12.) While he was president of Vtrax, Babcock observed that Vtrax had
no recognized cash, was not capitalized, had no inventory, had no assets aside from computers,
and was unable to fill purchase orders because it could not pay its manufacturer for the bicycles
in advance of shipment. (Babcock Depo. at 74:12-20; 78:4 - 79:5; 85:24-25; 93:2-8; 109:17-20.)
While Babcock was president, Vtrax never earned a profit and never generated any revenue. (Id.
at 110:11-15.) Babcock is unaware of any assets ever held by MadTrax Group. (115:1-8.)
Babcock never believed MadTrax could succeed in its efforts to acquire Mongoose. (Id. at
134:13-135:10.)
The President and CFO ofRobbins 's Bicycle Company Describe the Arimex Proposal as
"Crazy" and Agree Arimex Can do Nothing for MadTrax
83.

Babcock attended the meeting with Arimex and the meeting with Unisource Cap.

(Id. at 81:22 - 82:10.) Babcock described the meeting with Arimex as "crazy." (Id. at 140:1724.) Babcock didn't believe anything would come from the meeting. (Id. at 140:25 - 141:5.)
xliv

84.

After meeting with Arimex, Larsen and Babcock had a discussion about the fact

that Arimex was not a company that could do anything for MadTrax Group. (Id. at 189:14-22.)
The proposed Arimex transaction was premised on MadTrax first giving money to Arimex,
before Arimex would lend money to MadTrax, and the arrangement "just didn't sound right."
(Mat 189:16-190:8.)
The Arimex Loan Agreement Included Conditions Precedent to Funding that MadTrax Did
Not and Could Not Satisfy
85.

Robbins attaches as Exhibit 34 to his moving papers what he claims is a copy of

the final form of agreement between MadTrax and Arimex for a $165 million loan. As noted
above, there exists no foundation whatsoever for this document and it must not be considered in
support of Robbins' motion for summary judgment. By its own terms, however, the document
required in advance of any loan to MadTrax that MadTrax establish an escrow account with a
financial institution and deposit into the escrow account $16.5 million. (See Arimex Agreement,
attached as Exhibit 1, at If 1.6; Arimex Escrow Agreement with Bank One and MadTrax,
attached as Exhibit 2.) The agreement further required in advance of any loan from Arimex that
MadTrax Group obtain an executed "Proof of Funds" letter from an "FDICA regional bank" in a
specific form provided by Arimex. (Id. at ^ 1.7.)
86.

Neither MadTrax nor Robbins had $16.5 million on hand to fund the required

escrow account prior to receiving the Arimex money, and Robbins knew MadTrax was going to
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have to raise that money to get the loan. (Robbins Depo. at 266:23 - 269:16.) Larsen testified
that number was "just too big" for MadTrax. (Larsen Depo. at 223:13-21.)
87.

MadTrax was incapable of making the required pre-payment. MadTrax sought

financing from Arimex and Unisource Cap because it had no assets of its own. (Robbins Depo.
at 204:16-20.) MadTrax never had any assets, never had any bank accounts, was never
capitalized and never had any cash flow. (Larsen Depo. at 126:15 - 127:7.)
88.

There exists in this case no evidence that a "proof of funds letter" was ever

executed by a regional bank, as required by the express terms of the Arimex loan agreement
before Arimex would fund the loan.
The CFO ofRobbins's Bicycle Company Discusses with Robbins that Arimex was Not a
Legitimate Opportunity for MadTrax
89.

Following the Arimex meeting, Larsen had conversations with Robbins in which

Larsen said he didn't think the Arimex deal was "real," or a "legitimate opportunity to fund
Mongoose or any other deal." (Larsen Depo. at 190:22 -191:2.) Larsen never received
additional information he requested from Arimex as part of his due diligence, including a list of
other companies with which Arimex had entered into similar lending arrangements. {Id. at
191:18- 192:7.)
90.

In Larsen's opinion, the only thing that came from the meetings and discussions

with Arimex was "just a lot of wasted time." {Id. at 192:25 - 193:3.) Larsen never saw any
finalized or executed loan agreements with Arimex. {Id. at 193:4-8.) As far as Babcock is
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aware, there was never any follow-up with Arimex after the meeting. (Babcock Depo. at 141:610.) Babcock is aware of no commitments for lending from Arimex as a result of the meeting.
{Id. at 141:11-14.) Babcock never saw any loan agreements of contracts between MadTrax
Group and Arimex. {Id. at 171:1-4.)
The Purported Funding Agreement with Unisource Cap was "Three Times as Crazy'9 as the
Unrealistic Arimex Transaction
91.

Larsen was also present for the September 2000 MadTrax meeting with the

principal of Unisource Cap. (Larsen Depo. at 193:17-22.) Larsen described the Unisource Cap
discussions as "three times the - as crazy as the Arimex deal." {Id. at 193:23 - 194:1.) Larsen
described the proposed Unisource transaction as "just a joke." {Id. at 194:2-11.) Babcock was
also present for that meeting and is aware of no follow-up ever taking place with Unisource.
(Babcock Depo. at 142:17-24.) Babcock is aware of no lending commitment resulting from the
MadTrax Group meeting with Unisource Cap. {Id. at 142:25 - 143:3.)
Robbins and MadTrax Never Disclosed to their Own Investment Bankers the Purportedly
Finalized Lending Agreements with Arimex and Unisource Cap
92.

Prior to retaining the investment banking firm of Duff & Phelps in November

2000 to assist with the Mongoose bid, MadTrax had no source of funding in place for the
purchase of the Brunswick bicycle division. (Larsen Depo. at 195:8-12; See also Duff & Phelps
November 7, 2000 retainer letter, attached as Exhibit 32.)
93.

Duff & Phelps worked as MadTrax's agent to obtain financing for the proposed

Mongoose acquisition, including obtaining in November 2000 a term sheet for $75 million from
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GE Capital Commercial Finance ("GE Capital"). (See GE Capital November 7, 2000 letter,
attached as Exhibit 3, and term sheet, attached as Exhibit 33.)
94.

Susan Wilson ("Wilson") was a managing director at Duff & Phelps on the team

that assisted MadTrax in November 2000 with its efforts to acquire Mongoose. (Wilson Depo. at
9:3-15.) One aspect of Wilson's engagement with MadTrax was to provide assistance in
obtaining financing for the Mongoose acquisition. (Id. at 48:3-6.) Wilson never saw the
Lightner Letter in connection with Duff & Phelps' representation of MadTrax Group. (Id. at
42:22-43:4.)
95.

The reference in the Lightner Letter to a loan for $165 million was much higher

than any numbers Wilson discussed with MadTrax Group in November 2000 for the acquisition
of Mongoose. (Id. at 45:13-21.) Despite Duff & Phelps having discussions with MadTrax
Group about its access to capital for the Mongoose acquisition, and notwithstanding that
obtaining financing for the acquisition was one of the main components of Duff & Phelps' work
for MadTrax, neither Robbins nor anyone else at MadTrax told Wilson about having access to
$165 million in financing. (Id. at 46:5-18.)
96.

Wilson did not have any conversations with Robbins or anyone else at MadTrax

Group in which she was informed that Robbins or MadTrax Group had access to cash, bonds or
other marketable securities valued in excess of $971 million, as represented in a separate letter
Robbins requested and obtained from Lightner and Bank One to give to Lincoln Partners as
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evidence of MadTrax's ability to fund the proposed acquisition of Mongoose. (Id. at 46:19 47:11] See also ^ 113-121 below.)
97.

Had MadTrax indeed obtained a loan from Arimex for the Mongoose acquisition

before November 2000, that fact likely would have precluded MadTrax Group from obtaining the
GE Capital loan Duff & Phelps was pursuing as MadTrax's agent to fund the proposed purchase.
(Mat 49:10-50:4.)
The False August 22, 2000 Lightner Letter Was Never Intended for Lincoln Partners
98.

The August 22, 2000 Lightner Letter is addressed 'To whom it may concern."

(See Lightner Letter, Exhibit 25.) It is not addressed to Lincoln Partners. (Id.)
99.

Lincoln Partners was the investment banker retained by Brunswick to provide

advice with respect to the sale of Brunswick's bicycle division, to perform due diligence and to
screen potential bidders to determine whether they had the financial means to consummate the
purchase of Mongoose. (Brown Depo. at 11:10 - 12:4.)
100.

Robbins' ability to finance the acquisition of Mongoose was of paramount

importance to Lincoln Partners. (Houser Depo. at 18:20 - 19:5.) Lincoln Partners spent a lot of
time talking with Robbins about where the money was coming from for his proposed purchase of
Mongoose. (Houser Depo. at 12:20 - 13:3.)
101.

Robbins' ability to finance the purchase of Mongoose was a sensitive issue for

Robbins. (Id. at 18:11 - 19:5.) Robbins was reluctant to provide the information Lincoln
Partners requested about his ability to finance the purchase. (Id. at 19:6-7.) Robbins eventually
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put Lincoln Partners in touch with Lightner at Bank One, and they had conversations with
Lightner about Robbins' ability to fund the proposed acquisition of Mongoose. {Id. at 16:5 17:1.)
102.

David Houser ("Houser"), a senior vice president at Lincoln Partners, worked on

the Brunswick bicycle sale in 2000, including MadTrax's bid. (Houser Depo. at 7:18-21; 10:821.) Houser has no recollection of any discussions with Robbins or MadTrax Group about $165
million being loaned or deposited into Bank One for the transaction. {Id. at 52:16-18.) Despite
being pressed by Lincoln Partners to be specific about the source of MadTrax's funding for the
proposed acquisition, Robbins made no representations about where the money was coming
from. {Id. at 55:24 - 56:23.) Specifically, Robbins never made any representations about having
funds available from a company called Arimex Investments or Unisource Cap. {Id. at 56:24 57:6; Brown Depo. at 66:6-15; 80:9-21.)
103.

Neither Brown nor Houser at Lincoln Partners has any memory of ever seeing the

August 22, 2000 Lightner Letter prior to their depositions in this case. (Brown Depo. at 73:6-12;
Houser Depo. at 51:23 - 52:18.)
104.

Larsen, the MadTrax point of contact for Lincoln Partners had not seen the

Lightner Letter prior to his deposition in this case. (Larsen Depo. at 234:9 - 235:15.)

1

Lightner and Bank One Published Several Other False Letters to Assist Robbins with His
Business Transactions
105.

In addition to the fraudulent and false August 22, 2000 Letter (see Paragraphs 46-

79 above), Lightner and Bank One authored for Robbins at least three other letters on Bank One
letterhead in which Lightner and Bank One made statements Lightner admits were false at the
time the letters were written. (See July 27, 2000 Bank One letter to James Schenk at Brunswick
Corporation, attached as Exhibit 34; October 19, 2000 Bank One letter to Rob Brown at Lincoln
Partners, attached as Exhibit 35; and October 19, 2000 Bank One letter addressed to the Union
Bank of Switzerland, attached as Exhibit 36.) Lightner also created a false Form Verification of
Deposit for Robbins falsely stating the value of Robbins' accounts at Bank One. (See Form
Verification of Deposit, attached as Exhibit 37.) Lightner neither confirms nor denies that he
wrote any of the letters, but as detailed below, the sworn testimony of third-party witnesses
independently ties Lightner to the letters. (See Statement of Addt'l Material Facts, fl 106-123.)
106.

The first of the false Bank One letters authored by Lightner is a letter dated July

27, 2000. (See July 27, 2000 Lightner Letter to Brunswick, attached as Exhibit 34.) Robbins or
Larsen requested and obtained this letter from Lightner at Bank One. (Robbins Depo. at 214:23 215:1.) This letter was attached to another letter to Brunswick the same day from MadTrax
Group. (Robbins Depo. at 214:7-22.)
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107.

The July 27, 2000 Lightner Letter to Brunswick reads:

July 27, 2000
James Schenk
Vice President
Brunswick Corporation
Dear Mr. Schenk:
MadTrax Group, LLC (the Company) and several members of management have been
long-time customers with Bank One, Utah, NA (Bank One). Over the years, Bank One
and the Company have partnered together to complete several successful business
transactions.
Based on our discussions with management of the Company, we confirm that the
Company has the financial resources to complete the acquisition of the bicycle segment
of Brunswick Corporation. Bank One is interested in the potential opportunity to finance
the purchase of certain acquired assets. The management of the Company has established
several significant lies of credit with Bank One.
Please call me at (801) 481-5020 if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
llsll

Benjamin M. Lightner
Bank One, Utah, NA
Relationship Manager1
108.

The letter contains several misrepresentations. Robbins, Lightner and Bank One

all concede that Madtrax Group and the members of management had not been longtime
customers of Bank One in July 2000. (Lightner Depo. at 219:20 - 220:8; Robbins Depo. at
216:22 - 217:8.) Bank One does not believe MadTrax Group had even been formed at that time.
Lightner does not deny writing the letter, but testified that he did not know if he wrote the letter or not.
(Lightner Depo. at 224:4-15.)

lii

(Lightner Depo. at 221:22 - 222:2.) Bank One had not had a relationship with MadTrax or its
management for years, as represented in the letter. (Lightner Depo. at 220:21 - 221:11 ) Bank
One did not even know who the managers of MadTrax Group were. (Lightner Depo. at 220:21 22111.) It was not true in July 2000 that Bank One and MadTrax Group had partnered together
to complete several successful business transactions. (Lightner Depo. at 222:8-12; Robbins
Depo. at 217:16-24.) Moreover, Bank One did not have an interest in financing the purchase of
assets, as Bank One declined Robbins and Jenson every time they brought proposed business
transactions because they did not have the "wherewithal." (Lightner Depo. at 222.8-12.) In fact,
Bank One knew in July 2000 that MadTrax did not have the financial resources to complete the
acquisition of Mongoose. (Lightner Depo. at 222:3-7; 222:13-20.)
109.

At Robbins' request, Lightner and Bank One next authored the August 22, 2000

Lightner Letter. (See Bank One August 22, 2000 Lightner Letter, attached as Exhibit 25.) As
noted above, the August 22, 2000 Lightner Letter contains numerous representations that
Lightner and Bank One knew to be false at the time the letter was written. (See Statement of
Addt'l Material Facts,ffil46-79.)2

Lightner does not deny that he wrote the August 22, 2000 letter, but testified that because the letter was
false he did not think he wrote the letter, even though it was faxed fiom Bank One's Broadway branch where he
worked (Lightner Depo at 238 19-241 12 ) Chase has previously acknowledged that whether Lightner wrote the
letter piesents a question of fact that must be resolved at trial Overwhelming evidence will establish that Lightner
did in fact write the letter, including the testimony of Defendant Robbins that he requested and received the letter
from Lightner, and the testimony of disinterested third-parties that they discussed with Lightner the other letters
described herein containing similar (and in some instances, identical) misrepresentations
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Bank One Admits a Letter Addressed "To Whom it May Concern " Should Not be Written
Because the Bank Cannot Control Who May Rely on it
110.

The August 22, 2000 Lightner Letter is addressed "To whom it may concern."

{See Bank One August 22, 2000 Lightner Letter, attached as Exhibit 25.) Lightner understood
that an employee of Bank One should not address a letter "To whom it may concern" because
you are uncertain who might read it and rely on it. (Lightner Depo. at 255:24 - 256:4.)
111.

Bank One acknowledges that writing a letter addressed "To whom it may

concern" is inappropriate and a violation of standard practice in the banking industry. (Mayo
Depo. (as Bank One corporate designee), at 95:16 - 96:7.) Chase concedes "you don't generate
'to whom it may concern' letters at all in standard practice." {Id. at 104:2-4.)
112.

Chase acknowledges that such a letter is against standard practice in the industry

because there exists a risk that any person could claim to be "to whom it may concern." {Id. at
98:11-100:13.)
113.

At Robbins' request, Lightner and Bank One next prepared and sent to Lincoln

Partners a letter dated October 19, 2000. (Robbins Depo. at 232:18 - 233:9.)
114.

The October 19, 2000 letter (attached as Exhibit 35) is addressed to Rob Brown,

Vice President, Lincoln Partners LLC, and reads as follows:
Rob Brown
Vice President
Lincoln Partners
181 West Madison Street, Suite 3750
Chicago, Illinois 60602
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Dear Mr. Brown:
MadTrax Group, LLC (the "Company") and its individual members collectively have on
deposit with several financial institutions, including cash, government bonds and
marketable securities valued in excess of $971,716,000, of which $165,000,000 will be
deposited into Bank One, Utah, NA (Bank One) by December 1, 2000. Bank One has
received copies of all personal financials, tax returns, marketable securities, government
bonds, and pertinent documents to conclude and verify the value of MadTrax Group, LLC
and its individual members.
Based upon our recent discussions, and additional financial information provided by the
management of the Company, we confirm that the Company has the financial resources in
place to complete the acquisition of Brunswick Bicycles, with a purchase price of
$63,000,000.
Should you have any questions with respect to this matter, please contact the undersigned.
//s//
Benjamin M. Lightner
Bank One, Utah, NA
Wealth Advisor3
115.

Robbins' purpose in obtaining this letter from Bank One was to show Lincoln

Partners that MadTrax had the ability to fund the proposed acquisition. (Robbins Depo. at 233:49.) Robert Brown ("Brown"), a vice president at Lincoln Partners working on the Brunswick
bicycle sale had a conversation with Lightner at Bank One in which Brown requested Lightner
send something to Brown verifying Robbins' and MadTrax's ability to finance the proposed
acquisition. (Brown Depo. at 55:23 - 56:3.)

Again, Lightner did not deny he wrote this letter, but because the content of the letter was false he says he
would not have written the letter. (Lightner Depo. at 226:5-14.)
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116.

Robert Brown with Lincoln Partners spoke with Lightner who confirmed he had

written the letter, that the information contained in the letter was true and that MadTrax had the
ability to finance the purchase of Mongoose. (Brown Depo. at 81:12 - 82:11; 55:22 - 56:8.)
117.

David Houser with Lincoln Partners testified that Lightner confirmed in telephone

conversations the financial wherewithal of Robbins and his companies to do the transaction.
(Houser Depo. at 15:11 -18:9.)
118.

In fact, the information contained in the October 19, 2000 letter was false, as

Lightner admitted. (Lightner Depo. at 225:20 - 229:25.) For example, Bank One and Lightner
concede it was not true in October 2000 that MadTrax Group and its individual members had on
deposit with several financial institutions cash, government bonds, and marketable securities
valued in excess of $971 million. (Lightner Depo. at 229:2-10.) Lightner and Bank One knew
that was a false statement in October 2000. (Id at 229:12-14.)
119.

Bank One and Lightner further concede it was not true in October 2000 that Bank

One was expecting $165 million to be deposited by December 1, 2000. (Id. at 229:15-20.) Nor
was it true in October 2000 that Bank One had received copies of personal financial statements,
tax returns, marketable securities, government bonds or other documents to conclude and verify
the value of MadTrax Group and its individual members. (Id at 230:5-21.) Lightner and Bank
One knew that was a false statement at the time the letter was written. (Id at 230:22-24.)
120.

MadTrax Group and its agents prepared and sent between July and November

2000 no fewer than ten separate pieces of correspondence to Brunswick and Lincoln Partners.
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(See letters, attached as Exhibits 34-35 and 38-45.) None of them are addressed "To whom it
may concern." (Id.)
121.

As part of its file relating to the Brunswick transaction, Lincoln Partners kept

correspondence provided to it by MadTrax relating to potential financing sources. (Brown Depo.
at 28:4-15.) The August 22, 2000 Lightner Letter is not in the files of Lincoln Partners and was
not produced by Lincoln Partners in response to a subpoena in this case. (Id. at 76:3-7.) The
October 19, 2000 letter was in their files and was produced in response to a subpoena in this
case.
122.

The fourth Bank One letter authored by Lightner on Bank One letterhead is a

letter dated October 19, 2000, directed to the Union Bank of Switzerland and addressed to
"Ladies and Gentlemen." (See Bank One October 19, 2000 UBS letter, attached as Exhibit 36.)
Lightner's letter to UBS stated:
Union Bank of Switzerland
Bahnhofstrasse 45
Zurich, 8001
Switzerland
41-1-234-1111
Re:

MadTrax Group, LLC

Ladies and Gentlemen:
MadTrax Group, LLC (the "Company") and its individual members collectively have on deposit
with several financial institution [sic] including case, government bonds and marketable
securities valued in excess of $971,716,000, of which $165,000,000 will be deposited into Bank
One, Utah, NA (Bank One) by December 1, 2000. Bank One has received copies of all personal
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financials, tax returns, marketable securities, government bonds, and pertinent documents to
conclude and verify the value of MadTrax Group, LLC and its individual members.
Upon the execution of the Agreement between the Company and the Union Bank of Switzerland,
Bank One will establish a $100,000,000 ("Custodial Account") in accordance with the provisions
of the Agreement and the usage of the Companies funds to activate the account.
Should you have any questions with respect to this matter, please contact the undersigned.
Ilsll
Benjamin M. Lightner
Bank One, Utah, NA
Wealth Advisor
(801)481-5020
123.

Michael Peterson, at the time a Vice President with Merrill Lynch, spoke with

Lightner in a telephone conversation within a day or so of the date of the letter, in which Lightner
confirmed he had written the UBS letter and vouched for the accuracy of the representations in it.
(Peterson Depo. at 38:1 - 39:4; 34:25 - 38:4; and 24:12 - 25:19.)
124.

Bank One did not do any due diligence with respect to the August 22, 2000

Lightner Letter or any of the other letters authored by Lightner. (Lightner Depo. at 250:18-23.)
125.

Lightner and Bank One understood that consumers and businesses have an

expectation that if banks make representations in letter the banks will first do their due diligence
to make sure the representations are correct and that if a bank makes a representation in
correspondence that a transaction will occur, the bank is obligated to do due diligence to ensure
the representation is true and accurate. (Lightner Depo. at 25 - 26:14; and 30:8-13.)
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IV. ARGUMENT4
Bodell asserts against Bank One claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Fraud
generally consists of: 1) a representation by the defendant; 2) concerning a presently existing
material fact; 3) which representation was false; 4) which the defendant either knew to be false or
made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge on which to base the
representation; 5) for the purpose of inducing another to act; and that 6) the other party acts
reasonably thereon in ignorance of the falsity of the representation and to its detriment. See
Robinson v. Tnpco Investment, Inc , 21 P.3d 219 (Utah Ct. App. 2000.)
Negligent misrepresentation generally consists of: 1) a defendant with a pecuniary interest
in a transaction; 2) who is in a superior position to know material facts about that transaction; 3)
who carelessly or negligently makes a false representation concerning those facts; 4) expecting
another to rely and act on that representation; 5) a plaintiff who does rely on the representation;
and 6) suffers harm as a result. See Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 423 P.2d 659 (Utah 1967).
Bank One variously moves for summary judgment on fraud and negligent
misrepresentation claims on the bases that: 1) there was no representation by Lightner and Bank
One concerning a presently existing fact; 2) the representations made by Lightner and the Bank
in the August 22, 2000 letter were not false; 3) Bodell's reliance on the August 22, 2000 Bank

As Bank One notes in its moving papers, the Scheduling Order and Older on Motions filed May 29,
2007, provided for overlength briefing on summary judgment where a Defendant consolidated into a single motion
several discrete bases for summary judgment Like Bank One, Bodell's consolidated memorandum in opposition is
substantially shorter than authorized by the Court

1

One letter was not reasonable as a matter of law; and 4) notwithstanding the fact that it
previously moved unsuccessfully for summary judgment on the issue, Bank One argues Bodell's
pre-lawsuit settlement with Jenson amounted to an accord and satisfaction operating to Bank
One's benefit.5
In reverse order, Judge Bohling previously considered and correctly rejected Bank One's
specious argument that Bodell's pre-lawsuit settlement with Jenson precludes Bodell's claims
against Bank One. Judge Bohling's ruling is the law of the case and should not be disturbed.
Bodell's reliance on the Bank One letter was plainly reasonable under the circumstances, but
Utah courts have consistently held that the reasonableness of one's reliance is a question of fact
for juries to resolve after hearing all the facts surrounding the specific transaction at issue in each
case. Moreover, the Bank One letter upon which Bodell relied was false and Bank One itself
concedes it had no basis for the outrageous and false claims it made in the letter. Finally, the
Bank One letter quite clearly makes misrepresentations concerning then-existing facts, as is
evident on the face of the letter. Bank One's motion fails in its entirety.

As noted below, Bank One filed a motion for summary judgment on this issue. The issue was fully
bnefed and argued Judge Bohling denied Bank One's motion Judge Bohling's ruling is the law of the case Bank
One does not even argue that new facts or new law make the issue ripe for reconsideration Bank One's inclusion of
this issue is nothing more than an attempt to get a second bite at the apple in hopes that the Court will reconsider and
overrule Judge Bohling's previous ruling

2

A.

THE MISREPRESENTATION CONTAINED IN THE AUGUST 22 LIGHTNER
LETTER IS ACTIONABLE.
Bank One erroneously argues that Lightner's representation in his August 22 letter that

$165 million "will be" deposited into Bank One "coming from a loan agreement between
Madtrax Group, LLC . . . and Arimex Investments, LLC" is not actionable because it does not
relate to a presently existing fact but, instead, relates to a "possible future event." (Bank One
Memo, at 2.) This argument cannot withstand analysis. In the first place, the Bank's
representation was not a prophecy or hope, it was made as a statement of facts, which would
inform a reasonable person that the requisite due diligence was already performed to confirm
those facts. Here it is simple - the Bank not only admits the representations wer false, but admits
that it had no basis to make the representation.
Fraud consists of an affirmative misrepresentation or of an omission to disclose material
facts necessary to make the representation made not misleading. Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d
293, 294 (Utah 1980); Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d 802, 804-805 (Utah 1963). A plaintiff must
prove that a representation was false or was made when the representor knew he had insufficient
information upon which to base the representation. Alta Health Strategies, Inc. v. Kennedy, 790
F.Supp. 1085, 1094 (D. Utah 1992). Lightner admitted in his deposition, the August 22, 2000
letter was false and there was no reasonable basis for the representations made therein. (SOF ffl|
46-79.)
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In John Hancock MuL Life Ins, Co. v. Weisman, 27 F.3d 500, 504 (10th Cir. 1995), the
Tenth Circuit recognized that "an opinion or prediction can be a misrepresentation to the extent
that it is a misstatement of the facts underlying it." Accord, Register v. Roberson Constr. Co.,
Inc., 741 P.2d 1364, 1367 (N.M. 1987). And, in Herald Tyner Development Builders, Inc. v.
First Mark Development Corp., 429 S.E.2d 819, 821-822 (S.C. App. 1993), the court upheld a
fraud verdict where the defendant falsely assured the plaintiff that it intended to perform a
contract by completing the purchase of the subject property but failed to disclose that its decision
to follow through on its contract depended at least in part on whether a third party performed its
agreement to purchase lots from defendant.
A reasonable jury could easily find that the August 22 Lightner Letter strongly implies
that the Bank had performed its due diligence to confirm the facts presented in the letter; that a
fully executed loan agreement existed between Madtrax (which had not even been formed and
never was formed) and Arimex for Arimex to loan $165 million to Madtrax; that there were no
unfulfilled conditions to funding of the loan; and that the making of the loan was imminent. The
letter fails to disclose that the nonexistent Madtrax had not signed the Arimex loan agreement;
that neither Madtrax nor BankOne had done any due diligence to determine whether Arimex had
the capability of funding a $165 million loan; that even if Arimex had the ability to fund the loan,
Madtrax would only sign the loan agreement and obtain the loan in the highly unlikely event that
Madtrax was the successful bidder for Mongoose; that Robbins and Lightner had made
outrageous misrepresentations to Lincoln Partners and Brunswick concerning the bicycle
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companies to even be allowed in the bidding process; that even if Arimex had the ability to fund
the loan, Arimex would only fund the loan if Madtrax first deposited $16.5 million in an escrow
account to insure payment of interest to Arimex under the loan agreement; that Madtrax had no
ability whatsoever to pay that $16.5 million into escrow; and that MadTrax had in any event
decided not seek funding from Arimex, but instead intended to pursue funding from Unisource
Cap. (See August 22, 2000 Lightner Letter, attached as Exhibit 25; SOF 1fi[ 50-66, 79, 82 and 8588.)
Indeed, Vtrax's President, David Babcock, testified that by July and early August of
2000, because of a lack of funds, Vtrax could not even fill the one bicycle order it ever received,
that Vtrax never sold one bicycle and had no inventory, that he thought it was "crazy" to be
talking to "strangers from Mexico" (Arimex) about investments and that he did not worry about
financing the Mongoose transaction because he "didn't think we would ever get that bid."
(Babcock Depo. at pp. 103-104; 109-110; 115; 76-77; 85; 92-93; 140-141; 134-135.)
Most importantly, a jury would be compelled to find that the letter met the factual criteria
to impose liability on the sworn testimony of its author that it was false and that there was no
reasonable basis for the representation.
The cases relied upon by Bank One are easily distinguished because none of them
involved a situation like the case at bar where the person making the representation knew there
was no basis for the representation. For example, in Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No.
/, 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 1982), the Supreme Court merely held that the defendant's good faith
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representation that it intended to enter into a future transaction was not actionable. Similarly, in
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 423 P.2d 659 (Utah 1967), the Supreme Court held that the
representation was not actionable because it only reflected an opinion concerning the defendant's
future ability to build and finance a commercial building.
In short, it is a factual issue for the jury to decide whether at the time Lightner wrote his
August 22 letter he knew he had insufficient information upon which to base his assurance that
$165 million would be deposited into Bank One from a loan agreement with Arimex or whether
Lightner deliberately omitted facts necessary to make his representations not misleading.
B.

IT IS FOR THE JURY TO DECIDE WHETHER THE REPRESENTATION
MADE IN THE AUGUST 22 LIGHTNER LETTER WAS FALSE WHEN MADE.
Bank One tries to argue around its own officer's sworn testimony (as Bank One's Rule

30(b)(6) designee) that the letter was false and that there was no reasonable basis for the
representations in the letter. To that end, Bank One makes the astonishing argument that there is
no evidence that the representation made in the Lightner letter was false when made because "all
that stood in the way of Madtrax receiving its $165 million from Arimex was the signature of
Mark Robbins on the Arimex loan agreement." (Bank One Memo, at 5.) Bank One cannot get
around the fact that Lightner admitted in his deposition that the letter was false. (SOF fl 46-79.)
For all the reasons explained in Section A above, there was no basis for Lightner's
statement in his letter that $165 million "will be deposited" by the non-existent Madtrax and its
members, Robbins and Jenson, into Bank One. All Robbins had as of August 22, 2000, was a
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hope and a prayer that he would be able to purchase Mongoose and fund that purchase through a
loan from Arimex by egregiously misrepresenting his and the bicycle company's financial
strength and resources. There is no evidence that Arimex had the ability to fund the loan. In
addition, the evidence is indisputable that Robbins and the bicycle companies had no ability
whatsoever to deposit $16.5 million into escrow which was a condition precedent to the making
of the loan by Arimex. (SOF f| 80-90.) Neither had MadTrax secured a proof of funds letter
from a national bank confirming MadTrax's ability to fund the $16.5 million into escrow - also a
condition precedent to obtaining the Arimex loan. (SOF 80-90.) Genuine issues of material fact
clearly exist with respect to the truthfulness of Lightner's August 22 letter, which must be
decided by the jury at trial.
C.

WHETHER BODELL REASONABLY RELIED ON LIGHTNER'S AUGUST 22
LETTER IS A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY TO DECIDE.
Bank One next attempts to convert the quintessential fact issue of reasonable reliance into

a legal question by arguing that as a matter of law Bodell could not have reasonably relied upon
the representations contained in Lightner's August 22 letter without further investigation. This
argument is without merit and ignores both highly relevant evidence in this case and established
case law in Utah that a party generally may reasonably rely on affirmative representations of fact
without independent investigation.
Utah courts have emphasized time and again that whether a plaintiff reasonably relied
upon a misrepresentation is generally a question of fact to be determined by the jury. See, e.g.,
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Condor v. A. L. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 638 (Utah App. 1987); Berkeley Bank
For Coops, v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1980).
Although Bank One faults Bodell for not conducting an independent investigation of the
representations made by Lightner, in Condor, the court of appeals recognized that "[generally, a
plaintiff may rely on positive assertions of fact without independent investigations." 739 P.2d at
638. In the case at bar, at the time Jenson delivered Lightner's August 22 letter to Bodell, Jenson
represented that his lawyers had thoroughly reviewed the Mongoose transaction and that
everything was okay and that Jenson was loaning $4 million of his own money for the
transaction. In essence, Bodell was told that Jenson's lawyers had already conducted the
necessary due diligence. Beyond that, Jenson told Bodell that there was great urgency to
consummate the loan as Robbins had to acquire Cherokee & Walker's interest in the bicycle
companies immediately so that he could go forward with his acquisition of Mongoose. (Bodell
Depo. at p. 190 and 46.) Thus, there simply was no time for detailed due diligence even if
Jenson had not represented that his own attorneys had already performed that due diligence.
Bodell trusted Jenson based upon their past relationship.
The August 22 Lightner letter was, in fact, written by Benjamin Lightner who was a
Senior Wealth Advisor at Bank One, which was one of the largest, if not the largest, banks in
Utah and was well known and respected. Bank One knew and acknowledges in this case that
people regularly rely on representations from banks - and for good reason, as banks are required
to perform due diligence in advance of making representations like those made here. (SOF 1248

25.) There is ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Bodell reasonably
relied upon the representations contained in Lightner's August 22 letter.
In addition to the facts presented, Bodell has provided to Defendants the report of Gary
Schwartz, an exceptionally well-qualified expert on banking standards, who opines in his report
that individuals and businesses rely every day on representations made by banks. See Expert
Report of Gary Schwartz, attached hereto as Exhibit 46.6 Mr. Schwartz confirms that banks not
only know that businesses rely on representations the banks make, they depend on that fact and
the special relationship of trust banks strive to create in order to survive. Nobody will deposit
money with or conduct business with a bank that cannot be trusted. As Mr. Schwartz testifies,
that trust is the core foundation upon which the entire banking system in the United States rests.
It is absurd that Bank One, one of the largest national banks in the country, is taking the position
in this case that businesses cannot rely on letters it writes making specific representations about
its customers and their transactions - and Bank One does not dispute that it wrote the letter here
making exactly those kinds of representations
The cases relied upon by Bank One do not support its position that reasonable reliance is
not a factual issue in the case at bar. For example, in Larsen v. Exclusive Cars, Inc., 97 P.3d 714
(Utah App. 2004), which is one of the principal cases relied upon by Chase, the court of appeals
reversed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, holding that whether the plaintiff
reasonably relied upon a saleman's representations that a truck had a new engine presented a

Mr. Schwartz was recently deposed and confirmed the opinions offered in his expert report.
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genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment despite the fact the plaintiff had
signed a number of documents negating all warranties and oral promises. There was no
indication that the plaintiff had investigated whether the truck indeed had a new engine. 97 P.3d
at 716-717.
In Forsberg v. Burningham & Kimball 892 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Utah App. 1995), cited by
Bank One, the court of appeals actually affirmed the district court's factual finding after trial that
the purchasers of a home reasonably relied upon the seller's representations concerning the
boundaries of a lot.
Bank One also relies upon Maack v. Resource Design and Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d
570 (Utah App. 1994), where summary judgment was entered that a purchaser did not reasonably
rely upon the real estate agent's representation that there was a one year builder's warranty. That
case is easily distinguished because there the plaintiff Robert Maack was an experienced attorney
and he did not request, nor was he given, any information concerning the scope of the alleged
warranty or ask to see the alleged warranty or require any reference to the alleged warranty in the
written agreement between the parties. The court of appeals simply held that under these
circumstances the plaintiffs reliance was not reasonable absent some further inquiry.
Finally, Liggett v. Levy, 136 S.W. 299 (Mo. 1911), a Missouri case almost 100 years old
upon which Bank One relies, also involved far different facts. There, the letter written by the
bank simply contained vague statements that an individual and his company were valued
customers of the bank and their business had been satisfactory and they were "wide awake
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businessmen." The court correctly concluded that these vague statements could not be relied
upon to make a large loan.
The reasonable reliance issue, particularly on the evidence and testimony present here,
requires a factual determination that must be made by the jury.
D.

THIS COURT HAS ALREADY DETERMINED THERE IS NO ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION PRECLUDING BODELL'S CLAIMS AGAINST BANK ONE
AND BANK ONE CITES NO NEW LAW OR OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES
JUSTIFYING RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT'S PREVIOUS RULING.
EVEN IF THE COURT WERE TO RECONSIDER THE ISSUE, THE QUESTION
PRESENTED BY BANK ONE'S MOTION AT MOST RAISES A FACTUAL
ISSUE THE JURY SHOULD RESOLVE AT TRIAL.
Bank One moves the Court for summary judgment on the basis that Bodell's settlement

of its claims against Jenson and MSF for millions of dollars less than the amount owed Bodell on
the loans constituted an accord and satisfaction that bars Bodell's claims against Bank One.
Bank One's argument is nothing more than an effort to persuade this Court to reconsider and
overrule Judge Bohling's decision on this very issue nearly three and one-half years ago and
allow Bank One another bite at the same apple that years ago was fully chewed and digested.
Bank One filed on October 29, 2003 a motion for summary judgment, citing the same
paragraph from Bodell's settlement agreement with Jenson and his company it cites in the instant
motion, and asserting the same argument it makes here. Bank One's motion was fully briefed
and argued to Judge Bohling, who correctly ruled that "no 'accord and satisfaction' was reached
between Plaintiff Bodell on the one hand and the Jenson parties on the other." (See Judge
Bohling's Order dated March 15, 2004.) Judge Bohling further stated he was not persuaded that
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an accord and satisfaction operates to the benefit of third-parties unless those third-parties are
expressly named in the agreement. (Id.)
Three and one-half years after Judge Bohling decided the issue, Bank One raises it again
in the instant motion. Procedurally, Bank One's motion should be stricken because it did not
move the Court under Rule 54(b) for reconsideration of Judge Bohling's ruling. Moreover, Bank
One's motion should be stricken because it is completely unable to demonstrate that anything has
changed since Judge Bohling's ruling that would justify reconsidering the ruling in a new light,
or that Bank One has any relevant new evidence, or that the law has changed, or that the
summary judgment motion was inadequately briefed or that the Court needs to correct any errors.
Litigation is not a best two out of three match. A party is not entitled to reconsideration
of an earlier ruling just because it hopes to get a better result by judge shopping or hoping it can
better present arguments available to it and which could have been presented in its original
motion. Instead, a litigant may only properly obtain reconsideration of a decided issue where:
(1) The matter is presented in a 'different light' or other 'different circumstances;' (2)
there has been a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new evidence; (4) 'manifest
injustice' will result if the court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court needs to correct
its own errors; or (6) an issue was inadequately briefed when first contemplated by the court.
UPC, Inc. v ROA General Inc. 1999 UT App. 303, 990 P.2d 945, 958-959.
Bank One's motion is not presented in a different light or under different circumstances.
Nothing has changed since Judge Bohling's decision. A motion that "merely 'rehash[es]
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arguments already fully considered' in the court's summary judgment ruling" does not present
matters in a different light. (Id. at 959.) Neither has there been any change in the governing law.
Bank One relies on the same cases it previously cited to Judge Bohling. It appears Bank One
cites in the instant motion only two cases not previously provided to Judge Bohling, one a 1977
Minnesota state court decision and the other a 1995 decision from Mississppi. No 'manifest
injustice' will result if this Court refuses to reopen and reconsider Judge Bohling's decision. The
Court does not need to correct any errors - there were none. The motion was exhaustively and
competently briefed by Bank One's very capable counsel. In fact, entire sections of Bank One's
previous briefing is merely "cut and pasted" into its new brief. There is no relevant new
evidence that justifies reconsideration, and none is cited by Bank One in its brief.
Even if this Court were inclined to disregard Judge Bohling's ruling, Bank One's motion
at best raises a fact question for the jury to resolve at trial. Bank One erroneously argues that
Bodell's settlement of its claims against Jensen and MSF for millions of dollars less than the
amount owed Bodell on the loans constituted an accord and satisfaction and bars his claims
against Bank One.
As Bank One acknowledges, the elements of an accord and satisfaction are: (1) an
unliquidated claim or a bonafide dispute over the amount due; (2) a payment offered as full
settlement of the entire dispute; and (3) an acceptance of the payment as full settlement of the
dispute. ProMaxDev. Corp. v. Raile, 998 P.2d 254, 259 (Utah 2000). None of these elements
are satisfied in the case at bar.
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An accord and satisfaction is a contract between the parties and is governed by normal
contract principles. See, Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322, 326 (Utah 1992). As Judge Bohling found, the
alleged accord and satisfaction between Bodell and MSF and Jenson was only to discharge their
liability on the Note and Guaranty. The accord and satisfaction between those parties does not
somehow bar claims against third parties such as Bank One because the contractual language of
the accord and satisfaction does not so provide. If the Settlement Agreement had contained a
provision that Bodell accepted the $3 Million in satisfaction of all obligations of not only MSF
and Jenson but also of all claims against Bank One, then the accord and satisfaction would bar
claims against Bank One. Absent such an express provision, the accord and satisfaction does not
bar such claims.

See, e.g., In Re Dollar Time Group, Inc., 223 B.R. 237, 248 (S.D. Fla. 1998)

("An accord and satisfaction cannot be reached between parties other than those who were party
to the original contract or claim. . . . The Agreement contained no expression of intent to settle
claims" against non-parties.); Bevelheimer v. Gierach, 339 N.E.2d 299, 305 (111. App. 1975) (". .
. an accord and satisfaction does not embrace or operate as a bar with respect to matters not
contemplated by the agreement. . . and as a general rule an accord and satisfaction does not
operate for the benefit of third persons."); Mougey v. Salzwedel, 401 N.W.2d 509, 513 (N.D.
1987) (the accord and satisfaction did not bar claims against a third party because the accord and
satisfaction did not demonstrate an intent to bar claims against third parties); Haesly v. Whitten,
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580 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Tex. App. 1979) (accord and satisfaction which settled lawsuit handled by
the defendant attorney did not bar later malpractice action against the attorney.).
Bank One mistakenly seizes upon the following language in the Settlement Agreement
for its argument that it has been released from liability:
Bodell. . . acknowledges and agrees that the obligations of the
MSF Parties in connection with the Loans, including all principal
and interest that may have been deemed to have accrued thereon,
are hereby deemed fully satisfied and repaid in f u l l . . . . (Emphasis
Added)
This language does not state that the amount owing on the debt has been paid in full, but only
that the obligation of MSF and Jenson in connection with the loans are "deemed" fully paid and
satisfied. The indisputable fact is that the $3 Million settlement did not pay the amount owing
Bodell in full, but was millions of dollars short of the full amount owing.7
Bank One further argues that the language quoted above can only be interpreted to mean
that the debt owing to Bodell has been fully paid because of other language in the Settlement
Agreement releasing Jenson and MSF from liability. However, the fact that the agreement
provided for a release and also that the "obligations of the MSF Parties . . . are hereby deemed
fully satisfied and repaid in full" indicates nothing about an intent to release of claims against

Bank One mistakenly argues that under the parole evidence rule Bodell cannot contradict the language of
the Settlement Agreement which supposedly acknowledges the full amount of the debt has been paid. In addition to
the fact that the agreement does not state that the full amount of the debt has been paid as pointed out above, Bank
One cannot rely upon the parole evidence rule. Utah law is clear that the parole evidence rule only applies in
contioversies between parties to a contract and those claiming under them. A stranger to the contract cannot invoke
the parole evidence rule. See, American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Nicholas, 124 F.2d 477, 479-480 (10th Cir. 1941);
Olmstead v. Oregon Shortline R. Co., 76 P. 557 (Utah 1904).
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third parties such as Bank One. As demonstrated below, because Bank One was not specifically
named in the release, under Utah's Liability Reform Act, Bank One was not released.
Moreover, even if the Settlement Agreement on its face had acknowledged full payment
of the debt (which it did not), the Settlement Agreement still was not an accord and satisfaction
even as to Bodell, MSF and Jenson. One of the requirements for an accord and satisfaction is
that there is "an unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute over the amount due." ProMax, 998
P.2d at 259. As Judge Bohling found, no unliquidated claim was involved. Nor was there any
dispute at all over the amount due. The amount due was simply a mathematical calculation of
the principal plus the accrued interest - a calculation easily computed and provided to Defendants
at the inception of this case and again as recently as this month when Bodell served the
supplemental expert report of Merrill Weight.
Finally, even if it were assumed for argument that the Settlement Agreement constituted
an accord and satisfaction as among Bodell, MSF and Jenson with respect to the liability of MSF
and Jenson under the loans, that does not mean that Bank One is released from liability. Bodell
does not seek recovery from Bank One under the August 30 Note or Guaranty. Bank One did not
execute either document. Instead, Bodell seeks recovery in tort against Bank One for fraud and
negligent misrepresentations that induced Bodell to make that loan to MSF.
Welt v. Sasson, 223 B.R. 237 (Bnkrptcy S. D. Fla. 1998) is instructive. In that case, the
defendants were directors of two companies that agreed to merge. They caused one of the
companies, Dollar Time, to make a $500,000 loan and transfer other assets to the other company,

16

Bargain. The merger fell threw and Dollar Time and Bargain entered into a Settlement
Agreement pursuant to which Bargain agreed to transfer certain inventory to Dollar Time and the
$500,000 loan was restructured. The parties subsequently agreed that in lieu of payment of the
note, Bargain's affiliate would sublease retail space to Dollar Time for five years, during which
time rents would be waived. This arrangement was to have saved Dollar Time $500,000 in rents.
Dollar Time actually opened and operated a store at that location for a few months before filing
for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee for Dollar Time then filed suit against the defendants for
breach of fiduciary duty in causing Dollar Time to make the $500,000 loan and other transfers to
Bargain. The defendants argued that the Settlement Agreement between Dollar Time and
Bargain constituted an accord and satisfaction which discharged Bargain's debt under the note
and therefore barred any claim against the defendants. The court rejected this argument, stating:
An accord and satisfaction cannot be reached between parties other
than those who were party to the original contract or claim. . ..
While it is true that the Settlement Agreement did represent an
accord to settle all claims between Dollar Time and Bargain, the
Agreement contained no expression of an intent to settle the claims
between Dollar Time and Sasson and Klansky individually. . ..
Because the parties to the Settlement Agreement were Dollar Time
and Bargain, the Agreement does not document an accord and
satisfaction between the parties to this action. 223 B.R. at 248.
The simple fact in the case at bar that Bank One cannot escape is that the amount of the
debt that MSF and Jenson owed to Bodell with respect to the August 30 loan was not repaid in
full. Thus, Bodell was damaged by being induced to make the loan by Bank One's fraud and
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negligent misrepresentations. Under the Utah Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Annotated
Section 78-27-42 (the "LRA"), Bodell's release of MSF and Jenson from further liability for
payment of the unpaid balance of the loan did not release any other person or entity not named or
specifically identified in the release, including Bank One. Because there is no language in the
Settlement Agreement indicating that part of the bargain was to release claims against Bank One,
under the provisions of the LRA neither the alleged accord and satisfaction nor the express
release contained in the Settlement Agreement bar claims against Bank One. Section 78-27-42
provides:
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more
defendants does not discharge any other defendant unless the
release so provides. (Emphasis Added)
In turn, Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-27-37(1), defines a defendant as: "A person .. .
who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery." In Child v.
Newsome, 892 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court explained the purpose for the
enactment of the LRA as follows:
Section 78-27-42 was enacted to repeal Section 15-4-4 of the Joint
Obligations Act, which had codified the common law rule that a
release of one tort-feasor also released all other tort-feasors. The
statute was designed to retain the liability of tort-feasors and
reverse the common law rule "so that release of one joint tortfeasor did not automatically release all tort-feasors." (Citations
omitted)
The LRA requires that a release "must contain language either naming the defendant or
identifying the defendant with some degree of specificity in order to discharge that defendant
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from liability." Child, 892 P.2d at 12. See also Nelson, 935 P.2d at 514; Stevensen v. Goodson,
924 P.2d 339 (Utah 1996); Thornock v. Jensen, 950 P.2d 441, 443-444 (Utah App. 1997). In the
case at bar, the release of MSF and Jenson does not name Bank One or identify Bank One with
any degree of specificity, or at all. Thus, the release of MSF and Jenson from liability on the
loans does not release Bank One from liability for wrongfully inducing Bodell to make the
August 30 loan.
The cases cited by Bank One do not support its argument that it has been released from
liability. Indeed, only two of the cases even involved an issue of accord and satisfaction or of
joint liability of tortfeasors. In Luxemburg v. Can-Tex Industries,, 257 N.W.2d 804 (Minn.
1977), cited by Bank One, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of a complaint,
ruling that the settlement of the plaintiff contractor's claims against a village relating to a
construction project did no operate as a release and discharge of plaintiff s claims against other
joint tortfeasors because the plaintiff had not been paid in full and there was no intent to release
the defendants. The court stated in this regard that the language of a release is not conclusive on
the issue of intent. Id. at 807-808. In ProMax, supra, cited by Bank One, the court simply held
that a contractor entered into an accord and satisfaction with the purchaser of a house by closing
the sale and accepting payment from the purchaser. There was no issue in the case of liability of
co-tort-feasors or co-obligors. And, there was a bona fide dispute as to the amount owing by the
purchaser.
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E.

AT THE VERY LEAST, A JURY QUESTION EXISTS ON WHETHER BANK
ONE HAD A PECUNIARY INTEREST IN THE TRANSACTION.
Bank One insists that Bodell cannot recover on its negligent misrepresentation claim

because Bank One supposedly did not have a pecuniary interest in the Bodell loan. (Bank One
Memo, at 13.) There is, however, ample evidence in this case from which a reasonable jury
could find that Bank One did have a pecuniary interest.
Robbins, Jenson and the bicycle companies were customers of Bank One and
acknowledged as such by Lightner in his various letters. Lightner stated in his July 27, 2000
letter to Brunswick Corp. that "Madtrax Group, LLC. . . and several members of management
have been long-time customers with Bank One" and that "[o]ver the years, Bank One and the
Company had partnered together to complete several successful business transactions."
(Lightner Depo. at pp. 219.) At the time Lightner wrote his August 22 letter, Bank One stood to
receive a substantial financial benefit if Robbins and Jenson were able to acquire Mongoose and
give Bank One additional business. Further, as of August 22, 2000, Robbins was indebted to
Bank One in an amount that cannot be confirmed because Bank One has lost or destroyed
relevant account documents and records necessary to establish the exact amount. Regardless,
Robbins' own correspondence with Bank One establishes that he had at in 2000 at least two lines
of credit with Bank One totaling $3.3 million. (Robbins' April 24, 2001 Letter to Bank One,
attached as Exhibit 47.) Bank One stood to benefit financially if Robbins was able to acquire
Cherokee & Walker's interest in the bicycle companies and acquire Mongoose and repay his loan
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out of profits. Of course, Bank One also had agreed to serve as escrow agent for both the $16.5
million deposit MadTrax was required to make as a condition precedent to obtaining the $165
million loan from Arimex, as well as the $165 million loan itself. As Bank One acknowledges, it
profits from such arrangements.
Notwithstanding the evidence here, courts have not required a direct pecuniary interest in
a transaction. Rather an indirect pecuniary interest is sufficient, as recognized by the court in
Bank One's own cited case of Reimsnyder v. South Trust Bank, N.A., 846 So.2d 1264, 1267 (Fla.
App. 2003). And, the transaction requirement is broadly construed. See, Geosearch, Inc. v.
Howell Petroleum Corp., 819 F.2d 521, 525-526 (5th Cir. 1987). Indeed, "[t]he fact that the
information is given in the course of the defendant's business, profession or employment is a
sufficient indication that he has a pecuniary interest in it, even though he receives no
consideration for it at the time. It is not, however, conclusive." Id., citing Restatement (Second)
of Torts, § 552(1), Comment d. See also, Robinson v. Tripco Inv., Inc., 2000 UT App 200, K 31,
21 P.3d 219, 226-227; MSA Tubular Products, Inc. v. First Bank & Trust Co., 869 F.2d 1422,
1424-1425 (10th Cir. 1989); Cypress Oilfield Contractors, Inc. v. McGoldrick Oil Co., Inc., 525
So.2dll57, 1162 (3rd Cir. 1988).
The cases relied upon by Bank One do not demonstrate that Bank One had no pecuniary
interest in the subject transactions. In Gildea v. Guardian Title Company of Utah, 970 P.2d
1265, 1271-1272 (Utah 1998), relied upon by Bank One, the Supreme Court only recited the
elements of a negligent misrepresentation cause of action. The existence of a pecuniary interest
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was not an issue in the case. In Reimsynder, supra, the only other case cited by Bank One, a
bank officer simply told the plaintiff that a bank customer was a reputable company. There was
no evidence that the bank had any direct or even indirect pecuniary interest in the transaction.
Further, the court distinguished the general statement made by the bank officer from situations
where a bank makes representations concerning the size of deposits and the credit worthiness of
its customers based upon their dealings with the bank. In the case at bar, Lightner made specific
representations concerning the $165 million deposit coming from the Arimex loan and, as
demonstrated above, there is ample evidence from which a jury could find that Bank One had a
pecuniary interest in the transactions.
F.

WHETHER BANK ONE WAS IN A SUPERIOR POSITION TO ASCERTAIN
THE TRUE FACTS CONCERNING THE $165 MILLION DEPOSIT AND THE
ARIMEX LOAN PRESENTS A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY.
Bank One next argues that as a matter of law it was not in a superior position to ascertain

the true facts concerning the $165 million deposit supposedly coming from the Arimex loan.
(Bank One Memo, at 15.) Once more, Bank One ignores highly relevant evidence from which a
reasonable jury could easily find to the contrary. Importantly, the fact that Lightner admits he
knows the statements in his August 22 letter were false by itself is sufficient to demonstrate he
was in a superior position to know the true facts. But, there is much more evidence.
Robbins, Jenson and the bicycle companies were customers of Bank One. Bank One had
detailed information concerning their financial condition. Lightner was the private banker for
Robbins and Jenson and had frequent and regular communications with Robbins during 2000.
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(SOF ^fl[ 27-36.) Robbins was a personal friend of Lightner's and offered Lightner a job while
Lightner was employed by Bank One. (SOF lfl( 27-36.) Bank One declined any financing for
Robbins and his bicycle companies with respect to the Mongoose acquisition because Robbins
did not have the necessary resources. (SOF f 53.) Of course, Bank One would have to have
obtained financial information about Robbins and his companies even to draw that conclusion.
Lightner was personally involved in the efforts of Robbins and Jenson to acquire Mongoose.
(SOF ff 27-36, 57.) Among other things, Lightner wrote letters at Robbins's request falsely
representing the financial strength of Robbins and Jenson and the bicycle companies. Lightner
also attended a meeting with Robbins and Arimex to discuss a potential loan. (SOF ^[f 27-36,
57.) Robbins kept Lightner informed of "everything that was going on" with the Mongoose deal
and potential financing. (SOF ^ 56.)
Lightner admits that the letters he wrote to assist Robbins and Jenson in their efforts to
acquire Mongoose were false. (SOFffl[105-125.) As discussed in more detail above, a
reasonable jury could certainly conclude based upon this and other cited evidence that Lightner
was well aware of the financial condition of Robbins, Jenson and the bicycle companies and their
efforts to obtain financing by making fraudulent representations concerning their financial
condition and that in fact Lightner conspired with them in their attempt to acquire Mongoose by
making egregiously false representations concerning their financial condition. A reasonable jury
could also find that Lightner knew it was highly unlikely that the Arimex loan would be made
both because Robbins did not have $16.5 million to deposit in escrow, which was a condition
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precedent to the Arimex loan, and because the loan would only be made if Robbins was
successful in acquiring Mongoose, which was highly unlikely.8 cf., Christenson v.
Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 306 (Utah 1983); Maack, 875 P.2d at 576.
Bank One argues that Bodell had a previously existing relationship with Jenson because
they had been neighbors 20 years earlier for a short time and because Bodell had a few months
earlier loaned Jenson $1 million. Unlike Bank One, however, there is no evidence that Bodell
had any knowledge concerning the ability of Robbins, Jenson or the bicycle companies to acquire
Mongoose or to close the Arimex loan or the terms of the Arimex loan. Beyond that, Bodell did
discuss the transactions with Jenson who falsely told him the Mongoose purchase was a "done
deal" and did not disclose the other facts above to Bodell. (SOFffi[38, 45 and 75.)
Hit Products Corp. v. Anchor Fin. Corp., I l l F.Supp.2d 723 (D. S.C. 1999), cited by
Bank One, where the court held that the bank was not in a superior position with respect to
representations regarding its customer, involved far different facts and does not assist Bank
One's argument that the superior position issue can be decided as a matter of law. In that case,
the plaintiff had been engaged in an extensive, ongoing business relationship with the bank's
customer for many years. At the time the bank filled out a form stating that it had an excellent
relationship with the customer for a number of years and that the customer maintained balances

o

Bank One argues that Bodell had access to the information because it could have contacted Arimex
There is no evidence that Bodell knew how to contact Arimex or that Arimex would have disclosed information to
Bodell or that Arimex knew the true financial condition of Robbins, Jenson and the bicycle companies or that there
was any way they could consummate the Arimex loan even if Arimex had the ability to fund the loan or that Robbins
was looking for other financing sources. Of course, Lightner met directly with Arimex at Robbins' request
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ranging from $25,000 to $350,000, always paid promptly and that cash flow was sufficient for
business operation, the customer owed a delinquent debt to the plaintiff of over $1 million and
the plaintiff did not inform the bank about the large debt. It was under those circumstances that
the court held that the bank was not in a superior position to know the true facts.
The jury must determine as a fact issue at trial whether Bank One was in a superior
position to know the true facts concerning the supposed $165 million deposit and the Arimex
loan.
G.

BODELL WAS A FORESEEABLE RECIPIENT OF THE AUGUST 22
LIGHTNER LETTER.
The final argument asserted by Bank One is that Bodell cannot recover for negligent

misrepresentation because Bodell was supposedly not a foreseeable recipient of Lightner's
August 22 letter. To make this argument, Bank One has been forced to once again ignore
substantial highly relevant evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Bodell was
within the class of persons whom Lightner intended or had reason to expect would receive the
letter and act thereon.
The fact that Bank One claims Lightner did not intend that the representations contained
in the letter be given specifically to Bodell is unimportant.9 The letter was written "To Whom It
May Concern," not to Lincoln Partners or any other specific person or entity. This is the best
evidence in the case about to whom Bank One was directing the letter - to anyone concerned

Neither Lightnet nor Bank One offered any testimony concerning Lightner's intent when drafting the letter
requested by Robbins Rather, Bank One relies exclusively on the testimony of co-defendant Robbins on this point.
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with the subject matter of the letter, namely MadTrax, Robbins, Jenson and massive loans. The
fact that Bank One now identifies as the intended recipient someone other than the specific
addressee it named in the letter only serves to raise a factual question about which is correct - the
letter itself, or Robbins's testimony after the fact that Bank One now adopts on this issue.
Of course, Bank One has acknowledged through its Rule 30(b)(6) designees that the
problem with writing a letter addressed "To Whom It May Concern," and the reason standard
banking practice dictates such letters not be written, is that any number of people may rely on
such a letter. (Lightner Depo. at p. 248; Mayo Depo. at p. 100.) A reasonable jury could easily
conclude on that basis alone that the letter was written to assist the efforts of Robbins and Jenson
and their companies in their contemplated business transactions and/or to raise money in order to
purchase Cherokee & Walker's interest in the companies it owned jointly with Robbins and to
fund the purchase of Mongoose Bicycles.
The significance of the fact that the Letter was addressed "To Whom It May Concern" is
underscored by the fact that ten other letters written by MadTrax and its agents and sent to
Brunswick and its agents (including Lincoln Partners) were all correctly and specifically
addressed. (See Letters, Exhibits 34-35 and 38-45.) For example, the October 19, 2000 letter
Lightner sent to Lincoln Partners making similar misrepresentations was addressed to "Rob
Brown, Vice President, Lincoln Partners, LLC," and on July 27, 2000, nearly a month prior to
writing the August 22 Letter, Lightner signed a letter making similar misrepresentations
addressed specifically to "James Schenk, Vice President, Brunswick Corporation." (See Exhibit
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40.) A reasonable jury could certainly conclude that if Lightner only intended that his August 22
Letter be given to Lincoln Partners he would have specifically addressed the letter to Lincoln
Partners as he specifically addressed the other two letters to the companies to which they were
directed.
Bodell was in the class of potential financiers and the letter was given to Bodell for the
very purpose of inducing it to lend $4 million to Jenson to be immediately paid by Jenson to
Robbins to fund the repurchase of Cherokee & Walker's interest. Lightner knew full well that
Jenson and Robbins were working together to raise funding, as the letter itself plainly
demonstrates. Indeed, Lightner states in his August 22 letter "MadTrax . . . and its individual
members Mark Robbins and Marc Jenson . . . will be depositing $165,000,000
Section 531 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability to the
persons or class of persons whom he intends or has reason to expect to act or to
refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation, for pecuniary loss
suffered by them through their justifiable reliance in the type of transaction in
which he intends or has reason to expect their conduct to be influenced.
(Emphasis added)
See, e.g., Soderberg v. McKinney, 44 Cal. App.4th 1760 (1996) (real estate appraiser liable to
investors for negligent misrepresentation and fraud even though he did not know their names or
identities at the time he made his misrepresentations because it was foreseeable the appraisal
would be given to and relied upon by the investors); Reisman v. KPMG Peat Marwick L.L.P.,
787 N.E.2d 1060, 1067-1068 (Mass. App. 2003) (accounting firm liable for false statements in
the audit because plaintiffs were among those whom the accounting firm had reason to expect
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would rely on the statements because they were potential investors.); Texas Capital Securities,
Inc. v. Sandefer, 58 S.W.3d 760, 772-773 (Tex. App. 2001); Woodward v. Dietrich, 548 A.2d
301, 309-310 (Pa. Sup. 1988); and Citizens State Bank Moundridge v. Gilmore, 603 P.2d 605,
610-611 (Kan. 1979).
The issue of the class of persons to which Lightner's August 22, 2000 Letter was intended
is a question of fact the jury will have to decide after hearing and weighing all the evidence at
trial. The evidence shows that potential financiers for Jenson and Robbins was the class whom
Jenson, Robbins and Lightner had in mind when creating the August 22, 2000 Lightner Letter,
and that Bodell was a member of that class. Lightner had substantial knowledge concerning
Robbins' and Jenson's business and was significantly involved in their financing efforts.
Robbins himself testified he kept Lightner fully informed of "everything that was going on" with
respect to the financing for the deal, and that he was "in constant contact" with Lightner about
these transactions. (Robbins Depo. at 326, 330- 31.) Lightner knew that Cherokee & Walker
owned part of at least one of Robbins' companies and that Robbins was going to buy out
Cherokee 8c Walkers' interest. (Lightner Depo. at 41-42; 107-08.) Lightner believes it likely
that Bank One had conversations with Cherokee & Walker and Robbins about their business. {Id.
at 203-04.) As evidenced by Bank One's refusal to make additional funding available to him,
Lightner knew Robbins did not have the money needed to buy out Cherokee & Walker's interest.
Accordingly, Lightner knew Robbins would need to raise the funds. In fact, Lightner knew that
Robbins was seeking funding for his transaction. {Id. at 157-58.)
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Lightner knew that Robbins and Jenson were partners. (Lightner Depo. at 39; 199-200.)
Lightner knew Robbins and Jenson were close enough that they did deals on the strength of
merely a handshake. (Id. at 199-200.) Lightner knew that Jenson and Robbins were "always
lending money to each other." (Id. at 39.) While denying having any specific memory of the
reason, Lightner testified he took numerous checks to Cherokee & Walker at the direction of
Robbins or Jenson, likely in the year 2000, as an employee of Bank One. (Id. at 40-41.) Lightner
knew that Robbins received money from Jenson in 2000, and though admittedly fuzzy on the
details, Lightner even admits he believed Robbins used that money to re-acquire Cherokee &
Walker's interest in Robbins's companies. (Id. at 259-60.)
Of course, the timing surrounding the Lightner Letter also raises compelling inferences
that Jenson, Robbins and Lightner specifically intended the letter for Bodell, though Bodell need
not make such a showing to establish liability. To that end, the evidence shows that Robbins was
desperate by mid-August for an $8 million loan to buyout Cherokee & Walker before they seized
Robbins' bicycle companies, thus depriving Robbins of any chance to successfully close his bid
for Mongoose. (SOF ^ff 1-48.) By that date Robbins had missed seven promised payment
deadlines for Cherokee & Walker, which had retained counsel and initiated the legal process to
seize control of the jointly owned companies. (SOF ^ | 19-23.) Robbins finally secured on
August 15 a commitment from Jenson for the $8 million loan, but as Jenson explained to
Robbins, Jenson was only putting up $4 million himself, with the other $4 million coming from
Bodell. (SOF fl 38-41.) Under their agreement, Jenson was to fund the $8 million for Robbins
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on August 15. (See August 9, 2000 Commitment Letter, attached as Exhibit 22.) Bodell,
however, was struggling with the size of the transaction and had not yet committed to loan the $4
million Jenson needed to get the full $8 million to Robbins. (SOF ^ 45.) As time ticked by,
Robbins ran out of options. Finally, on August 22 he approached Lightner and obtained the
August 22, 2000 Lightner Letter making specific representations about $165 million coming into
Bank One to be managed by Robbins and Jenson, who Lightner identified as members of
MadTrax. (See Lightner Letter, attached as Exhibit 25.) In fact, Jenson was not a member of
MadTrax at the time, and a jury could easily conclude the only reason for his name to appear in
the Bank One letter was tie Jenson to Robbins and his purported Arimex loan transaction. Of
course, Robbins obtained the letter from Bank One, promptly gave it to Jenson, who told
Robbins he was going to show it to Bodell, and then Jenson did exactly that. (SOF f 74.) The
Lightner Letter served its purpose, pushing Bodell over the edge and causing Bodell to commit to
the $4 million loan. Bodell signed an agreement and made the $4 million loan to Jenson on
August 30, eight days after Robbins obtained the false letter from Bank One. Jenson in turn gave
the $8 million to Robbins, who paid Cherokee & Walker in full.
A reasonable jury could easily conclude based on these facts that Lightner intended the
letter to be shown to potential financiers or had reason to expect that would occur. In this regard,
the fact that Robbins testified in his deposition that he wanted the letter for the purpose of
(falsely) demonstrating his financial strength to Lincoln Partners is not conclusive on that issue.
It is obviously in Robbins's interest as a Defendant in this case named in a separate fraud count
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to attempt to establish that Bodell has no claims based on the letter because, as Robbins has
already testified, he knew that the statements contained in the letter were false and he has
potential liability based on those false statements. A jury may simply believe, especially in light
of the contradictory evidence, that Robbins' claim is self-serving and not credible. Notably,
when asked directly if he told Lightner he intended to show the August 22, 2000 Letter to
potential investors, Robbins reply was "I don't recall." (Robbins Depo. at 325-326.) Moreover,
Lightner (for Bank One) did not testify that he intended that the letter be given only to Lincoln
Partners. Significantly, Jenson testified he told Robbins he was going to show the August 22
Lightner letter to Bodell to persuade Bodell to loan $4 million for the acquisition of Cherokee &
Walker's interest. (SOF f 74.)
Bank One can offer no explanation why the August 22, 2000 letter is not in Lincoln
Partners' files if, as Bank One contends, Lincoln Partners was the intended recipient. Bank One
subpoenaed Lincoln Partners' records in this case and received documents in response. Those
responsive documents include numerous other letters and documents, including other letters from
Lightner and Bank One. The August 22, 2000 Letter, however, was nowhere to be found.
Confirming that Lincoln Partners never received the August 22, 2000 Letter, David Houser and
Robert Brown, both employed with Lincoln Partners at the time, and working as Brunswick's
agents on Robbins' transaction, testified they had no recollection of ever having seen the letter.
(Houser Depo. at 51-52; Brown Depo. at 73.) They did, however, have a clear recollection of
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other letters and documents sent by Lightner, and they remembered telephone calls with Lightner
concerning those documents. (Houser Depo. at 16-18, 38-41; Brown Depo. at 55-61.)
One of the documents that was in Lincoln Partners' files was a letter written by Lightner
on Bank One letterhead dated October 19, 2000, addressed to Brown at Lincoln Partners. (See
Exhibit 35.) That letter recites many of the same misrepresentations contained in the August 22,
2000 letter relied upon by Bodell. (Compare Exhibit 25 and Exhibit 35.) The October 19, 2000
letter makes no reference whatsoever to the August 22, 2000 letter. A reasonable jury could
conclude that Robbins confused the two letters in his testimony, or simply disbelieve his
testimony for any number of reasons including bias or his claimed poor recollection of many of
the related events. Indeed, there would be no reason to send the October 19 letter to Lincoln
Partners if the August 22 letter had already been sent.
Lightner obviously intended some person or class of persons receive and rely on the
misrepresentations he made in the August 22, 2000 Letter. Clearly, whether Lightner intended
his August 22 Letter to be given only to Lincoln Partners or to anyone in the class of potential
financiers and/or whether he had reason to expect that it would be given to a member of the class
of potential financiers are questions of fact for the jury to decide based on all the evidence at
trial, and particularly after the jury has an opportunity to assess for themselves the credibility of
Robbins's testimony in light of all the contradictory evidence.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that Bank One's motion for
summary judgment should be denied.
DATED this A ^ day of August, 2007.
BURBIDGE MITCHELL & GROSS

Robert J. Shelby
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bodell Construction
Company
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INTRODUCTION
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Bank One presented seven separate legal theories
on which summary judgment could be entered. The statement of undisputed material facts to
support these seven theories consisted of a total of 42 paragraphs. In response, Plaintiff Bodell
Construction Company ("Bodell") submitted no less than 52 pages of disputations of facts and
additional facts it claims are material. The sheer volume of the injected facts makes the task of
the Court to identify facts that are truly material and disputed very difficult.
Bank One will address this tactic by focusing this Reply on two legal theories advocated
in its Motion that do not involve fact disputes, and which standing alone entitle Bank one to
summary judgment. In doing so, Bank One will continue to assert the five other theories not
addressed in this Reply and will be prepared to address those five other theories at oral
argument.
These two defenses are basic concepts of law and each is case dispositive. Simply stated,
Bodell's reliance, to the extent it existed at all, on the Lightner Letter was not reasonable, and,
secondly, a later settlement agreement between Bodell and Jenson constituted an accord and
satisfaction of the claims against Bank One.

Defendant Mark Robbins has separately moved for summary judgment. Some of the arguments raised
by Robbins duplicate those raised by Bank One. To economize and simplify the Court's work, Bank One
will not revisit those arguments in this Memorandum but joins and incorporates by reference those
arguments made by Robbins. Those arguments are: (1) No representation of a presently existing material
fact, and (2) Bodell was not a foreseeable recipient of the Lightner Letter.
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
Many of the "facts" injected by Bodell are either not material or consist in substantial
part of opinion, overstatement and characterization rather than record evidence.2 Additionally,
Bodell repeatedly cites to extensive portions of the record to dispute a single sentence of an
undisputed fact propounded by Bank One

However, for the reasons explained above, Bank

One will not refute these 52 pages of injected facts in this Reply and will instead focus on two
theories for which the necessary supporting facts are minimal and undisputed.
ARGUMENT
I.

BODELL'S RELIANCE ON THE LIGHTNER LETTER IN MAKING A S4
MILLION UNSECURED LOAN WAS UNREASONABLE.
In measuring the existence or reasonableness of reliance upon a written instrument, one

would expect the terms of the instrument to match those upon which reliance is placed

Stated

another way, if Bodell truly relied upon the Lightner Letter for comfort in getting its loan repaid,
then the Lightner Letter should, at a minimum, contain some terminology that Bodell could point
to that would support its expectations. In this case, Bodell claims it relied upon the Lightner
Letter to provide long term financing and to get its bridge loan repaid Bodell should be able to
For example, in its first dispute of fact, Bodell discusses whether a particular entity was legally
organized (Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Memorandum in Opposition to Bank One's Motion
for Summary Judgment ("Opp ") at vi, ^| 2), a matter of no significance whatsoever to the arguments
raised by Bank One Another example In Paragraph 5, Bodell provides a conclusion, " the evidence
overwhelmingly establishes that " instead of a fact citing to the record Opp at vii, *§ 5
Foi example, in disputing Paragraph 5 of the undisputed facts, Bodell cites to its Statement of
Additional Material Facts, Paragraphs 1-49, 74-78, and 98-104 Citing to 61 paragraphs of Additional
Material Facts to dispute a single fact is not a dispute "supported by citation to supporting materials"
contemplated by Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure It is impossible to refute in an
understandable manner a citation to 61 paragraphs
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read to the Court the precise language in the Lightner Letter that says there will be repayment, or
that there will be long term financing, or that the monies leferred to in the letter are for its
benefit The letter says nothing of the sort The Lightner Letter consists of four sentences The
first sentence identifies the entities that will be depositing money into an account at Bank One
The second sentence identifies the source of the funds

The third sentence says the monies will

be deposited into an interest bearing account and who will be the fund's manager
sentence invites questions with respect to the matter

The fourth

That is the sum total of the letter upon

which Bodell claims it relied for repayment of the bridge loan There is not one word concerning
bridge loans, long term loans, repayment, ownership of the funds, assignment of interests in the
funds, length of time the funds will be on deposit, disposition of the funds or security interests in
the funds

There is no mention of Bodell, no mention of collateral, no mention of use of the

funds, no mention of the purpose of the funds or the deposit Bodell simply points to a document
and states that this is what it relied on In essence, Bodell's position is that it relied upon a letter
that contained none of the terms Bodell was relying on

In the absence of even a scintilla of

terminology in the letter that Bodell could rely on, the court should find as a matter of law theie
could not be and there was no reliance, and should hold that a person cannot rely upon something
that does not exist Furthermore, Bodell did not even contact the purported author of the letter to
confirm Bodell could reply upon the information contained in the letter or that the letter
pertained even tangentiall} to the multi-million dollar loan it was about to make
Not only is Bodell's alleged reliance on the Lightner Letter blatantly unreasonable on its
face, the testimony of Michael J Bodell, the President of Bodell, shows that in fact he was not
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relying on the Lightner Letter but upon a separate oral representation by Marc Jenson. The real
representation Bodell was relying on was the oral representation by Jensen that the proceeds of
the Arimex loan would be available to pay the Bodell loan. This representation is not even
contained in the Lightner Letter, further demonstrating the unreasonableness of the claimed
reliance on the letter. Mr. Bodell testified:
Q.
Can you give me a list of the factors that you relied on that
led you to the conclusion to make that loan?
A.
Well, the overwhelming one was the confirmation of funds
going into their account, the source of repayment.
Q.

The letter from Mr. Lightner?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

What else?

A.
Well, the assurances from Jenson that he would see that he
was ~ that as soon as this money came in, he would pay us
immediately.
Q.

What else did you rely on?

A.

Nothing, really.

Bank One Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. 39, Bodell Dep. at 61.
BodelFs reliance was on the proceeds of the Arimex loan being available to pay the
Bodell loan. Marc Jenson - not Bank One - made this representation. The Lightner Letter does
not say anything about the Arimex loan proceeds being available to pay the Bodell loan. To rely
on the Lightner Letter to show the Arimex loan proceeds would be available to Bodell is patently
unreasonable.
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Bodell had no relationship whatsoever over with Bank One - Bodell was not a customer
of the Bank, had no accounts at the Bank, and did not know who Mr Lightner was (Bank One
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("BO SOF"), 1 32)

The Lightner Letter was not

addressed to Bodell (BO SOF ^ 7 ) Bodell never contacted Bank One to verify the contents of
the Lightner Letter
Anmex

BO SOF, ^ 28 ) Bodell did not conduct any due diligence concerning

(BO SOF, % 29 ) Making a $4 million unsecured loan under those circumstances,

relying upon the Lightner Letter as the source of repayment, is conclusively unreasonable
Even Bodell's own expert witness has testified it would be unreasonable for Bodell to
rely on the Lightner Letter to establish that Bodell could be paid from the proceeds of the
Anmex loan Gary Schwartz, described by Bodell as "an exceptionally well qualified expert on
banking standards" (Opp at 9), testified in his deposition
Q And it wouldn't have been reasonable for him to rely on that
any portion of the $165 million would be available to repay him,
would it9 That's not a fact stated m the letter9
A That's correct

Q So you are agreeing it would not be reasonable for Bodell to
assume he could be repaid out of the $165 million based on the
text of the letter7
A Based upon this letter, that is correct
Exhibit A, Schwartz Dep at 112, 114 Bodell's own expert even agrees that Bodell could not
have reasonably relied on the Lightner Lettei for the idea that it would be repaid out of the $165
million deposit Yet, as described above, that is exactly the point on which Bodell claims to have
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relied on in the Lightner Letter.
Like any other fact issue normally reserved for the jury, the reasonableness of reliance
may be decided on summary judgment where there is no dispute of material fact. Larsen v.
Exclusive Cars, Inc., 97 P.3d 714, 715 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) ("There are instances where courts
may conclude that, as a matter of law, there was no reasonable reliance.") (citations omitted).
There is no dispute of material fact in this case and Bodell cannot show reasonable reliance by
clear and convincing evidence. The court, not the jury, should decide this issue.
Bodell attempts selectively to distinguish some of the cases cited by Bank One. Opp. at
9-11. Yet Bodell cannot undermine the notion that where there is no dispute of material fact, it is
proper to decide the issue of the reasonableness of reliance on summary judgment. Notably,
Bodell does not mention Jar dine v. Brunswick Corp., A2?> P.2d 659 (Utah 1967), a case similar to
the instant one in significant respects. In Jar dine, a business man advanced funds to a developer,
and claimed to have done so based on a third party's representations that the developer "could
build these buildings and finance them; and there is nothing to worry about." Jardine, 423 P.2d
at 661. The Utah Supreme Court actually reversed a jury verdict, finding reliance on this and
other representations was not reasonable. Concerning the "nothing to worry about" comment,
the court noted that at the time it was made, the author of the letter "was not making any
representation about [the borrower] as a credit risk for a loan from [plaintiff]." Jardine, 423 P.2d
at 662. So here, there is no evidence that Lightner was making a representation about Jenson's
creditworthiness. Bodell "cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever is told him, but has the duty
of exercising such degree of care to protect his own interests as would be exercised by an
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ordinary, reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances; and if he fails to do so, is
precluded from holding someone else to account for the consequences of his own neglect." As a
matter of law, Bodell has not shown that it acted reasonably in relying on the Lightner Letter.
This is particularly true in light of the requirement that it make that showing by clear and
convincing evidence. See Jar dine, 423 P.2d at 663.
Plaintiff also ignores Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 (Utah Ct. App, 1994) in which the
Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment holding reliance had been unreasonable where the
plaintiffs, sophisticated business people like Bodell's president, Michael J. Bodell, were held as a
matter of law not to have reasonably relied on a third party's characterization of a balance sheet,
where the plaintiffs themselves had "adequate opportunity to review the underlying data for
themselves." Brown, 871 P.2d at 562-63. So here, Bodell had adequate opportunity to review
the underlying data for itself. Summary judgment is therefore appropriate.
II.

THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES AN ACCORD AND FULL
SATISFACTION OF THE CLAIMS IN THIS ACTION
Bank One's opening brief asked the Court to interpret the Settlement Agreement between

Bodell, MSF Properties, L.C. ("MSF") and Jenson as a matter of law and determine that it
constitutes an accord and satisfaction of the debt owing to Bodell, thereby satisfying the damages
claimed by Bodell from Bank One.
As demonstrated in Bank One's opening Memorandum, it is well settled that there can be
but one satisfaction of a debt or obligation. Once an obligation is satisfied, no other claims may
be brought on that obligation, including claims against third parties. The obligation is satisfied,
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discharged and gone.
Bodell entered into a Settlement Agreement dated March 18, 2003 with Marc Jenson.
Jenson paid Bodell $3 million pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, which was agreed to
constitute a satisfaction of the Bodell loan. Therefore no further claims may be brought against
Bank One or anyone else.
A.

Bank One Seeks Reconsideration of Judge Bohling's Decision On This Issue.

Bank One noted in its opening brief that very early in this case, Bank One had brought
this same argument based on accord and satisfaction as a summary judgment motion which was
denied by the Honorable William Bohling. Bodell objects that Bank One did not bring a
separate motion for reconsideration under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). Opp. at 12. Although Bank
One did not invoke the rule by name, it was doing so in substance, and cited Tremblay v. Mrs.
Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), a case which interprets rule 54(b) to
allow reconsideration of a summary judgment decision on the grounds, inter alia, that the earlier
decision was in error, which is the basis for this re-assertion of the accord and satisfaction
argument. Bank One believes the law clearly favors its position and asks the Court to correct the
earlier error.
B.

Bodell Has Not Raised a Dispute of Material Fact.

Responding on the merits of Bank One's argument, Bodell has not raised any dispute of
material fact but instead argues that the release contained in the Settlement Agreement is not a
release of claims against Bank One as a matter of law. See Opp. at 13-19 (no issues of disputed
fact are mentioned in the discussion of how to interpret the Settlement Agreement).
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C.

Bodell Confuses the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction with Release.

Bodell confuses two different legal doctrines and misconstrues Bank One's argument as
relying on the release contained in the Settlement Agreement when in fact Bank One relies on
the accord and satisfaction contained in the Settlement Agreement.

Release is a different

doctrine and concept and should not be confused with accord and satisfaction. A release excuses
performance by a party. Accord and satisfaction extinguishes a claim.
Bodell argues that its release of claims against MSF and Jenson did not release claims
against Bank One. In support of its argument, Bodell relies on Section 78-27-42 of the Utah
Liability Reform Act which provides that u[a] release given by a person seeking recovery to one
or more defendants does not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides",
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-27-42. Opp. at 18. BodelPs reliance on the Liability Reform Act is

misplaced and irrelevant to the issue presented by Bank One. Bank One does not argue that the
release by Bodell of MSF and Jenson contained in the Settlement Agreement operates as a
release of Bank One.4 Rather, Bank One maintains that the Settlement Agreement constitutes an
accord and satisfaction of the obligations owed to Bodell.
A release is a waiver of claims against a party. Black's Law Dictionary 1292 (7th ed.
1999) (A release is uthe act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could
have been enforced"). An accord and satisfaction, on the other hand, "arises when the parties to
a contract agree that a different performance, to be made in substitution of the performance

Although Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment does not assert that the release in the Settlement
Agreement operates as a release of Bank One, Bank One maintains that such is the case and reserves the
right to assert such position in the future.
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originally agreed upon, will discharge the obligation created under the original agreement."
ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 998 P2d 254, 259 (Utah 2000). The U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois clearly explained the difference: "There are two different things: an
accord and satisfaction is a contractual method of discharging a debt or claim by some
performance other than that which was originally due; a release is a contract whereby a party
abandons a claim or relinquishes a right that could be asserted against another."

Doyle's

Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Wendy's International, Inc., 144 F.Supp. 2d 969, 976 (N.D.
111. 2001). See also, Thompson v. Nicholson, 1994 WL 44428 *4 (Term. Ct. App. 1994) (Release
and accord and satisfaction "differ from one another in that a release is a relinquishment by the
creditor or holder of a right, and an accord and satisfaction is a discharge of a claim or demand
by or for the debtor or person liable, by some means other than its full performance.").
An accord and satisfaction is similar to a novation. The Settlement Agreement replaces
the obligations under the note.

The Settlement Agreement expressly states that the loan

obligations are "fully satisfied and repaid in full." The note is discharged by the Settlement
Agreement. There is no longer any obligation owing on the note. If Jenson had failed to pay the
$3,000,000.00 pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Bodell's remedy would have been for
breach of the Settlement Agreement, not to sue on the note. Upon reaching an accord and
satisfaction, the note is gone. It is discharged.
D.

The Settlement Agreement on its Face Establishes the Necessary Elements of
Accord and Satisfaction.

The Settlement Agreement constitutes an accord and satisfaction because the full amount

3754256 6 DOC

11

owing under the Loan was not paid, but rather that it was "deemed" paid in full by Bodell. This
is the very definition of an accord and satisfaction ~ an agreement to give and accept some
performance other than that which is actually due as full satisfaction of a claim or obligation.
See ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 998 P.2d at 259. In Utah, the necessary elements to establish
an accord and satisfaction are: "(1) a n unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute over the amount
due; (2) a payment offered as full settlement of the entire dispute; and (3) an acceptance of the
payment as full settlement of the dispute." Id. at 998 P.2d at 259 (citing Marion Remodeling v.
Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609-10 (Utah 1985)). The Settlement Agreement establishes all of the
necessary elements of an accord and satisfaction.
1.

The Settlement Agreement Covers Both Liquidated and Unliquidated
Claims.

Plaintiff argues that "even if the Settlement Agreement on its face had acknowledged full
payment of the debt . . ., the Settlement Agreement still was not an accord and satisfaction even
as to Bodell, MSF, and Jenson" because there was no unliquidated claim or bona fide dispute
over the amount due. Opp. at 16. Plaintiffs statement is not an accurate characterization of the
facts alleged in the Complaint or recited in the Settlement Agreement. Bodell had numerous
claims against MSF and Jenson, both liquidated and unliquidated, in addition to the loan, which
were resolved by the Settlement Agreement/
Bodell's original Complaint, which predated the Settlement Agreement, alleges
numerous actions by Jenson which, if true, would give rise to fraud and other claims against
5

Bank One does not admit that the debt owing to Bodell by MSF and Jenson was undisputed but will not
challenge that assertion for present purposes.
3754256J5DOC
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Jenson. Complaint, fl 12-16. The Settlement Agreement clearly and expressly provides that it
is a a full settlement of all obligations, disputes and other matters between them, including but not
limited to the Loans" (4th Whereas Clause, emphasis added), the release extends to all claims
and "allegations of fraud", "whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or
unliquidated ..., arising out of all past affiliations and transactions ... including, but not limited
to, the Loans and all related arrangements and transactions", fl[ 2, emphasis added), "that the
obligations of the MSF Parties in connection with the Loans, including all principal and interest
that may have been deemed to have accrued thereon, are hereby deemed fully satisfied and
repaid in full," f 2 (emphasis added), and that the Settlement Agreement "is a mutual release of
claims and that, following execution of [the Settlement Agreement], no Bodell Party shall have
any claim against an MSF Party," Id. ^ 5. Bodell acknowledges that the Settlement Agreement
covers claims beyond the $4 million loan: "As the settlement documents demonstrate, the
agreement resolved outstanding disputes between Jenson and Bodell relating to more than just
the $4 million loan in August, 2000." Bodell's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment of Defendant Mark Robbins at xxxiv, ^] 92. It is undisputedly clear and
express that Bodell had claims against MSF and Jenson for fraud, as well as on the note and
guarantee, that those fraud claims were unliquidated, that the Settlement Agreement was global
and covered all liquidated and unliquidated claims, that there was "a full settlement of all
obligations, disputes and other matters," and an accord and satisfaction.
Whether Jenson and MSF disputed that the loan was owing or what the amount owing
under the loan is immaterial. In order to establish an accord and satisfaction in Utah, the law
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requires, among other things, "an unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute over the amount
due." ProMax, 998 P.2d at 259 (citing Marlon Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609-10
(Utah 1985) (emphasis added). The Settlement Agreement is not merely a release of claims
between Bodell, Jenson and MSF arising under the loan, but also settles all claims between the
parties, including "allegations of fraud" and other claims "whether . . . liquidated or
unliquidated."
2.

An Offer of Payment in Full Satisfaction of the Claims was Offered by
Jenson and MSF and Accepted by Bodell.

The second and third elements of accord and satisfaction are "(2) a payment offered as
full settlement of the entire dispute; and (3) an acceptance of the payment as full settlement of
the dispute." ProMax, 998 P.2d at 259. Bodell does not dispute that a payment was offered and
accepted as full settlement of all disputes between Bodell and Jenson and MSF.
E.
The Accord and Satisfaction Operates as a Legal Bar of Plaintiffs Claims
Against Bank One.
Bodell next argues that even if an accord and satisfaction was reached as between Bodell,
MSF and Jenson, that accord and satisfaction would not apply to Bank One because Bank One
was not a party to the Settlement Agreement. Bodell suggests that, in the Settlement Agreement,
there was no "intent to release . . . claims against third parties such as Bank One." Opp. at 15-16.
Whether Bodell subjectively intended the Settlement Agreement to operate as an accord and
satisfaction is irrelevant as a matter of law. See e.g., Estate Landscape and Snow Removal
Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co , 844 P.2d 322, 330 (Utah
1992) (stating that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction "does not require subjective intent to
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discharge an obligation, provided the parties' actions give rise to a reasonable inference that they
accepted the altered performance"), Dishinger v Potter, 47 P 3d 76 (Utah Ct App 2001)
(holding that parties' subjective intent was "of no legal consequence" and that acceptance as full
satisfaction was established by parties' conduct) The language of the Settlement Agreement is
sufficient to establish an accord and satisfaction as a matter of law regardless of Bodell's
subjective intent 6
Bodell also relies on a case from the Bankruptcy Court in the District of Florida In In re
Dollar Time Group Inc, 223 B R 237 (Bankr S D Fla 1998),7 the Bankruptcy Court did
precisely what Bodell is attempting to convince this Court to do - confuse the doctrine of accord
and satisfaction with the doctrine of release The language quoted by Bodell in its brief clearly
demonstrates this confusion

In Dollar Time Gioup, the court stated that w'[a]n accord and

satisfaction cannot be reached between parties other than those who were party to the original
contract or claim " Id at 248 (citation omitted) The court goes on to state that "[w]hile it is true
that the Settlement Agreement did represent an accord to settle all claims between Dollar Time
and Baigam the Agreement contained no expression of an intent to settle the claims between
Dollar Time and [the defendants] individually ' Id The Dollar Time decision caielessly and
improperl} commingles the concept of release with accord and satisfaction
satisfied

Rather, a debt or claim is satisfied

A party is released not satisfied

Parties aie not
If there is an

In its opening brief at 13, Bank One suggested that because the terms of the Settlement Agreement were
clear, extrinsic evidence should not be consideied Bodell suggests that Bank One cannot invoke the
parole evidence rule because it was not a party to the agreement Opp at 15 n 7 Even if true, this point
is insignificant because Bodell has not suggested that an> material facts exist which would vary the terms
of the written agreement Instead, Bodell argues from the text of the Settlement Agreement See Opp at
15-16
This case was cited by Plaintiff as Welt \ Sasson in its memorandum Opp at 16
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accord and satisfaction of a debt, the obligation is gone and no further claims can be made
against anyone. The court in Dollar Time provides no meaningful discussion of the elements and
effect of an accord and satisfaction, and should be disregarded.
The law is well settled that there can be but one satisfaction of a debt or obligation. See
Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co. v. Professional United World Travel Assoc, Inc., 592 P.2d 586,
588 (Utah 1979); Blodgett v. lions First National Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 903 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). It is equally well settled that this principle applies to tort claims. 1 AM. JUR. 2D Accord
and Satisfaction § 12 (1994) (and cases cited therein) ( An accord and satisfaction between a
person injured and one of several co-tortfeasors responsible for the injury will discharge the
other tortfeasors from further liability to the person injured).
Other cases have found that an accord and satisfaction bars claims against third parties
who are not parties to the agreement creating the accord and satisfaction. In Luxenburg v. CanTex Industries, 257 N.W.2d 804 (Minn. 1977), the Court ruled, "if the injured party has accepted
satisfaction in full for the injury suffered by him, the law will not permit him to recover again for
the same injury . . . ." Id. at 807-808. In a footnote, the Court acknowledged that an amount less
than the full damages may represent "full compensation" where the lesser amount reflects a
discount due to the fact that liability is disputed. See also Havard v. Kemper National Insurance
Companies, 945 F. Supp. 953 (D. Miss. 1995) (An accord and satisfaction between the insured
and the insurer discharged all claims of plaintiff and therefore plaintiffs claims against
appraisers were dismissed).
When an accord and satisfaction is reached, the debt is discharged by substitute
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performance. It is not a question of what parties remain liable. The debt is gone. There can
only be one satisfaction of an obligation. The Settlement Agreement satisfies the obligations on
the loan and any tort claims. If the loan has been satisfied, whether by accord and satisfaction or
otherwise, no damages are suffered.

Since Bodell has no damages, it cannot make a claim

against Bank One or anyone else.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment should be granted in favor of Bank One on
both the fraud and negligent misrepresentation causes of action (as well as on the pending
summary judgment motion of Bank One on the fraud claim), the Complaint dismissed upon the
merits, and Bank One awarded its costs.
Dated this 31 st day of August, 2007.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

John A. Beckstead
H. Douglas Owens
Romaine C. Marshall
Attorneys for Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., successor to Bank One, N.A.
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM REGARDING
DEFENDANT BANK ONE'S REQUEST
TO RECONSIDER THE PRIOR RULING
ON ACCORD AND SATISFACTION

v.
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a Utah
limited liability company; BANK ONE,
UTAH, National Association, a Utah
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,

Civil No. 030917018
Judge John Paul Kennedy

Defendants.

Pursuant to the Court's direction at the hearing on September 10, 2007, Plaintiff Bodell
Construction Company, Inc. ("Bodell") files this supplemental memorandum in further
opposition to Defendant Bank One, Utah's ("Bank One") Motion for Summary Judgment.
Specifically, this memorandum responds to the Court's request for briefing on its discretion to

reconsider Judge Bohling's denial of Bank One's prior motion for summary judgment on the
issue of accord and satisfaction.
I.

INTRODUCTION
On March 15, 2004, after extensive briefing and lengthy oral argument, Judge Bohling

entered an Order denying Bank' One's Motion for Summary Judgment, joined in by Defendant
Robbins, on the issue of accord and satisfaction. (A copy of the Order Denying Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion to Continue C&W's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Permit Discovery (the "Order") is attached hereto as
Exhibit A.) More than three years later and after hundreds of thousands of dollars of additional
expense to the parties in discovery and motion practice, Bank One seeks reconsideration of the
Order in its latest Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 3, 2007. However, that request for
reconsideration fails to recognize in any way that such motions to reconsider are disfavored
under Utah law and remarkably does nothing more than rehash the very same arguments made
previously by Bank One and rejected by Judge Bohling.
At the hearing on September 10, 2007, this Court asked the parties to brief whether the
Court had the authority to reconsider Judge Bohling's Order and, if it did, whether it should do
so. The short answer is that while the Court has such authority, it should not entertain
reconsideration in these circumstances.
Motions to reconsider are discouraged by the Utah Supreme Court because they are
wasteful of judicial resources. Indeed, such motions are treated with disfavor because otherwise
losing parties would always seek a second bite at the apple. Under clear Utah case law, Utah
courts typically deny motions to reconsider as inappropriate, especially where as here the
requesting party fails to point to any extraordinary circumstance, error of law or new fact as
2

justification. Bank One's request for reconsideration should be rejected because motions to
reconsider are generally not appropriate, because the request presents no new facts or law as a
basis for reconsideration, and because Judge Bohling made no error.
II.

MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION ARE GENERALLY DISFAVORED AND
THERE IS NO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE IN THIS CASE TO
WARRANT THE REQUESTED RECONSIDERATION.
Bank One's motion is remarkable for its complete failure to acknowledge the disfavor

with which such motions for reconsideration are regarded by Utah courts. In Salt Lake City
Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the Utah Court of Appeals
wrote:
Once the judge has decided, the system assumes he or she has decided correctly
and would decide the same way again. Reconsideration requests in that situation
are frowned on. The occasional reversal on appeal is a price the system is pleased
to bear in exchange for being free of the burden of reconsideration in the vast
majority of cases where the correct result was reached and would be reached
again on reconsideration, re-reconsideration, and consideration of the rereconsideration.
Id. at 44. This disfavor is "particularly applicable when, in the case of summary judgment, a
subsequent motion fails to present the case in a different light, such as when no new, material
evidence is introduced." Id. at 45. Since Bank One's instant motion "fails to present the case in
a different light," it should be denied. The Utah Supreme Court explained, "[ajlthough we have
discouraged these motions, they have proliferated in civil actions to the extent that they have
become the cheatgrass of the litigation landscape. We acknowledge that the extraordinary
circumstances may arise when it is appropriate to request a trial court to reconsider a ruling.
These occasions are rare, however, and we encourage attorneys to reverse the trend to make
motions to reconsider routine." Shipman v. Evans, 100 P.3d 1151, 1155 n.5 (Utah 2004)
(emphasis added). There is nothing in Bank One's motion to suggest that there is any
3

"extraordinary circumstance" here. Rather, Bank One candidly admits that the basis for its
request for reconsideration is that it thinks Judge Bohling's ruling was "in error." {Reply in
Support of Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Fraud and Negligent
Misrepresentation Claims ("Reply Memorandum") at 9.) In other words, Bank One is simply
unhappy with the result, something that is true for half of all litigants. For these reasons, the
Court should deny the motion for reconsideration without further expenditure of judicial
resources.
In its Reply Memorandum, Bank One recognizes that its initial motion did not specify
under which procedural rule its request for reconsideration was made and asserts that its request
comes under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), referencing Tremblay v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306,
1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). {Reply Memorandum at 9.) While Rule 54(b) does not specifically
authorize motions for reconsideration, it does provide in relevant part that "any order or other
form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry
of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties."
In U.P.C, Inc. v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 990 P.2d 945, 958-59 (Utah 1999), the Utah
Supreme Court addressed the issue of motions to reconsider in the context of Rule 54(b):
We have interpreted Rule 54(b) to allow "a [trial] court to change its position with
respect to any order or decision before a final judgment has been rendered in the case."
Tremblay v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1320 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App. 1994); accord
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184-85 (Utah 1993)(permitting reconsideration of
summary judgment under Rule 54(b) and holding summary judgment did not fully
dispose of case when part of counterclaim remained in trial court, and was thus subject to
revision); Kennedy, 600 P.2d at 536-37; Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc.,
761 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)(stating "Rule 54(b) allows courts to readjust
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prior rulings in . . . cases . . . unless those rulings disposed entire claims or parties and
those rulings were specifically certified as final").
*

*

*

However, a litigant seeking revision and reversal must demonstrate a reason for the
request. See id. For instance, a litigant may show that: (1) the matter is presented in a
"different light" or under "different circumstances;" (2) there has been a change in the
governing law' (3) a party offers new evidence; (4) "manifest injustice" will result if the
court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court needs to correct its own errors; or
(6) an issue was inadequately briefed when first contemplated by the court.
In this case, Bank One makes no pretense of having new evidence or new law. It simply states
that Judge Bohling's "earlier decision was in error." (Reply Memorandum at 9.) In other words,
Bank One can point to no "different light" or "different circumstances," does not argue there has
been a change in the governing law, does not offer new evidence, does not argue there will be
"manifest injustice" if the court does not reconsider the prior ruling or that the issue was
inadequately briefed the first time. Bank One just thinks that Judge Bohling got it wrong. This
rationale for a motion to reconsider is exactly the kind of rationale that most litigants advance
when pursuing motions to reconsider, and is the reason such motions are disfavored; otherwise,
every losing litigant would seek reconsideration and the litigation process would be endless.
In this case, moreover, there would be manifest injustice if the Court were to reconsider
this ruling after three years and all the litigation effort and expense of the parties. Bank One was
free to seek reconsideration from Judge Bohling after his Order in 2004, but it did not. It waited
until the end of discovery and the eve of trial to seek reconsideration. If there really was error,
Bank One should have sought to point it out to Judge Bohling in 2004.
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III.

JUDGE BOHLING DID NOT ERR IN HIS PRIOR RULING.
The crux of Bank One's request for reconsideration is its assertion that Judge Bohling's

decision was "in error." We have attached hereto as Exhibit C, for the Court's convenience, the
section of Bodell Construction Company's Memorandum in Opposition to Bank One's Motion
for Summary Judgment addressing Bank One's request for reconsideration of the prior mling on
accord and satisfaction. However, there are several points to emphasize based on the arguments
made by Bank One at the hearing on September 10, 2007.
First, Bank One argues that the Settlement Agreement between Bodell and former
defendant Marc Jenson was an accord and satisfaction and not a release. However, even a
cursory review of the Settlement Agreement (Ex. B), reveals that it was a release of Jenson only.
Paragraph 2(a) contains a release by Bodell of Jenson and his company, MSF Properties, L.C.
Paragraph 3 contains a release of Bodell by Jenson and MSF. The words in Paragraph 2(b) on
which Bank One focuses do not change the clear character of the Settlement Agreement as a
release.
Second, Bank One disputes Judge Bohling's conclusion that "at issue is a liquidated debt
for which less than the outstanding balance was accepted in the settlement agreement with the
Jenson parties. Accordingly, no 'accord and satisfaction' was reached between Plaintiff Bodell
on the one hand and the Jenson parties on the other." Order at 2 (Ex. A). At the hearing, Bank
One argued that the parties were not settling a "liquidated debt" because the Settlement
Agreement says "the parties now desire to achieve a full settlement of all obligations, disputes
and other matters outstanding between them, including, but not limited to the Loans."
Settlement Agreement at 1 (Ex. B). Bank One also argues that because the release language in
Paragraph 2(a) of the Settlement Agreement was broad, referencing release of claims "of
6

whatsoever kind and nature," the Settlement Agreement went beyond settlement of the specific
claims on the Loans. However, these arguments seek to give a meaning to the broad language of
a release without recognize the reality, which is that the only actual claims of Bodell against
Jenson and MSF, as made clear in the complaint against them in this case, related to the Loans
themselves. Indeed, Bank One does not suggest that Bodell had actual claims against Jenson or
MSF other than on the Loans, as defined in the Settlement Agreement. Thus, the undisputed
reality of the Settlement Agreement is that it was settling a liquidated amount.
Third, Judge Bohling also held that "the Court is further not persuaded that an accord and
satisfaction operates for the benefit of third parties unless said third parties are specifically
referenced in the agreement." Order at 2 (Ex. A). It is undisputed that the Settlement Agreement
does not reference Bank One, or Defendant Robbins for that matter, and that required a payment
of less than the full amount of Bodell's loss. Bank One's arguments now are the same ones it
made to Judge Bohling that were rejected by him. There is good reason for rejecting Bank One's
argument on this score. The law encourages settlements, and for Bank One to be able to escape
liability based on a settlement with a different defendant where it was not mentioned and where
the settlement was less than the claimed loss would defeat that purpose. It is for that reason that
the Utah Liability Refomi Act, Section 78-27-42, provides that "[a] release given by a person
seeking recovery to one or more defendants does not discharge any other defendant unless the
release so provides." See Child v. Newsome, 892 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 1995) (explaining that the
purpose of this section of the Act was to reverse the common law rule that a release of one tortfeasor also released all other tort-feasors).
In its Reply Memorandum, Bank One contends that the doctrine of accord and
satisfaction applies to tort claims and cites 1 Am. Jur. 2d Accord and Satisfaction § 12 as support
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for that notion (Reply Memoiandum at 16 ) Howevei, Bank One omits the most applicable
portion of that provision, which piovides
[I]f an mjiiied paity leceives a pait of damages fiom one co-tortfeasor, and receipt
of that pait is not undeistood to constitute a full satisfaction of the injury, the
injured paity does not thereby discharge the otheis ftom liability The latter
transaction is in the natwe of a release, reserving the right to sue the other
tortfeasors, 01 a covenant or agreement not to sue the tortfeasor from whom the
partial satisfaction was received
(emphasis added) Given that Bodell did not specifically release any parties other than
Jenson, the Settlement Agieement is in the nature of a release and does not discharge
claims against other parties who were not named in and were not parties to the Settlement
Agreement
For these reasons, even if the Court were to reconsider Judge Bohling's ruling, it should
confirm it

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration should be denied

DATED this | f ^

day of September, 2007.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
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James S/Jardine (16/47)
Matthew R. Lewis (79L#)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company
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I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM REGARDING MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER was
sent via mail, postage prepaid and email on this / / " day of September, 2007 to the following:
David W. Tufts
Erik A. Olson
Jason R. Hull
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
P.O. Box 4050
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050
John A. Beckstead
Douglas Owens
Romaine Marshall
HOLLAND & HART
60 East South Temple, #2000
Salt lake City, Utah 84111
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John A. Beckstead, #0263
H. Douglas Owens, #7762
Romaine C. Marshall, #9654
HOLLAND & HART LLP

60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1031
Telephone: (801)799-5800
Fax: (801)799-5700
Attorneys for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
as successor to Bank One, N.A.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

BANK ONE'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE
COURT'S AUTHORITY TO
RECONSIDER THE PRIOR RULING
ON ACCORD AND SATISFACTION

V.

MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, L.L.C.,
a Utah limited liability company; CHEROKEE
& WALKER, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability
company; BANK ONE, UTAH, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, a national banking association,
and DOES 1 through 50,

Civil No. 030917018
Judge John P. Kennedy

Defendant.

Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as successor by merger to Bank One, N.A.
("Bank One"), respectfully submits this Supplemental Memorandum Regarding The Court's
Authority to Reconsider The Prior Ruling on Accord and Satisfaction. This brief was requested
by the Court at the motions hearing September 10, 2007.

<-\C\L\^

I. THE COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO RECONSIDER JUDGE BOHLING'S
ORDER.
The Court has authority to reconsider Judge Bohling's decision denying Bank One's
earlier motion for summary judgment based on accord and satisfaction. A court has inherent
authority to revise or correct any order before entry of final judgment. Additionally, the rules
specifically grant such authority. See Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) (order that adjudicates fewer than all
claims "is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims
of all the parties"); Tremblay v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1320 n. 2 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) (Rule 54(b) allows trial court "to change its position with respect to any order or decision
before a final judgment has been rendered in the case"); U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 990
F.3d 945, 958-59 (Utah 1999) {same, quoting Tremblay). Plaintiff admits the Court has the
requisite authority. Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum at 2 ("while the Court has such
authority . . .").
Bank One believes Judge Bohling's earlier decision is in error. The correction of error
has specifically been held to be grounds for bringing a motion to reconsider. See U.P.C., Inc.,
990 P.2d at 959 ("a litigant seeking revision and reversal must demonstrate a reason for the
request. For instance, a litigant may show t h a t . . . (5) a court needs to correct its own errors")
(internal citation omitted).
Plaintiff claims there would be manifest injustice because three years have passed since
the decision and the parties have incurred additional expense. Plaintiffs Supplemental
Memorandum at 5. Manifest injustice does not occur when an error is corrected. Quite the
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contrary; the presumption is that correcting an error serves the ends of justice. This is as true of
errors corrected by trial courts as it is for errors corrected much later on appeal.
Additionally, waiting to revisit an issue until discovery is completed makes sense where
discovery may lead to evidence that is relevant to the issue. For example, Plaintiffs might have
contended that extrinsic evidence weighed in favor of construing the settlement agreement as
something other than an accord and satisfaction. As it turns out, discovery did not disclose any
evidence that would change the summary judgment arguments. However, because discovery
might have produced evidence relevant to the accord and satisfaction issue, it was appropriate to
wait until the close of discovery to request reconsideration.
It also makes sense to reconsider the motion at this point because Bank One filed a
motion for summary judgment based on six other arguments. While the Court is already
examining the case in detail, the motion to reconsider does not waste judicial resources and
should not be disfavored.
II. THE PRIOR RULING IS IN ERROR.
The Court directed the parties to brief its authority to reconsider the previous decision.
The Court specifically clarified that it was not requesting any re-briefing of the merits of the
parties' arguments. Bank One therefore attaches at Exhibit A the portion of its prior Reply in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment bearing on the merits of the argument. Plaintiffs rebriefing of the merits does not present any new argument. Plaintiffs Supplemental
Memorandum at 6-8.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Bank One respectfully requests the Court to reconsider the
earlier ruling denying summary judgment based on the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, and to
grant summary judgment in its favor on that issue.
iis^6di of September, 2007.
Dated this>^tiay
HOLLAND & HART LLP

John A. Efeckstead
H. Douglas Owens
Romaine C. Marshall
Attorneys for Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., successor to Bank One, N.A.
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